That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind : The Contract of Employment at Common Law in Ontario, 1890-1979 by Mummé, Claire Isabel
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
PhD Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2013
"That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind":
The Contract of Employment at Common Law in
Ontario, 1890-1979
Claire Isabel Mummé
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in PhD Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Mummé, Claire Isabel, ""That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind": The Contract of Employment at Common Law in Ontario,
1890-1979" (2013). PhD Dissertations. 5.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/5
 
 
 
 
 
“That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind”: 
The Contract of Employment at Common Law in Ontario, 
1890-1979 
 
Claire Mummé 
 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Graduate Program in Law 
York University 
Toronto Ontario 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©Claire Mummé, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
“The relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its 
inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, 
however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by the 
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 'contract of employment'.”
  -Otto Kahn-Freund , Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 1977) 
This study examines the legal evolution of the common law of employment contracts in Ontario 
between the 1890s and the 1970s. It focuses on the changing relationship between notions of 
property and contract in employment, as visible through the judicial discourse of reported common 
law cases.  
 
I argue that between the 1890s and the end of the 1970s Ontario saw the emergence and 
consolidation of two different conceptual paradigms for regulating work at common law. The 
common law of employment contracts was framed and reframed over different eras of the 20th 
century through what the courts understood of the nature of the exchange between the parties, 
the property interests involved and the legal tools necessary to manage that exchange.  Contrary to 
the traditional narrative in the field, the courts of Ontario first conceptualized employment as a 
matter of exchange at the turn of the 20th century. This first paradigm emerged in tandem with the 
province’s second industrial revolution and sought to regulate the discretionary nature of white 
collar professional work. The second paradigm was entrenched in the 1960s and 1970s. It is over 
these years that workers in Standard Employment Relationships (SER) first began to bring 
employment-related claims to the common law courts, a few decades after it emerged as the 
paradigmatic form of work over Ontario's mid-century. The basic premises of the SER - of long-term 
employment, job security and internal career advancement - fundamentally changed the 
psychosical and economic terms of employment. But faced with workers’ claims for recognition of 
these new work terms in law, the courts instead chose to entrench a limited legal framework which 
denied job security as an enforceable contract term. 
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Introduction 
The Contract of Employment: The Bedrock Legal Institution of the 
Laws of Work 
(1) Introduction 
The employment contract is often referred to as the ‘bedrock’ legal institution for the regulation of 
waged work, the defining legal concept that provides access to the legal regimes of labour and 
employment law.1 Amidst the changing forms of labour market arrangements, corporate structures 
and production methods of the early 21st century however, the continued viability of the 
contractual approach to work regulation has become a source of anxiety and debate amongst 
scholars. Because of the similarities in origins and conceptual approaches to employment 
regulation, and because of the global nature of the technological and economic developments of 
the 21st century, this is a conversation occurring across common law and civilian legal systems. 2  In 
this study I will focus on one understudied aspect of the regulation of work, the common law of 
employment contracts. 
The contract of employment can be thought of as the legal instantiation of the waged work 
relationship. Otto Kahn-Freund described it as the “the corner-stone of the edifice of labour laws”.3 
It is a legal structure with a dual nature: “on the one hand, it [has] underpinned the common law of 
‘managerial prerogative’ through the open-ended duty of obedience, while simultaneously 
supporting the edifice of social legislation aimed at providing the individual with protection against 
the economic risks.”4 In this manner, the contract of employment has taken on an institutional 
shape, joining “the enterprise to the welfare state, just as it [connects] the common law of contract 
                                                          
1
 Otto Kahn-Freund, “Legal Framework” in A. Flanders and H.A. Clegg, eds. The System of Industrial Relations in 
Great Britain (1954) at p.45. Note however that this statement by Kahn-Freund is also variously cited to 
“Blackstone’s Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment” (1977) 93 LQR 508; Labour and the Law (London: 
Stevens, 1977); “A Note on Status to Contract”, (1967) 30 (6) MLR 635; “Introduction” to Karl Renner’s The 
Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions (1949);  “Labour Law and the Individual: Convergence or 
Diversity?” in Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom Further Essays (1995) at 295. 
2
 Nicola Countouris, The changing law of the employment relationship: comparative analyses in the European 
context (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007) 
3
  Kahn-Freund, “Legal Framework”, supra note 1 at p.45 
4
 Simon Deakin."The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution "(2001) ESRC Centre for Business 
Research WP203 at p.32 
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and property to social legislation”.5 The contract of employment serves as the foundational concept 
of the laws of work in a number of ways. It does so firstly by playing a gatekeeping function. Despite 
the theoretically ‘contractual’ nature of the employment relationship, there are in fact separate, 
although interrelated, rules that govern the employment relationship as compared to general 
commercial contractual relationships. So as to be able to access the legal duties, rights and 
protections of the laws of work, one must be considered to be working under a contract of 
employment, and thus to be an ‘employee’.  An employment classification displaces some of 
aspects of the general law of contract, such that the parties are regulated instead by a hybrid 
amalgam of contract law and statutory interventions, which impose a variety of minimum standards 
on the parties and provide them with substantive entitlements. In this sense, employment is a 
‘quasi-status’, as Guy Mundlak argues, in the sense that the origin of the status “[…] is in the 
contractual relationship, but the rights and obligations that follow from it are only partly 
contractual”.6 The second reason for the employment contract’s centrality to the law of work is that 
it is thought to provide the legal foundation for the normative content and substantive orientation 
of other legal regimes that regulate the waged work relationship. 
In Canada, as elsewhere, concerns over the continued benefits of the contract of employment focus 
on two aspects of its foundational role: firstly, on whether the employment relationship can 
continue to play a central role in linking public welfare entitlements with labour market 
participation7, and secondly, whether it is still an effective ‘gatekeeper’ for the laws of work.8 In 
other words, there is widespread concern over whether the concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘contract of 
employment’ continue to be effective mechanisms for locating people in economically vulnerable 
                                                          
5
 Simon F. Deakin. “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl 
and Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at p.186.  
6
 Guy Mundlak, “Generic or Sui-Generis Law of Employment Contracts?” (2000) 16 Int’l J. of Comp. Lab. Law & Ind. 
Rel. 309 at 311. 
7
 Alain Supiot,et al, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 
8
 Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris. The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Mark Freedland, “From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus” 
(2006) 35(1) Ind. L.J. 1;Guy Davidov, “The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as a Viable 
(Though Overly-Used) Legal Concept” in The Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law, Davidov and Langille eds. 
(Hart, 2006);  Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford University Press, 2005); Guy 
Davidov."The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of 
Protection"(2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 357–418; Brian Langille and Guy Davidov, “Beyond Employees and Independent 
Contractors: A View from Canada” (1999-2000) 21 Comp. Lab. L. J. 7. 
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positions that require legal protection. At a deeper level, however, is a series of concerns over the 
basic premises and purposes of work law regulation in the 21st century.9 As trade union 
membership rates and density continue to decline in Canada and across the Western world10, as 
legal forms of corporate organization become increasingly malleable, with production chains and 
locations transferable worldwide11, and types of labour market arrangements proliferate12, the use 
of labour and employment law as a method of aggregating a countervailing force against the power 
of capital, or as a location for spreading the risks of economic loss off the shoulders of workers, 
seems increasingly uncertain. 
As the fundamental building block of work law regulation, the contract of employment is therefore 
increasingly in the spotlight. Research on the contract of employment is proceeding in a few ways. 
One strand focuses empirically on changing forms of work and their divergence from existing social 
welfare and work-related legislative regimes.13 A second strand of research engages normatively in 
                                                          
9
 Guy Davidov and Brian Langille, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Guy Davidov and 
Brian Langille, Understanding Labour Law: A Timeless Idea, a Timed-Out Idea, or an Idea Whose Time has Now 
Come? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011);  Christopher Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, Richard Johnstone, 
Richard Mitchell and Anthony O’Donnell, Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, 
Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006); 
Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Karl 
Klare, Joanna Conaghan, and Michael Fischl, Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices & 
Possibilities. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
10
 OECD StatExtracts, Trade Union Density, 1999-2010, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN 
11
 Valerie de Stefano, “Smuggling-in Flexibility: Temporary Work Contracts and the ‘Implicit Threat’ Mechanism – 
Reflections on a New European Path (Geneva, ILO, 2009);Katherine Stone, “Flexibilization, Globalization and 
Privatization: The Three Challenges to Labor Rights in Our Time” (2005) 44 OHLJ  77; Katherine Stone,  “Policing  
employment  contracts  within  the  nexus-of-contracts firm” (1993) 43(3) UTLJ 353; Hugh Collins, “Independent  
contractors  and  the  challenge  of  vertical disintegration” (1990) 10(3) Ox. J. of Legal Stud. 353. 
12
 The literature on non-standard work is vast. For some notable examples see: Law Commission of Ontario, 
Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work, Final Report, December 2012; Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New 
Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011);  Leah Vosko, Precarious Employment: Understanding 
Labour Market Insecurity (Mtl & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Judy Fudge, “Beyond Vulnerable 
Workers? Towards a New Standard Employment Relationship,” (2005) 12(2) CLELJ 145; Gerhard Bosch."Towards a 
New Standard Employment Relationship in Western Europe"(2004) 42, 42 Brit. J. Ind. Rel. 617; Jean-Claude 
Barbier, Angelina Bryggo, and Frederic Viguier, Defining and Assessing Precarious Employment in Europe (European 
Commission, 2002); Brendan Burchell, Simon Deakin and Sheila Honey, “The Employment Status of Individuals in 
Non-Standard Employment”, Department of Trade and Industry, UK, 1999; Gerry Rodgers, “Precarious Work in 
Western Europe: The State of the Debate” in G. Rodgers and R. Rodgers, eds. Precarious Jobs in Labour Market 
Regulation: The Growth of Atypical Employment in Western Europe (Geneva: ILO, 1989), Ulrich Mückenberger, 
Simon Deakin, “From Deregulation to a European Floor of Rights: Labour Law, Flexibilisation and the European 
Single Market” (1989) 3 Zeitschrift für ausländische und internationales Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 153 
13
 For instance, Law Commission of Ontario, ibid; Judy Fudge and Fiona MacPhail, “The Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program in Canada: Low-Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labor” (2009-2010) 31 Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y J. 5; Deirdre McCann, Regulating Flexible Work (Geneva, ILO, 2008); Harry W. Arthurs, Fairness at Work: 
4 
 
re-examining the economic, social and political purposes of labour and employment laws, and 
labour market regulation writ large.14 A third strand of research engages with both the empirical 
and normative projects, by examining the historical construction of the constitutive elements of the 
current legal order within the broader frame of the law of the labour market. 15 
The research project I present here falls within this third approach. In this study I examine the legal 
evolution of the common law of employment contracts in Ontario between the 1890s and the 
1970s. In particular, I seek to chart the origins and development of the legal concepts that structure 
the current boundaries of the common law of employment contracts. I envisage the common law of 
employment contracts as one regulatory strand amongst a number that have together organized 
the law of the labour market over the 20th century. Integrating the study of work-related regimes 
requires a fundamental reorientation in perspective for legal scholars. Over the 20th century, 
scholarship on the law relating to employment focused primarily on collective labour law. Whether 
because of a normative opposition to work law as an individual endeavour, or because of the 
limited regulatory coverage that the common law of employment actually provided, individual 
employment law remained “labour law’s little sister”, in the words of Judy Fudge.16 But as collective 
approaches to work regulation recede in centrality and as trade unionism suffers from political 
vilification and dropping membership rates, scholars can no longer afford to ignore the law that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Federal Labour Standards for the 21
st
 Century, (Ottawa: HRSDC, 2006) 61-65; Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens, 
Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006);  
Katherine Stone, “Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces 
and Employers Without Employees”, UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 06-12, 2006; 
Stephanie Bernstein, Katherine Lippel, Eric Tucker, and Leah Vosko, “Precarious Employment and the Law’s Flaws: 
Identifying Regulatory Failure and Securing Effective Protection for Workers” in Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious 
Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2005); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, “The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of 
the Contingent Work Force” (2005) Wash. & Lee L. Rev 879;  Rafael Gomez and Morley Gunderson, “Non-Standard 
and Vulnerable Workers: A Case of Mistaken Identity?” (2005) 12 C.L.E.L.J. 178; Maurice Emsellem and Catherine 
Ruckelhaus, Organizing for Workplace Equity: Model State Legislation for ‘Nonstandard’ Workers, National 
Employment Law Project, 2000. 
14
 See the chapters in Davidov and Langille, The Idea of Labour Law, supra note 9; Davidov and Langille, 
Understanding Labour Law, supra note 9;  Klare, Conaghan, and Fischl, supra note 9; Supiot, supra note 7. 
15
 Harry Arthurs, “Charting the Boundaries of Labour Law: Innis Christie and the Search for an Integrated Law of 
Labour Market Regulation” (2011) 34 Dal LJ 1; Arup, Gahan, Howe, Johnstone, Mitchell and O’Donnell, supra note 
9; Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 9. 
16
 Judy Fudge, “Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little Sister and the Feminization of 
Labour” (1991) 7 J.L. & Pol’y 73. See also Brian Langille’s earlier piece, calling for a broadening of the lens of 
analysis. Brian Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 200. 
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regulates the non-unionized. Such a change in focus is not primarily about searching for alternatives 
to labour law. Although some may conceive of the ‘law of the labour market’ approach as 
abandoning the project of developing countervailing power, I view it instead as providing a broader 
descriptive lens that allows us to break out of isolation the separate regimes of work law, and to 
examine the ways in which different regulatory regimes have impacted one another and workers’ 
socioeconomic position.17 Such an approach provides on the one hand a prescriptive forward-
oriented program of research, in which the “primary aim would be to chart the plate tectonics of 
dynamic labour markets […] because labour markets are regulated by powerful forces of political 
economy that are invisible, or at least unmarked on conventional maps of labour law”, in the words 
of Harry Arthurs.18 It also suggests the need for research that focuses on interweaving the histories 
of separate strands of work law to examine the ways in which the overall structure was constituted 
and is currently breaking down. So far this type of research has focused on the contract of 
employment as an institutional vehicle for labour market organization over the 20th century.  The 
project of those studies has been to chart the constitutive boundaries built into the contract of 
employment to differentiate it from other contractual forms, and the use of the employment 
relationship as a bridging mechanism between public statutory regimes and private productive 
relationships. 19  What has been less frequently examined is the historical development and role of 
the common law of employment contracts in structuring of the labour market.20 Historical studies 
                                                          
17
 In ‘Renorming Labour Law’ Eric Tucker undertakes an important examination of the recurrent dilemmas that 
characterize the project of regulating the employment relationship within a capitalist market system. As part of his 
analysis Tucker engages with Deakin and Wilkinson’s study of the law of the labour market in England, supra note 
9, and their concluding suggestion that the regulatory focus should shift towards a ‘human capabilities’ approach, 
based on the work of Amartya Sen. Tucker suggests, along with Hugh Collins, that an approach that focuses on 
regulating the labour market without a commitment to protective regulation may supplant labour law’s 
fundamental concern with counteracting unequal bargaining power. However, as the above comment suggest, if 
one takes the ‘law of the labour market’ approach as a descriptive one, I believe it can be used without a 
normative move away from a concern for countervailing power. See Eric Tucker, “Renorming Labour Law: Can we 
Escape Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?” (2010) 39(2) Ind LJ 99; Hugh Collins, “Labour Law as 
Vocation” (1989)  105 LQR 468.  
18
 Arthurs, Charting the Boundaries, supra note 15 at p. 14. 
19
 Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 9, Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, supra note 5 at 
p.179. 
20
 Most research does not in fact specify which iteration of the contract of employment is being studied, whether it 
be the institutional operation of the contract of employment, its statutory construction, or in fact the Standard 
Employment Relationship, rather than any issue particular to a legal form. The employment contract is therefore 
often presented as a unitary concept. There are different meanings ascribed to the concept of ‘unitary’ in regards 
to employment.  Mark Freedland, in the The Personal Employment Contract, surpa note 8 at p. 15-17 argues 
against a unitary approach which suggests a clear separation between contracts of service and contracts for 
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of the contract of employment at common law tend to focus solely on the creation of its 
definitional boundaries (the binary divide), that is, on the process by which the contract of 
employment was differentiated from own-account, self-employment contracts.21 Thus although the 
contract of employment is commonly imbued with ideological and normative significance for the 
systems of labour laws that operate in common law jurisdictions, there remain important holes in 
our understanding of its historical evolution.  
As we shall see, the common law of employment contracts is generally regarded as the originating 
point for modern work law regulation.22 The traditional narrative in the field holds that employment 
moved from the status-based statutory regulatory frame of master and servant law in the 19th 
century in England as part of the generalization of modern contract principles, and in response to 
the political and economic changes in production brought on by the Industrial Revolution.23 The 
new common law contractual frame for work law regulation is then assumed to have been exported 
across the British colonies, and to have arrived in Canada in this manner.24 Most accounts suggest 
that the shift from status to contract was never fully completed in the employment context because 
notions of subordination from the previous master and servant system were maintained within the 
new contractual form.25 Yet very little direct research has been done on the content and process of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
services, or as between independent contractors and dependent employees. When I speak of a unitary approach 
to the employment contract, however, I am concerned with the lack of differentiation in the analysis of the 
contract of employment at common law, under minimum employment standards legislation, as an institution, as a 
relationship, etc. See infra chapter 1, section 1(c) for a description of different forms of employment contracts in 
Canada. 
21
 Countouris, supra note 2. 
22
 Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract supra note 8 at p.2 
23
 A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, 
2
nd
 ed. (London, 1914) at p. xxx-xxxii; Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, (London: John Murray, 1920) at p. 319; 
Daphne Simon, “Master and Servant”, in John Saville, ed., Democracy and the Labour Movement (London 1954); R. 
W. Rideout, “The Contract of Employment” (1966) 19 CLP 111; Kahn-Freund, Blackstone’s Neglected Child, supra 
note 1; Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), xi, 791 pp. (repr. 
in paperback with corrections, 1985). 
24
 In fact, most authors do not address where or when the common law of employment contracts emerged in 
Canada. Most writers move from a description of English master and servant legislation to the modern Canadian 
law of work and newer statutory legislation. See eg  Geoffrey England and Roderick Wood,  Employment Law in 
Canada 4
th
 Edition (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 1-1. After presenting the English tale, 
England and Wood state in footnote 1 that the Canadian courts have drawn heavily from English employment law. 
25
 Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1974) at p. 181-
184; Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (USA: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) at p. 133-135. See 
infra chapter 1, section 2(a) for more on this issue. 
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this shift in the 19th century, or on the common law evolution of the contract of employment prior 
to the 1970s, in Canada and across Anglo-American jurisdictions.   
 
 Stories about the common law contract of employment tend to be highly politicized. As the so-
called founding legal concept of modern work law, narratives about its origins, about its public or 
private law character, about its free-will basis or its subordinating nature, and about its relationship 
to liberal law, are deployed to shape arguments about the nature of the law of work and its role in 
organizing market relationships. Indeed, the story of the contract of employment’s evolution is 
invoked in many of the overarching narratives of the development of liberal capitalism over the 19th 
and 20th centuries. From across the political spectrum, the history of the contract of employment 
has been told as a story of the 19th century: as part of the rise of liberal capitalism and classical 
contract theory,26 of the public/private divide and the commodification of labour27,  of changing 
corporate forms of organization, production methods and labour processes28. It has also been told 
as a 20th century story: as provoking the collective organization of workers to escape from classical 
contract’s commodification of the wage-work exchange29, as creating the need for state 
intervention into the market to protect workers from the risks of economic insecurity30, and as 
                                                          
26
 From very different political perspectives: Dicey, supra note 23; Morton Horwitz, “The Historical Foundations of 
Modern Contract Law” (1974) 87(5) Harv. L. Rev. 917 at p.953-955. See also Jay Fineman, “The Development of the 
Employment at Will Rule” (1976) 20(2) Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 at 132-133. 
27
 Morton Horwitz, “The History of the Public/Private Distinction” (1982) 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423; Gerald Turkel, 
“The Public/Private Distinction: Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology” (1988) 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 801; Ken 
Foster, “From Status to Contract: Legal Form and Work Relations, 1750-1850”, 3 Warwick Law Working Paper 1 
(1979) at 23-24; Isaac Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Autonomy” of the 
Law"(1977) 11 Law & Society Review 571–588; Karl Marx, The  Economic and  Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
(New York: International  Publishers, 1964). 
28
 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (Baltimore: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968); Harry Braverman, 
Labor and Monopoly Capitalism: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1974) ; Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (Belknap Press, 1977); Oliver Williamson, “The Organization of 
Work: A Comparative Assessment” (1980) 1 J. Behaviour Economic Behavior and Organization 5; Sanford Jacoby, 
Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945 (NY: 
Taylor and Francis, 1985). 
29
Otto Kahn-Freund stated that: “The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always 
be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be in 
inherent in the employment relationship”. See Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 
(3
rd
 ed., London, 1983) at 18 ; Manfred Weiss, “Re-Inventing Labour Law?” in The Idea of Labour Law, Brian Langille 
& Guy Davidov eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) at 44; Paul O’Higgins, “’Labour is not a Commodity’ – an 
Irish Contribution to International Labour Law” (1997) 26(3) Ind LJ 225; Harry W. Arthurs, “Developing Industrial 
Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second Century” (1967) 45 Can. B. Rev. 786 at 788-789. 
30
  See Ruth Dukes’ description of Sinzheimer’s early theorizing on the purposes of labour law and collective 
organization. Sinzheimer’s work has not as yet been translated to English. Dukes, “Hugo Sinzheimer and the 
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acting as a bridging mechanism between public and private markets31. More recently, it has re-
emerged to centrality as 21st century analysts contemplate the global economic effects of the 
deregulation decades of the 1980s to the 2000s, the effects of technological innovation and the 
dissolution of vertical integration in corporate form, the growth of transnational production chains, 
employment and unemployment’s role in macroeconomic policies and the conceptual crisis in 
labour and employment law. But despite its cameo appearance in most tales of modern legal 
regulation and political governance, the history of the contract of employment at common law has 
rarely been the story in its own right.  
 
There is a tendency, regardless of political orientation, to portray the contract of employment at 
common law as the ‘non-interventionist’ approach to labour market regulation. The reason for this 
conceptual slippage may be the close normative relationship between free will contract and the 
“free market”, but that slippage often results in a depiction of the common law employment 
contract as regulated simply by the market, as if the market is not formed by a legal architecture, 
and as if the law of employment contracts was not constructed through political choices. Equating 
market, contract and non-interventionism therefore tends to pre-empt questions on the 
particularized evolution of the common law of employment contracts, and to sidestep question 
about its historical. And without a fuller understanding of the conceptual historical trajectory of the 
common law of employment contracts, our picture of the operation of the 20th century labour 
market is simply incomplete.  
 
Our lack of knowledge of the evolution of the employment contract at common law is particularly 
acute in regard to three outstanding questions. The first is the degree to which the common law of 
employment contracts presaged the development of other forms of workplace regulation, or 
whether it was actively developed in tandem and in reaction to statutory legal regimes. This 
question is of significance because despite the frequent rhetorical recognition that there is nothing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Constitutional Function of Labour Law” in The Idea of Labour Law, Brian Langille & Guy Davidov eds. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2011); Muckenberger and Deakin, supra note 12 at  p. 157.  In other words, the common 
law contract of employment was thought of as the legal embodiment of labour commodification which provoked 
the creation of differing welfare state mechanisms. See Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) at chapter 2. 
31
 Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 9 at p. 16-17. 
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inherent to the contractual form, the idea that the common law of employment is of ancient 
contractual descent remains prevalent and shapes the perceived paths of its jurisprudential 
development. Following from this first question, the second is when and how the common law of 
employment contracts was institutionalized as the residual category for work regulation. The 
common law of employment contracts provides both the normative contours of other work-related 
statutes, and in Ontario, the common law wrongful dismissal claim is the sole cause of action that is 
theoretically available to all workers. If the common law of employment contracts developed in 
tandem with statutory regimes, rather than as the original starting point for work regulation, how 
did it come to take on such a central normative role? The third question is how and to what extent 
the common law of employment contracts played a role in segmenting labour markets by creating 
procedural and substantive limits to its access for all but higher status workers.  
 
Academic writing on the common law of employment contracts in Canada began to appear with 
some frequency in the 1970s, mirroring an upsurge in common law employment claims at that 
time, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.32 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Ontarian courts began drawing 
on case law from the 19th century and early 20th century to address the new labour market 
questions provoked by the emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship. Despite the 
frequent judicial claims of its ancient origins, the common law of employment contracts appears 
only to have taken modern form since the 1960s and 1970s. But what occurred in this area of law 
between the 19th century and the 1970s remains something of a mystery. Studies on the contract of 
employment in the 1970s across the common law world tended to trace back the origins of (then) 
current doctrines in the 19th century, and then proceeded to their (then) current application.33 
Similarly, the first academic textbook on Canadian employment law published in 1980 by Innis 
Christie drew primarily from case law in the 1970s, with the odd reference to earlier cases in which 
foundational principles were elaborated, from Canada or England.34 There is therefore a gap in time 
surrounding knowledge of the contract of employment at common law. There is some sense of the 
development of particular doctrines in the 19th century in England, although no general history of 
common law employment claims over that period exists. But there is almost no knowledge of what 
                                                          
32
 See infra p. 14 for a breakdown of reported cases per decade between 1890 and 1979. 
33
 Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment (London: Oxford University Press, 1976) 
34
 Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto:Butterworths,1980) 
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the common law of employment contracts consisted of over the first half of the 20th century. The 
image that is often painted is of an area of law that sprang fully formed into existence sometime in 
the 19th century, and that has continued to apply in the same manner ever since.  
Recent studies on the influence of 20th century welfare statutory regimes on the English evolution 
of the binary divide suggest that not only is this not the case, but in fact that statutory 
developments had a significant influence on the development of common law doctrines.35 And in 
Canada it appears as though there was little opportunity to develop the substantive content of the 
contract of employment at common law prior to the 1960s and 1970s, simply because of the 
paucity of reported cases.36 This then is the second reason for the lack of research on the contract 
of employment at common law. It is a regulatory regime of profound normative significance but 
one formally invoked before the courts primarily by one class of workers. Because it relies on 
individual workers to bring claims, because it is substantively oriented towards higher income 
workers, and because it is interpreted and enforced by the civil courts, with all of their attendant 
costs, there are few reported decisions prior to the 1970s, and most concern the work of higher 
income employees.37 What this implies is that, contrary to the judicial belief in the ancient nature of 
the contract of employment at common law, it is in fact an area of law of relatively recent 
substantive provenance. It is only as of the 1970s that a significant number of cases were brought 
to the courts regarding employment contracts, which then tripled in size as of the 1980s, and that 
specific rules regarding the rights and obligations of employment were fleshed out at common 
law.38  
                                                          
35
 Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 9. 
36
 Christie, supra note 34 at p.3. 
37
 It is unclear whether the relatively low number of reported decisions concerning the employment contract at 
common law indicates that it was of significant regulatory purchase in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries between 
employers and employees, or that it had little effect on the employment relationship. This is a question of 
significant importance, which while beyond the scope of this study, is one I hope to take up in future research. 
38
 See also Arthurs, Charting the Boundaries, supra note 15 at p. 4. 
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Table 1: Summary of Reported Employment Contract Cases, Ontario 1890-197939 
Decade 
 
Wrongful Dismissal Property-Related 
Claims 
Miscellaneous Total  
 
1890-1899 5  
2 of which appealed a 
1 
 
0 6 
1900-1909 18 
2 of which appealed 
 7  
3 of which appealed 
11 36 
1910-1919 22 
 2 of which appealed 
6 
3 of which appealed 
5  
1 of which 
appealed 
33 
1920-1929 15 
 3 of which appealed 
 4  
 1 cross-claim for WD 
7 26 
1930-1939 7 
 
6  
1 of which appealed 
1 cross-claim for WD 
3 16 
1940-1949 5  
 
1  
1 of which appealed 
2 8 
1950-1959 6  
 1 of which appealed  
6  
 
4 16 
1960-1969 19  
4 of which appealed 
10  
4 of which appealed 
6  35 
1970-1979 56  
5 of which appealed 
33  
4 of which appealed 
5 94 
Totals 153 68 43 270 
a
 The cases are organized by decade of decision. The ‘appeals’ category denotes the number of cases decided 
within each decade that were then appealed upwards. Cases that were appealed are only counted once, in the 
decade in which the first reported decision was made.  
 
                                                          
39
 The “wrongful dismissal” category includes reported motions and decisions concerning wrongful dismissal at 
common law. It includes cases that involved statutes, so long as the wrongful dismissal claim was decided on the 
basis of common law principles. It also includes cases for both wrongful dismissal and wages owing, and cross-
claims for wrongful dismissal from cases brought by employers on other grounds. The ‘property-related’ category 
includes reported motions and decisions regarding requests for interim and interlocutory injunctions, and damages 
for breach of restrictive covenant in employment, including contracts for sales of businesses that also included a 
separate employment restrictive covenant. It also includes trade secrets and confidential information cases, 
accountings for wages and income earned outside employment, and cases concerning ownership over work-
related tools. It does not include copyright and patent cases, because they were decided based on statute. Where 
there was a wrongful dismissal cross-claim the case was counted in the wrongful dismissal category. In the 
miscellaneous category are cases such as employer claims against workers for quitting without notice, contractual 
claims wages owing, cases concerning whether a worker was partner or employee, interpretation and application 
of contractual terms, etc. Claims for wages that were decided on the basis of quantum meruit were not included. 
For all categories cases that were appealed are counted once.  
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Given that the common law of employment contracts is formally invoked in the courts primarily by 
the least vulnerable workers, why should it be the focus of study? Why not study areas of law that 
are used by workers more in need of protection? My reason is simple. As we seek to redesign legal 
structures to meet the changing nature of work and production in the 21st century, we need to 
better understand the ways in which the legal regimes of employment operated together over the 
20th century, so as to fully understand how they are breaking down. The common law of 
employment contracts is assumed to play a foundational role in charting the legal boundaries of the 
individual waged-work exchange.  We need to test this assumption and find about more about this 
process. And there are many outstanding questions, questions that are not limited to legal 
developments in Ontario and in Canada. How have the courts conceived the content of the wage-
work exchange over the 20th century? What aspects of workers’ labour were alienated through 
employment, and what property entitlements, if any, were exchanged through contract? Why and 
when did the implied duties that afford the employer a managerial prerogative come to be cast in 
contractual terms? Were those duties all remnants of the old master and servant law, or only some 
of them? When did the employment relationship take on an open-ended form within a contractual 
frame? Where does the doctrine of reasonable notice come from? Was this area of law one that has 
always been used primarily by upper status workers? What does it mean to say that work was 
contractualized, and when did this contractualization take place? In what order and in what 
relationship to one another did these foundational principles and doctrines emerge? What 
influence did statutory work law regimes have on the evolution of the common law of 
employment? All of these questions matter because each one of these common law developments 
and broader conceptual shifts has been determinative in setting the institutional boundaries which 
construct the content of other statutory regimes and popular understanding of what work consists 
of, who is a worker, what duties one owes, what one owns, how one may be dismissed, and what 
one may then recover.  
 
To begin to answer these questions I have therefore undertaken a study of the genealogy of legal 
ideas and concepts as they emerge from the judicial discourse of reported common law decisions 
concerning employment contracts between 1890 and 1979 in Ontario. I attempt to trace the 
lineage of ideas that were embedded into the legal form of the employment contract in its common 
law incarnation over the 20th century, focusing on changing conceptions of what was exchanged in 
13 
 
an employment contract and the legal tools by which to actuate and protect the interests so 
created. This examination is set in the context of public law and statutory interventions into the 
regulation of work over the time period under study, so that the common law of employment 
contract can be reintegrated into the story of work law in Canada over the 20th century.  The project 
is set in Ontario, so as to both amplify the historical understanding of the particular legal evolution 
of the law of work in Canada’s largest province, but also as a case study of the employment contract 
at common law more generally.  
(2) Project Contours 
(a) Scope, Sources and Methods 
This study focuses on the history of the common law of employment contracts. It is concerned with 
that area of law that is viewed as the intellectual source of modern work law regulation in Canada – 
as its originating point. The project is, then, an intellectual history of legal evolution, rather than a 
history of work practices.  The project covers three eras of the 20th century, organized in 
chronological fashion. It begins in the 1890s, as Ontario’s second industrial revolution gets 
underway. I begin at this moment in time because, as I will argue, it is between the 1890s and the 
end of the 1930s that ideas of property, time, and the tools of managerial control of employment 
were organized around an emerging class of white collar workers in Ontario. It is through these 
decades that the common law of employment shifted from a purchase of labour power and worker 
obedience over periods of months or years, to a contractual idea of work as a specific exchange of 
labour services for wages over a working day.  The second era of study spans the 1930s to the 
1950s, covering the tumult of the Great Depression and the Second World War, and the 
reorganization of Ontario’s labour market and economy around Fordist production and the 
Standard Employment Relationship. The final era under study is the 1960s and 1970s, when writing 
in the field first became common in Canada, and just before common law claims regarding 
employment begin to proliferate in numbers during the 1980s.  
 
The primary source material for this project is common law cases reported in print and electronic 
reporters regarding employment contracts from Ontario.40 The project studies reported wrongful 
                                                          
40
 Reported decisions include decisions in print law reports and, occasionally, decisions available on Quicklaw and 
Westlaw that were not also available in print reporters. 
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dismissal cases, cases regarding the contractual interpretation and enforcement of employment 
agreements, and cases dealing with the property entitlements exchanged through contract 
(restrictive covenants, confidential information, property entitlement, etc.). It does not include 
cases where the decision is based on a relevant statute, unless some aspect of the decision relies on 
the common law. It does include claims for wages at common law, but does not include quantum 
meruit cases. A quantum meruit laim permits a worker to recover for services rendered that were 
intended to be remunerated, but where there was no express agreement between the parties on 
the amount to be paid.41   
 
There are limitations to the ways in which the reported case law can be used as primary source 
material. Firstly, analyzing reported decisions does not capture the variety of legal disputes workers 
may face in employment. Because workers are vulnerable to dismissal, most may not raise legal 
issues with their employers, or seek aid from the courts during the course of employment, instead 
simply ‘lumping it’ and finding alternative employment.42 Moreover, the cost involved in bringing a 
claim to the civil courts means that cases that are litigated are likely to be brought by higher status 
workers, who are more likely to have the financial ability to retain a lawyer and sustain the costs of 
litigation. Even where workers did, and do seek to use the law, most 19th and early 20th century 
workers were more likely to make use of the wage recovery mechanisms of the master and servant 
statute or the Divisional Courts, neither of which were courts of record, rather than bring a common law 
claim.43 Since the late 1960s, it seems likely that non-unionized workers tend to make use of the 
administrative process under the Employment Standards Act to adjudicate workplace disputes, rather 
than litigating before the common law courts.  
 
                                                          
41
 See for example Chalk v. Wigle (1907), 10 O.W.R. 146 (Ont. H.C. J. T.D.)[Chalk]; Dixon v. Garbutt (1907), 10 
O.W.R. 838 (Ont. H.C.J. Weekly Ct.) [Dixon]. There is longstanding disagreement as to whether quantum  meruit 
claims are contractual or restitutionary in nature. See GHL Fridman, “Quantum Meruit” (1999) 37(1) Alta L Rev 38. 
It should be noted that in not including this body of case law, a significant amount of the common law’s treatment 
of work done by women is not accounted for, because many quantum meruit claims arose from relationships of 
care - housekeeping, nursing, etc.  
42
 Richard Abel, William Felstiner and Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming,Claiming…”, (1980-1981) 15 L. & Soc’y Rev. 630 
43
 See infra chapter 2 at notes 46, 47, 50 for more information on the terms of recovery under different wage 
recovery mechanisms prior to the  mid-20
th
 century. 
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There are also a series of structural biases involved in which cases are reported. There are many more 
claims filed than reported. We do not have records on how many employment-related claims were 
filed, and how many were settled or otherwise withdrawn, and why. Moreover, first instance 
decisions are often unreported, and they tend to contain a fuller factual record of the relationship 
between the parties. Those lower level decisions that are reported are generally selected by a law 
report editor, and are therefore subject to the personal priorities of the editor and their 
understanding of what constitutes a significant legal issue. While almost all appellate level decisions 
in Ontario are now reported, whether or not cases proceed to an appellate level court involves 
factors such as the complexity or novelty of the legal claim made, which claims can be appealed as 
of right and which cases appellate courts must accept for consideration, and the financial ability of 
the parties to sustain protracted litigation. Workers will often not have the financial ability to 
appeal unfavourable decisions to an appellate level court, such that there is a bias within reported 
decisions in favour to those workers with the financial ability to maintain litigation, as well as to 
questions that the legal community considers of general significance. For all these reasons a focus 
on reported decisions does not speak to the typical legal problems workers faced in employment in 
a given time period, nor to the total volume of cases brought to the courts in any given period of 
time, nor to the social history of workers’ interaction with law or experiences in employment. 44 
 
What reported decisions can provide is material through which to trace the intellectual history of 
legal decision-making in the courts. I use reported decisions as a lens through which to deconstruct 
the relationships and linkages built between legal concepts and ideas that defined what the 
judiciary and legal practitioners understood as constituting the wage-work exchange at common 
law at different periods of time.  Using the recorded cases of different eras allows us to decode the 
nexus between different legal ideas at different historical moments.45 I hope that this focus will 
provide insight into the intellectual trajectory of the common law of employment, its relationship to 
the political and economic contexts in which that trajectory unfolded, and provide sufficient details 
                                                          
44
 For a general description of the relationship of disputes to legal claims before courts, see Abel, Felstiner and 
Sarat supra note 42; Marc Galanter, “The Radiating Effects of the Courts”, in Empirical Theories about Courts, K.O. 
Boyum & L. Mather (New York: Longemans, 1983) 117 at p.118-121. 
45
 Simon Deakin."The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution "(2001) ESRC Centre for Business 
Research WP203 at 1-2. 
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on the scope of the “law on the books” so as to aid with projects that investigate its relationship 
with the “law in action”.   
 
As noted, the primary source material for this study is the reported decisions of the Ontario courts 
and the Supreme Court of Canada. I utilize a sample of approximately 270 reported cases over the 
80 years span of the study. For the period prior to 190046, I manually searched all published cases in 
Ontario related to waged work47  from the Court of Common Pleas from 1877-189948, the Queen’s 
Bench from 1877-189949, the Chancery court from 1881 to 188950, and the Court of Appeal from its 
creation in 1881 to 190051. I also consulted the Annual Report of the Inspector of Division Courts for 
the Province of Ontario (1880, 1882-1900).52 From 1900 until 1970 I searched Quicklaw online for 
all cases in Ontario and at the Supreme Court of Canada under the search terms: “master and 
servant”, “employment contract”, “employment and contract”, “wrongful dismissal”, “employment 
and dismissal”, “reasonable notice”, “covenants not to compete”, “confidential information”, 
“trade secrets”.53 In terms of secondary sources, for the period between 1875 and 1900 I consulted 
the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts Gazette, the Upper Canada Law Journal and 
Municipal Courts’ Gazette, the Upper Canada Law Journal (new series), the Canada Law Journal, and 
the Canada Law Times. I also consulted magistrates’ handbooks and treatises of the era, primarily 
                                                          
46
 I began systematically collecting cases in 1877, the year the criminal provisions of the Master and Servant Act 
were repealed. But I consulted cases, where available, beginning in 1847, when the Master and Servant Act was 
first enacted in Ontario. 
47
 I consulted cases regarding dismissal from work, contract interpretation, work and labour claims, seduction, 
negligence, railway-related claims, interpretation of master and servant law, mechanic’s liens, statutory labour, 
and wages. There was little consistency in the manner of their indexation over the 19
th
 century. For this study, 
however, I used only cases that were common law contractual claims regarding employment and did not rely on a 
statute or other area of private law.  
48
 Reported in the Report of Common Pleas, the Upper Canada Common Pleas Reports, the Digest of Cases at 
Errors and Appeals, QB, Common Pleas and Chancery, and the Ontario Reports.  
49
  Reported in the Upper Canada Queen’s Bench Reports  (Old Series); Queen’s Bench and Practice Reports 3
rd
 
series); and Ontario Reports. 
50
 Reported in the Ontario Reports.  
51
 Reported in the Ontario Court of Appeal Reports and the Ontario Practice Reports.  
52
 Annual Report of the Inspector of Division Courts for the Province of Ontario, (Toronto: King’s Printer, 1875-
1920). Division Courts were not courts of record, although they were likely to be a primary venue for hearing 
employment contract cases because they held a jurisdiction to hear civil claims for no more than 40 shillings as of 
the 1840s. The Annual Report does not break down the nature of the claims, other than in regards to torts and 
replevin claims, and so provides little indication of the degree to which the Division Courts were used for work 
related claims.  
53
 I then excluded cases that were not directly related to the contract of employment at common law. In some 
instances, where cases elaborated under different regimes were then utilized in regards to the contract of 
employment, they were then included in the study. 
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from England. There were no Canadian treatises on the law of employment in the 19th century, 
although a Canadian edition of a British treatise was published in 1906 (with notes on Canadian 
cases).54 English case law and treatises were consulted to the extent that they informed the 
development of Ontario jurisprudence. Research on 19th century English common law of 
employment cases was primarily accomplished by locating cases discussed in leading treatises and 
more modern recent writing on the period. Where appropriate, American case law and 
commentary were also consulted, either as a doctrinal source or as a comparative tool for charting 
Ontario’s legal evolution.  To the extent that the courts of Ontario used case law from other 
provinces, they were also examined.  
 
(b) Legal Genealogy and Social Change 
 
A study focused on the evolution of the common law of employment contracts necessarily involves 
broad questions about the relationship of law to the social and economic development of 
employment practices for the period of time under study.  Put more concretely, it engages 
questions of law’s relationship to social change, and the impact on law of social change. The 
relationship of micro-level doctrinal legal change to meta-level historical shifts is notoriously 
difficult to pin down.55 In long time frames and at a high level of analysis, it is possible to discern 
characteristic elements of liberal law that align with the socioeconomic formations that constitute a 
system of capitalist production. This instrumental understanding of the law’s development, 
however, does little to explain the day-to-day legal decisions that are often inconsistent with the 
interests of capitalist needs. 56 There are not, in my opinion, any current theoretical approaches 
which convincingly resolve the causal relationship between the meta- and micro- levels of legal and 
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social change.57 The relative autonomists perhaps come closest, but for the reasons shortly 
explained, I cannot entirely adopt their analysis. Relative autonomists tend to view the legal order 
as taking on high level characteristics conducive to capitalist market relations. They also recognize, 
however, a certain degree of autonomy in law’s evolution. 58  In this sense relative autonomists 
reject an older form of Marxist theorizing that presents the law as simply a mirror of class relations 
and a tool of class oppression. Rather, they argue, the law’s autonomy is qualified because the state 
needs to act beyond the interests of the capitalist classes to legitimize itself and the legal system.59 
Where I share the relative autonomist description of liberal law at a meta-level, I tend to view less 
obvious alignment between the needs of capital and the specifics of doctrinal change at a micro-
level of analysis. It is also for this reason that I am unable to speak definitively as to the causal 
relationship between micro- level and meta- level legal or social change. 
 
Instead, for the purposes of this study I focus on micro- and meso-level interactions. I argue that 
common law change occurs in a reciprocal relationship with the socioeconomic context in which it 
operates. On the one hand, common law legal change (as distinct from legislative change) follows 
from the circumstances of the parties that use it. In this sense the background and existing context 
of parties are likely to provoke the types of legal claims they make. At the same time as legal change 
is initiated by the needs of parties who invoke it, those parties will use the categories of existing 
legal thought to shape the manner in which they ask for their needs to be met. The existing 
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categories of legal concepts therefore tend to shape what directions and changes appear available, 
both at an imaginative level, and in terms of the plausibility of the argument advanced. In this way 
parties appear to operate within the existing boundaries of the concepts as they are then 
understood, even as they seek to change their application and/or meaning. As micro-level legal 
change occurs, some elements of the intellectual structure of the older rationale often therefore 
stay in place, embedding itself into the adapted rule. As Simon Deakin argues, “[c]onceptual 
adaptations are piled on top of each other, with the result that the structure of legal thought at any 
given point in time incorporates forms which, although in some sense superseded, nevertheless 
continue to shape the path of the law.”60 Thus the content, as much as the request for change itself, 
will be highly path dependent, relying on individuals with the need, motivation or capacity to 
pursue a legal claim, on the arguments devised by counsel, on the background, approach, and 
mood of the judiciary.   
 
Christopher Tomlins suggests that the contradiction between the law’s seeming micro-level 
response to context and its meso-level need for ongoing consistency can be explained by the legal 
system’s operation as a modality of rule.  
Concern for consistency demonstrates law’s sensitivity to its social context, but as a 
discursive practice in itself consistency is also the foundation upon which is built law’s 
potent ‘ideology-effect’ of legitimation. The pursuit of consistency thus demonstrates law’s 
responsiveness to its context, the achievement of consistency simultaneously reinforces 
law’s claim to authority over that context – its claim to tell the truth.61  
 
This process of micro-level adaptation solidifies certain mid-level legal understandings into shared 
institutional norms and practices. These shared norms come to represent the assumed bases of 
entitlements, as well as the boundaries of conceptual categories that are deployed in broader 
social, economic and political discourse. But as legal practices take on this institutional shape, the 
contingent nature of the boundaries built into the contours of the conceptual categories often 
become invisible, presented as naturalized products of common sense. The contingency of their 
emergence and of their content is often lost from view. The fact that legal forms hold no intrinsic 
meaning – that they are given different content at different moments in time – becomes 
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obscured.62 As Marxists and Critical Legal Scholars remind us, line-drawing is not a politically neutral 
activity: categories not only legitimize but naturalize concepts, masking the normative implications 
of the boundaries devised, adding and subtracting relationships from the arena of legal 
contestation. As stated by Karl Klare: 
The peculiarity of legal discourse it that it tends to constrain the political imagination and to 
induce belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are just and rational, or 
at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate. The modus operandi of law as legitimating 
ideology is to make the historically contingent appear necessary.63  
 
A study of the way micro-level change solidifies into conceptual frames of understanding within the 
realm of the common law serves to elucidate the previous histories of existing concepts, the 
reasons and methods for their evolution, emphasizing those concepts that remain and those that 
have been lost from view. Such a method is particularly logical in regards to an area of law of which 
many claims are made, but little is known, as is the case with the contract of employment at 
common law.  
(3) The Central Argument and Chapter Breakdown 
 
Rather than a static, 19th-century based area of law, the following chapters will depict the law of 
employment contracts as one that took on modern form in the 20th century, a product of slowly 
evolving concepts that were deployed for different purposes in different socioeconomic contexts. It 
is an area of law that was constructed by amalgamating previous doctrines and concepts and 
redeploying them within changing circumstances, rather than forging radically new paths where the 
context of their operation shifted. The boundaries of what was exchanged in the wage-work 
contract were negotiated and re-negotiated over time. Over the 20th century that negotiation 
occurred primarily between notions of contract and property, and over two main periods of time. 
Between the 1890s and the end of the 1920s, and then between the 1960s and the 1970s, in 
property-related and wrongful dismissal claims workers and employers struggled over the property 
interests exchanged by contract. As the boundaries of the exchange were contested in the different 
eras under study, the legal tools with which to manage the content of that exchange were 
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simultaneously adjusted, based on the changing nature of the labour process and the elements of 
the labour force regulated by the common law of employment at any given moment in time.  
Thus although most of the current doctrines that organize the law of employment contracts are of 
19th and early 20th century origins, many of them had altogether different uses than they do 
currently. This is particularly true of the law in Ontario. As we shall see, prior to the 20th century the 
Ontario judiciary took relatively little initiative to adapt the emerging law of employment contracts 
in England to the needs of a newly expanding post-colonial economy. The particularities of the local 
context instead made themselves felt by the nature of the claims asserted, which in turn reflected 
the socioeconomic context of local relationships of production. By the 20th century, however, there 
was an almost simultaneous evolution of the common law of employment contracts in Ontario. 
While the courts of England only began to hear claims that revealed the changing social and 
economic realities of work some decades after their second industrial revolution, the judiciary in 
Ontario did so just as the province underwent its own transition to industrialization.64 This meant 
that while the law adapted slowly in England, it was simultaneously applied in Ontario in a manner 
that seemed to mirror the rapid socioeconomic changes of the early 20th century in Ontario.  
Chapter One begins by looking closely at what the contract of employment is in law, and what has 
been written on its origins in England, the United States and Canada. To understand the origins of 
Ontario law, I then draw together existing sources to detail the evolution of the common law of 
employment contracts in England in the 19th century. We then turn to Ontario, providing an 
overview of 19th century common law of employment claims and work regulation, set in the context 
of a colonial society and economy.  
Chapter Two addresses the period of Ontario’s second industrial revolution, 1890 to 1929. During 
this era, in response to its own second industrial revolution, a new nexus of ideas began to emerge 
at common law in England, which was simultaneously applied in Ontario. This nexus was created 
through three significant legal developments in the law of employment contracts over the turn of 
the 20th century. The first change was to notions of property rights in employment through the 
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commodification of different forms of labour power that could be exchanged through an 
employment contract. The second change was to the tools of managerial control, which moved 
beyond the older master and servant duty of obedience to include principles absorbed from the law 
of agency into the common law contractual frame, with an increasing focus on controlling workers’ 
exercise of discretion. The last change was to legal understandings of employment duration. Over 
this period the presumption of annual hire, which was so central to the early construction of the 
wrongful dismissal claim, was displaced so as to set the scene for the emergence of indefinite 
duration employment. Together this nexus of ideas entrenched the first contractual analysis of 
employment at common law, which was substantively oriented towards higher status white collar 
workers.  
Chapter Three focuses on the emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship in Ontario 
between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s. It is through this period that internal labour markets 
grew within corporations, and job classification systems, seniority principles and career long 
employment began to mark the Canadian and Ontarian labour markets. Although the labour market 
was in the midst of significant structural change, the number of employment-related claims 
dropped dramatically over the mid-century. The reasons for the lack of claims are examined, as are 
hints of the new issues that would come before the courts from the social, psychological and 
economic investment of workers in SERs. 
 
Chapter Four examines the employment relationship at common law between 1960 and 1979. It is 
over these decades that the modern law of employment contracts was forged, amidst the changing 
economic and psychological expectations of workers in SERs and the emerging realities of more 
precarious service sector work. Over these decades workers and employers engaged in a new round 
of struggle over the property rights they exchanged in employment and what rights were created by 
that exchange. These struggles were visible both in property-related and wrongful dismissal claims 
of the era. The result of such claims was the entrenchment of a limited analysis forged around the 
wrongfulness/damages nexus, in Freedland’s terminology, which limited workers’ entitlements into 
an ever shrinking frame.65 At the same time as courts limited workers claims for greater property 
entitlement in the work relationship, decisions under other employment-related statutory regimes 
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served to reinforce the position of the common law of employment contracts as the residual frame 
for regulating non-unionized work in Ontario.  
Chapter Five provides some concluding reflections on development the common law of 
employment contracts over the 20th century. This chapter begins by synthesizing the results of this 
study, examines the shifting relationship between property and contract over the 20th century, 
before suggesting directions for future research. Finally, a concluding postscript challenges the 
claim that there has been a “return” to contract since the 1980s in the regulation of work.  
24 
 
Chapter 1 
What is the Employment Contract and What Do We Know of its Anglo-
American Origins? 
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(1) What is the Contract of Employment?  
 
Before beginning a historical study of the development of the contract of employment at common 
law, we must pause to ask what in fact is the contract of employment, and what does it do? What is 
its relationship to waged work? What is the current state of debate on its operation, and what do 
we know of its origins? Answering these questions is the project of this chapter.  
In legal terms, the contract of employment at common law is usually explained as a negotiated 
exchange between two parties equal in law, who determine mutually beneficial terms and 
conditions for organizing their relationship. It is thought of as a relationship of ongoing duration and 
open-ended in nature. It is open-ended in the sense that while some basic elements of the 
relationship will be set a priori, many are likely to shift over time1 Because of the shifting nature of 
this long term relationship, John Commons suggested that employment is not one contract, but 
rather “[…] is a continuing implied renewal of contracts at every minute and hour”.2 Mark 
Freedland, however, described it as a single continuing contract, which is often described as 
relational.3  The concept of the managerial prerogative is the legal mechanism which allows the 
employer to unilaterally change some aspects of the work relationship over time.4 As part of 
employers’ right to make decisions about the organization of their businesses, the managerial 
prerogative permits employers to direct and allocate work, and to adjust job tasks and schedules.5  
The employer’s power of direction is an implied contractual term of employment. “In return for the 
payment of wages, the employer bargains for the right to direct the workforce to perform in the 
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most productive way.”6 But of course an employer’s right to manage the workforce is rarely 
explicitly bargained for. It is instead presumed to exist, and is given effect in law through a series of 
implied contractual duties that the employee owes the employer, such as the duties of obedience, 
loyalty, fidelity, good faith and confidence.  
 
(a) The Contractual Nature of the Employment Contract   
 
Analysis of the nature of the contract of employment tends to focus either on its origins in a 
bilateral exchange, or on its broader labour market operation. For some the regulation of 
employment through contract is an exercise in individual freedom. Others view employment’s 
contractual form as less benign.  For those critical of the contractual regulation of work, a significant 
amount of commentary proceeds from the idea that the description of waged work as a contractual 
relationship between two equal parties is either incomplete, and/or intentionally obfuscates the 
structural inequality of the relationship. 
From one perspective the employment contract is viewed as an institution of individual freedom. 
Neoclassical economists, for instance, suggest that a system of individual contracting over wages 
and working conditions, based on supply and demand, is best suited for producing overall economic 
efficiency and for protecting individual freedom of choice.7 This line of analysis tends to focus on 
aggregate outcomes regarding economic prosperity and job creation in order to justify the 
regulation of waged work through a legal system that protects individual property rights and 
freedom of contract. The justification is one of liberty, where the exercise of free contracting rights 
is viewed as a method of maximizing individual choice. For analysts such as Richard Epstein, 
inequality of bargaining power is inescapable in any context of scarcity, including labour markets.8 
Individuals are better off, the argument runs, as a result of the choices they make, even through the 
simple choice to enter or abstain from an employment relationship.9 
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Others, however, are more critical of the contractual regulation of work. One argument focuses on 
the extent to which the common law contractual rules governing the employment relationship 
differ from those governing other types of contracts, such that the former should be treated as a sui 
generis area of law rather than as a subset of contract. Some commentators suggest that the 
employment relationship was never completely contractualized because certain features of the 
older master and servant system were absorbed into the contractual frame for work regulation in 
the 19th century in England.  Philip Selznick argues that older master and servant notions of control 
and hierarchy continued to be applied at common law to the work relationship.10 The employment 
relationship was contractualized only insofar as it moved from a prescriptive approach, in which the 
law actively specified the terms of the relationship and oversaw its day-to-day existence, to an 
interpretational and reactive approach, in which the law allowed the parties the freedom of day-to-
day control over the relationship and intervened only upon its dissolution. Alan Fox argues that full 
contractualization never occurred in the 19th century because it would have displaced the 
employer’s ability to direct the daily administration of the relationship. 11 Instead, the duty of 
obedience that grounded the feudal legal system of master and servant law was infused into the 
contractual form, providing the employer with the power to exert workplace control.12 Ulrich 
Mukenberger and Simon Deakin state that “the principle of an open-ended managerial prerogative 
to organize work and set the terms and conditions of employment [was] grafted on to the concept 
of contract” in the 19th century.13 The fact of subordination and the ability to control the workforce 
became the definitional hallmark of the employment relationship, distinguishing it from other 
forms of commercial exchanges and bringing it under the legal auspices of the laws of work.14 The 
result, according to Fox, is a “[…] legal construction […] put upon the contract of employment which 
left it virtually unrecognizable as contract”.15  
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The idea that central features of the employment contract emerge from the law of master and 
servant, and were recast as implied contractual terms, is central to the analysis of the extent to 
which employment law is fundamentally contractual in nature. The employment contract continues 
to be characterized by a large number of terms implied by law, rather than agreed to by the parties. 
These terms either stand as presumptions of law unless contractually waived, or are considered so 
central to the relationship that they may not be displaced even with party consent.16  Here we 
usually think of the managerial prerogative and the implied duties that workers owe their 
employers – the duties of obedience, good faith, fidelity, loyalty and confidentiality – as well as the 
implied term of reasonable notice of dismissal in Canadian law. Not only is the number of implied 
terms unusual, but most are implied by law as a matter of policy, regardless of the intent of the 
parties, as opposed to those terms designed to give business efficacy to the contract, as is typical in 
commercial contracts.17 Theoretically, summary dismissal at common law is justified by workers’ 
violation of the implied contractual duties, but throughout its history there has been little attempt 
to correlate an implied duty to the worker’s breach, such that the bases for cause are often 
unmoored from any explicit obligation owed by workers to their employers.18 Finally, employment 
contract damages are entirely different from commercial contract damages.  The only claim 
available for workers is a claim for wrongful dismissal. This claim is framed around what Freedland 
calls the wrongfulness/damages nexus, in which the only wrong is the failure to provide reasonable 
notice of termination and the only loss relates to the wages and contractual benefits that would 
have accrued over the reasonable notice period.19 While in principle workers are able to sue for 
other violations of the employment contract by their employers, for which presumably expectancy 
damages would be available, in practice this almost never happens. Further, specific enforcement is 
not available as a remedy, such that reinstatement in employment is not permitted at common 
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law.20 And in Ontario at least, unlike the standard approach to concurrent contract and tort liability, 
the courts have sometimes sought to limit workers’ ability of workers to sue in negligence for tort 
violation by their employers, on the basis that to do so would be to circumvent the contractual 
regime for work regulation.21  
For all these reasons, many argue that the employment relationship is in effect entirely different 
from other contract law regimes. But if some analysts focus on the effects of incomplete 
contractualization, others argue that it is the contractual form itself that plays a deformative role in 
the legal analysis of the employment relationship. From this perspective, conceiving of employment 
as a contractual relationship serves to legitimize an inherently unequal exchange. While the parties 
to the employment contract are theoretically equal in law, that very same legal equality, according 
to Otto Kahn-Freund, serves to mask the economic disparity between the parties that skews the 
bargaining process.22 With trademark eloquence Kahn-Freund argues that:   
[T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it 
is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the 
submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the 
legal mind known as the ‘contract of employment’.23 
Similarly, Lord Wedderburn argues that the contractual model that “emphasizes the personal and 
voluntary exchange of freely bargained promises between two parties equally protected by the civil 
law alone […] is of course suffused with an individualism which necessarily ignores the economic 
reality behind the bargain”. 24 If the contract of employment masks the economic inequality 
between the parties, it also obscures their social inequality, which is rooted in the bureaucratic 
power held by the employing organization.25 As Hugh Collins has argued, even where workers are 
able to exert some market leverage in their contractual bargaining, they are likely unable to exert 
significant bureaucratic power, and are thus subject to the role allocation and institutional rules of 
hierarchy which have developed within the employing organization.26 The ongoing social power of 
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the employer is deployed through the managerial prerogative, which legalizes the employer’s ability 
to direct the work relationship.  
For many therefore, the contract of employment is designed to legitimize an exchange that is 
structurally unequal. It is unequal in economic and bureaucratic terms, and indeed, to the extent 
that one party has the unilateral power to change some of the terms of the exchange during the 
contract’s term, it is also unequal in law.27  For Ken Foster, the contradictions between equality and 
subordination in law exist by design and are integral to the employment contract form. “The 
contract of employment constitutes the employee both as equal partner and obedient subject at 
one and the same time. The contract has both formal equality and subordination.”28 Arguing from a 
Marxian perspective, Foster suggests that the continued existence of the managerial prerogative is 
not simply an issue of inherited historical remnants but rather that “the duality of the contractual 
form reflects the dual nature of the labour process under capitalism itself”.29 This argument is an 
emanation of a broader Marxian critique of liberal law.30 The common law contract of employment 
in its idealized form represents an almost paradigmatic example of liberal law. By framing the 
employment relationship as one of contract, individual and formal equality is prioritized as the basis 
for the law’s application. Formal equality constitutes workers and employing entities as 
commensurable, hiding from view the differences in lived experiences, economic needs and desires 
of the parties by rendering them into simple objects of formal freedoms and political equalities.31 
Socioeconomic questions are separated from the interests of the law, relegated to a private zone of 
market activity in which the law takes no content-oriented role.32 Understood in this way, there is a 
parallel between the formal equality of the wage-work exchange, which makes individual lives 
exchangeable and experiences quantifiable, and the broader process of commodity fetishism 
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occasioned by capitalist production, which strips away the labour basis of productive power so as to 
commodify labour as exchangeable through money. 33 
(b) The Employment Contract as an Exchange of Property 
 
A Marxian analysis reminds us of the centrality of questions of property to the boundaries and 
operation of the contract of employment. David Beatty describes the employment relationship, or 
waged work34, as a “device for arranging our production relationships”.35 In Marxian terms, waged 
work involves a worker’s sale of his or her labour power to an employer in exchange for wages.36 
Contract is the legal mechanism by which that exchange occurs.  Property rights are heavily bound 
up with the contract of employment. For the employer, capital production in the form of goods, 
services, relationships and ideas is the goal of the employment relationship. But the ways in which 
property rights are apportioned between the employer and the worker, in terms of workers’ time, 
skills and knowledge, and of the product of the work itself, also have a significant role in 
determining the bargaining power between the parties, as well as the social reproduction of the 
inequality of bargaining power between them. Contract thus acts as the vehicle for the transfer of 
property exchanged through the wage-work bargain.37  
The issue of property rights in employment has been studied primarily in regards to whether and to 
what extent employment endows workers with property rights in their jobs, whether they are 
entitled to compensation for loss of job security upon dismissal, and what rights they might retain 
over their work-product. At common law the focus of such arguments has concerned whether 
workers are entitled to compensation for mental distress and/or reputational harm that arises from 
the fact or the manner of dismissal. In the collective labour context, trade unions have bargained 
for entitlements such as severance to recognize long-term service, which some have argued 
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constitutes a property entitlement which vests in the worker.38 There has been relatively little 
consideration of whether workers bargain for more than job security through their employment 
contracts however, such as for skills development or knowledge accumulation. More recently, 
scholars have sought to analogize workers to corporate shareholders by arguing that workers have 
property interests in the firm that arise by virtue of their investment in their employers’ enterprises 
throughout the life of the employment relationship. In this way, such scholars suggest, workers 
become stakeholders in the corporation, akin to shareholders, whose interests must be considered 
by corporate directors in making decisions about the enterprise.39   
The stakeholder theory of the firm relies on analysis of the long-term investment of the parties to 
an employment contract. This research focuses on the operation of the standard employment 
relationship (SER) that undergirded the mid-century Fordist production model.40 The SER has been 
defined as employment “which is continuous, long-term, fulltime, in at least a medium sized or 
large establishment […]”41. It was an exchange, in the words of Alain Supiot, of security for 
subordination. 42 Rather than recognizing an employee’s property interests in the employment 
relationship, protections for both parties were built through a series of legal, economic and 
psychological structures that reinforced a norm of long-term work. According to David Marsden 
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workers accepted the open-ended employment arrangement, despite its exploitative potential, 
because it created a number of incentive mechanisms which matched the psychological 
expectations and economic interests of workers. This was not primarily a matter of law, but of 
economic, social and psychological norms which reinforced each other and operated within a loose 
contractual framework. 43  The SER offered workers wage stability to offset market fluctuations and 
changes in the level of individual output over a long period of time.44 In return, it provided 
employers with workforce stability and protection for their training investments, allowing for future 
planning of complex production schemes within vertically integrated firms. These implicit economic 
contracts were supported by psychological beliefs about job norms and professional expectations 
regarding performance, and finally, were reinforced by the legal structure of the employment 
relationship. 45 
In legal terms, the long-term nature of the employment relationship was provided for by the two-
tiered structure of the contract of employment. According to Freedland, the first tier involves an 
exchange of wages for services.46 The second tier contains an ongoing and mutual expectation that 
the employment relationship will continue. “The second level – the promises to employ and be 
employed – provides the arrangement with its stability and its continuity as a contract”.47 The 
expectations exchanged at the second tier receive legal expression in the form of a claim for 
wrongful dismissal. If the contract is only one of wages for service, or only the first tier, it would be 
dissolvable at any time, as it is deemed to be under the at-will doctrine in the United States.48 But 
the second tier promise allows the worker recourse if the implied undertaking to retain in 
employment is not met.49 The open-ended nature of the employment contract, and the layers of 
economic and psychological expectations that guide its ongoing operation, create a legal structure 
that operates as a framework for cooperation rather than as a precise delineation of the terms of 
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the relationship.50 In Marsden’s terms, the contract of employment is an ‘incomplete contract’, 
such that the law focuses only on particular key events or terms, such as dismissal.51 Hugh Collins 
describes it as “incomplete by design”, in the sense that the contract is left intentionally incomplete 
to allow the employer to adjust the requirements of the job tasks to suit its needs through the 
operation of the managerial prerogative.52 This type of long term, open-ended flexible contractual 
arrangement is often referred to as relational, as an ongoing series of exchanges within the 
framework of an explicit bargain, whose adjustment is mediated by an array of social norms.53 The 
loose contractual framework of the relational employment contract therefore supported the 
psychological and economic norms of the SER, and, according to analysts like Marsden, allowed 
both workers’ interests and employers’ interests to be protected. 
In addition to structuring an employment relationship that provided long term investment 
protections and incentives to workers and employers, the SER and its contractual incarnation54 
were able to take on an important structural role within the broader regulatory system of the 20th 
century welfare state. Muckenberger and Deakin depict the welfare state as a series of regulatory 
layers, with the waged work relationship at the pinnacle, as the demarcator of socially productive 
activity.55  The employment relationship operated as a site of public welfare benefits distribution, 
funnelling social welfare benefits from the state to remunerated individuals through private market 
relations. Employers also operated as a delegate of state authority, collecting state levies in the 
form of payroll deductions. Underneath the employment relationship, and supporting it, were 
state-sponsored regulatory schemes designed to provide short term emergency income 
replacement. Such schemes, such as social insurance, were often tied to work status (and thus so-
called ‘socially useful’ activity) through qualifications periods based on the length and continuity of 
waged work. That type of regulation sat on top again of a set of state-sponsored schemes to 
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provide longer term income replacement independent of work status, such as welfare or disability 
benefits.56 The employment relationship thus operated over the second half of the 20th century in 
Canada as a “bridge between the modern business enterprise and the welfare state”.57  
However, if the contract of employment facilitated the operation of the SER, its foundations are 
becoming increasingly chimerical. What allowed the SER to take on this central function was its 
long-term nature, which was maintained by interlocking mechanisms both internal and external to 
the legal regulation of waged work. As employment relationships become of increasingly short 
duration, however, the premise which allowed the SER to perform an institutional labour market 
function collapses. Without a long-term basis to the relationship, the incentive mechanisms, the 
security, the second tier of the employment contract, can no longer be relied on, such that the 
substantive entitlements that workers theoretically received in exchange for subordination are now 
fading away. And just as the internal benefits of the SER atrophy, its role in linking workers to labour 
market protections is undercut. As forms of labour market arrangements proliferate which diverge 
from the SER, and increasing numbers of people earn a living through multiple short term contracts, 
agency work, temporary foreign and migrant work, part time contracting, etc., they are no longer 
able to access the legal protections of the laws of work, either because they do not fall under 
traditional definitions of ‘employee’, or because they do not meet the markers of labour market 
participation that were designed in function of the norm of long term employment over the 20th 
century.58  The contract of employment therefore loses its centrality as a labour market institution, 
and cannot deliver the security that incentivized acquiescence to subordination in the manner that 
it achieved over the 20th century. Operating increasingly without interaction with other labour 
market regimes, the contract of employment now serves as a legal mechanism that transfers all 
economic risks on to the worker. 
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(c) The Many Lives of the Contract of Employment 
Analyses of the nature, function and purpose of the contract of employment such as those 
described above tend to describe it in unitary terms, as if there is a single concept of such a contract 
independent of the various different legal regimes that regulate waged work. In particular, there is 
often conceptual slippage between the employment contract and the employment relationship. 
This is important, because, at least in Canada, the different legal regimes that regulate employment 
construct several different types of employment contracts.  
The first type of employment contract is the collective bargaining agreement of unionized workers, 
or Contract Type 1. In Canada, unionized workers, although hired through a bilateral contract-like 
exchange of promises, are governed entirely by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and the employer, and the laws relating to collective labour representation; 
there is no room for individual variation, derogation or additional terms, unless authorized by the 
collective bargaining agreement itself. 59 The collective bargaining agreement is interpreted and 
applied by labour arbitrators rather than the civil courts. For non-unionized workers, there is in 
theory only a single type of employment contract. The prevailing description of this employment 
contract presents it as comprised of terms negotiated by the parties and requirements implied at 
common law, all circumscribed by a statutory floor of rights that sets the legal baseline of 
entitlements above which the parties may bargain.60 Although we have no empirical studies on the 
question, anecdotal evidence suggests that in practice this type of employment contract, Contract 
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Type 2, exists for only a small percentage of the workforce. Workers under Contract Type 2 are 
those who are able to negotiate some entitlements above the statutorily imposed minimums, 
and/or have the financial ability to bring a civil claim rather than having only access to the 
administrative enforcement process of the employment standards’ regimes. The terms of their 
employment contracts are usually an amalgam of negotiated terms, employer-imposed terms, and 
common law implied obligations, which are interpreted and applied by the common law courts. The 
law enforced at common law is designed to afford greater entitlements to higher status workers. 
Many workers, however, because of an asymmetry of economic, bureaucratic and legal power, are 
likely to have employment contracts that contain terms which are set unilaterally by the employer. 
Although we have no empirical evidence about the typical content of such contracts, it is likely that 
Type 3 contracts will usually either be silent about the workers’ legal entitlements, or contain only 
those terms required by minimum standard legislation such as the Employment Standards Act in 
Ontario.61  In contrast to Contract Type 2, workers in Canada under Contract Type 3 are likely to 
have their rights adjudicated (if at all) before the enforcement arm of the minimum standards 
regime rather than before the courts.62 Thus, these two latter types of employment relationships – 
Type 2 and 3 – provide different substantive baseline legal rights, tend to be regulated by different, 
if overlapping legal regimes, and are enforced by different adjudicative bodies. In this sense, they 
constitute two analytically overlapping but separate employment contracts.  
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Despite the differences in content and administration between Contract Types 2 and 3, there is no 
easy line of separation between them, because aspects of the procedural and substantive law that 
governs them sometimes overlap. In theory employment standards legislation creates a minimum 
floor of entitlements, above which people can contract. One might have thought, therefore, that 
the common law of employment contracts would consist only in procedural rules for the 
interpretation of the terms negotiated about the legislative minimums. But the common law of 
employment contracts, like employment standards regimes, also creates its own substantive 
entitlements. The substantive obligations of the common law of employment take the form of 
implied contractual terms, which provide a generic structure to the employment relationship at 
common law, some of which can be contractually waived, but some of which cannot. The rights 
created by statute do not displace those created at common law, such that common law rights and 
available to all non-unionized employees. This means that workers may have rights both at common 
law and under employment standards legislation, which are of a similar conceptual nature but 
different in scope. For example, unless an employment contract endows a worker with a notice 
period greater than reasonable notice or the statutory notice period, that worker may be entitled to 
common law reasonable notice of termination is available. At the same time, employment 
standards legislation provides statutory notice for those to whom it applies. Thus both statutory 
notice and common law reasonable notice purport to act as minimum entitlements, but reasonable 
notice tends to provide greater compensation than does statutory notice. This means that those 
who can afford to sue at common law enjoy enhanced recovery; those who cannot depend on the 
statutory enforcement mechanism and receive much less. Thus the differences between Contract 
Types 2 and 3 operate at a socioeconomic level based on bargaining power differentials, which in 
turn impacts the legal source of their terms of employment, and suggests which employment law 
regime they will be able to access to determine their employment contract entitlements. 63 
The common law of employment contracts applies beyond Contract Type 2 in another way. It also 
provides the intellectual, normative and interpretive shape to other employment-related legal 
regimes, and in this sense applies to all three types of employment contracts. This is manifest in two 
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ways. Firstly, the common law of employment contracts is regularly used as a substantive source to 
fill interpretive gaps in statutory regimes. Thus, where employment-related statutes are silent on 
definitions, or on the scope of concepts, such as, for instance, the definition of ‘employee’ and 
‘independent contractor’, or the conceptual boundaries of constructive dismissal, the common law 
will be used to give such concepts meaning and to determine the nature of their statutory 
application.64 Secondly, the legal skeleton of the common law of employment contracts continues 
to organize all other employment-related regimes, except to the extent that it is specifically 
displaced by statute or, in some cases, by negotiation in a collective bargaining agreement. What 
this means is that certain basic assumptions about the boundaries and content of the employment 
relationship, assumptions that are thought to be of common law origin, manifest themselves across 
employment-regimes. Here I have in mind the idea of employment as a contractual exchange of 
wages for work, superimposed on an exchange of mutual obligations regarding ongoing work; that 
employment provides the employer with ownership of the worker’s labour power during the hours 
of work; that the employer owns the property rights over the products created by the worker’s 
labour power – physical and sometimes intellectual; and that by virtue of its property entitlements 
and the purchase of labour power, the employer holds the managerial prerogative to direct the 
relationship and workers owe a duty of obedience. The fact that these ideas have normative 
purchase across employment law regimes is one of the reasons that some scholars have begun to 
discuss the employment contract as an institution, having both analytical and normative content.65  
(2) Research on the Origins of the Employment Contract at Common Law  
 
As the description so far demonstrates, the contract of employment is a legal, economic and social 
relationship that is replete with contradictions. It is considered the bedrock institution in the legal 
governance of work66, but common law protections are usually invoked only by a small segment of 
the workforce. It is a relationship understood as regulated by the general principles of contract, but 
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one that was arguably never fully contractualized. 67 It is ostensibly a legal arrangement that 
promotes individual liberty, allowing the parties to establish a relationship on terms of their 
choosing, in a manner that promotes overall market efficiency68, but for many workers it is a 
relationship of legal, economic and social subordination69, or at most an institution of both 
subordination and wage security.70 How to square all of these conflicting roles and attributes of the 
contract of employment? To investigate these questions, let us take a further look at the literature 
on the contract of employment’s emergence at common law. 
(a) England 
The traditional narrative holds that the law of work moved from status to contract in England in 
tandem with the growth of the industrial revolution of the 19th century and the rise of laissez-faire 
notions of market and state.71 In the words of Philip Selznick, “[t]he waning of legal supervision of 
the master-servant relation is the most striking feature of the law of employment in the early 
nineteenth century.”72 Most available commentary from the second half of the 19th century viewed 
the legal nature of the employment relationship as evolving jointly with the general emergence of 
unitary principles of contract law. In 1765 Blackstone described work as a matter of private 
domestic law, inferring that contract had not yet risen to dominance as the pre-eminent form of 
waged-work legal regulation.73  A century later, however, Henry Maine asked in 1861 “whether the 
only relation between employer and labourer which commends itself to modern morality be not a 
relation determined exclusively by contract”.74  In this view, English law was on a trajectory from 
the distribution of legal rights and duties under master and servant laws on the basis of social status 
and the household economic unit, towards a system of freely assumed individual obligations 
determined by agreement, supervised by the law only on breakdown.75  
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The “status-based” system of work regulation that was said to be displaced by contract in the 19th 
century emerged from the law of master and servant, a statutory regime first enacted in England in 
the wake of the Black Death of the 14th century.76 The law of master and servant was a penal 
system of compulsory labour, designed to regulate labour mobility and wage rates. It applied to the 
waged-work relations of servants in husbandry (agricultural workers and household servants), 
labourers, and artisans.77 In the 16th century the system was reorganized with enactment of the 
Statute of Artificers in 1543, and was thereafter interwoven with the Laws of Settlement and the 
Poor Laws in the 17th century.78 Together these statutes created a comprehensive system for 
regulating the labour market, through centralized wage-setting, prohibitions on wage competition 
amongst employers, control of labour mobility and parish poor relief.79 While statutory in nature, 
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the laws of master and servant were bolstered by a complex body of case law, as well as particular 
customs and practices from different industries. The enforcement of master and servant law was 
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Worker violations of their employment contracts could be 
punished by penal sanctions, while employers were subject to civil fines for mistreatment. 
 
Towards the late 18th century and into the early 19th century a series of newer statutes were 
enacted to regulate the work of emerging industrial occupations, just as other central features of 
the master and servant system began to fall into disuse. These newer statutes were mostly 
designed to extend and clarify the coverage of master and servant law to artisanal craft work,80 but 
they also increased the disciplinary and punitive aspects of the system. 81 Robert Steinfeld argues 
that the statutes of the 18th and 19th centuries were innovative because they stripped away the 
paternalist obligations of the Elizabethan system and left only a contractual scheme that used 
punitive sanctions for the enforcement of its terms. The purpose of these statutes, according to 
Steinfeld, was to forcibly inculcate the new values of free-will contracting – to force impecunious 
workers to respect their contractual promises.82 Deakin and Wilkinson similarly argue that the 
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statutes of the 18th and 19th centuries were enacted amidst the active dismantling of the pre-
industrial corporatist system of production.83 The purpose of these statutes was to enforce 
industrial discipline over the work of industrial labourers and artisans, as well as agricultural 
workers.84   
The coverage of these new statutes was the subject of litigation at the turn of the 19th century.85 In 
a series of cases the courts declared that the laws of master and servant did not apply to the work 
of certain occupations, such as domestic servants, menial clerks, and higher status professions.86 
Such workers therefore only had access to the common law courts for their work-related claims. It 
is on the basis of these claims that the common law of employment contracts is said to emerge. The 
traditional story of the emergence of the common law of employment contracts suggests that it 
came to eclipse the law of master and servant in the early 19th century, even though the penal 
sanctions of master and servant law remained in force until 1875. According to Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, and later, Daphne Simon and Brian Napier, central elements of the master and servant 
regime, such as wage fixing, rules for trade entry, and the compulsion to work, were no longer 
actively applied by the early decades of the 19th century.87 Simon argues that by the mid-18th 
century, commercial practices had shifted sufficiently towards a capitalist model of production that 
wage fixing was no longer necessary to keep wages low, and trade entry rules acted to retard the 
aggregation and expansion of commercial ventures. Thus by the early 19th century, the provisions of 
the Statute of Artificers concerning the regulation of the work day, the limitation of wages, and 
“general compulsion to labour” had been abandoned in practice, and “only one thing remained, 
namely the punishment of the servant for leaving or neglecting his work”.88  
The penal sanctions for contract breach were repealed in 1874, the product of a long fought battle 
begun by trade unionists in the 1840s against the brutality of the penal sanctions and against the 
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presumption of annual hire that was integral to the law of master and servant. 89  The annual hire 
presumption held all employment contracts to be of annual duration unless explicitly fixed 
otherwise, such that neither party could end the relationship in the absence of cause, or three 
months notice prior to the end of the term. In the 19th century the notice requirement was used as 
a strike-breaking tool, permitting employers to fire workers who went out on strike.90  According 
Daphne Simon, in testimony before House of Commons W.P. Roberts, “the miner’s lawyer”, argued 
for equality of treatment for workers with their employers. When asked if he “would treat labour as 
you would any other commodity”, “merely as an article to buy and sell”, he replied simply, “Yes”. 91 
To be treated as any other commodity would require bringing work regulation onto a contractual 
model, which would provide at least formal equality between the parties.  
 
Under the master and servant system employment was considered a private domestic 
relationship.92 As Steinfeld argues, employers’ right of control over their workers was understood in 
law as founded in familial jurisdiction over their person, in the sense that workers were considered 
part of the employer’s household, as well as in a property right over worker’ services.93 The 
transition from status to contract therefore required the commodification of workers’ labour, such 
that workers could own and sell their labour separately from themselves. Writing in 1867 Marx 
explained that: 
[The worker] and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal with each other as on 
the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, 
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therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. The continuance of this relation demands that the 
owner of the labour-power should sell it only for a definite period, for if he were to sell it 
rump and stump, once for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from a free 
man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity.94 
Marx’s analysis relied on the idea that the worker could sell his or her labour, but also on the 
assumption that the employer owned the product of a worker’s labour.  
From the instant [the worker] steps into the workshop, the use-value of his labour-power 
[…] belongs to the capitalist. By the purchase of labour-power, the capitalist incorporates 
labour, as a living ferment, with the lifeless constituents of the product. From his point of 
view, the labour-process is nothing more than the consumption of the commodity purchase, 
i.e. of labour-power; but this consumption cannot be effected except by supplying the 
labour power with the means of production. The labour-process is a process between things 
that the capitalist has purchased, things that become his property.95  
As production increasingly moved into factories owned by employers, and workers used employers’ 
tools and raw materials to produce a tangible good, the employer’s right to the final product 
seemed to arise by virtue of his or her ownership of all of the product’s inputs (including the 
necessary labour power). In this context analysts conceived of the employment contract as the 
employer’s purchase of the worker’s physical labour over his or her time in the workplace.96  
The traditional story is that just as central features of the master and servant system fell into disuse 
in the early 19th century, newer occupations began to emerge that were now organized by the law 
of contract. Some viewed this process as a natural evolution which was part of the general rise of 
individualism in law and political opinion that accompanied the economic developments of the 
Industrial Revolution.97 The legal transformations of the period brought the will theory of contract 
to the centre of the organization of state and market, just as the common law of employment 
emerged as a subset of general contract law over the 19th century.98 Adoption of a contractual 
model of employment provided individual freedom and choice to workers and employers, thus 
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dispatching the formal inequality of master and servant law. Others viewed the transition as less 
benign.  By the mid-20th century members of the industrial relations Oxford School, such as Allan 
Flanders, Hugh Clegg, Otto Kahn-Freund and Alan Fox, viewed the common law regulation of work 
as a system of economic subordination.99 It was the common law’s antagonism to workers’ rights 
that necessitated the legislative interventions at the turn of the 20th century, and provoked the 
general English move away from law towards the system Kahn-Freund termed collective laissez-
faire.100 Alan Fox argued that the employment relationship was never fully contractualized because 
master and servant notions of obedience were read into the contractual form during the 19th 
century, repackaging the hierarchical notion of a managerial prerogative into the language of 
contract, which has been fundamental to its development ever since.101 Nonetheless, for critical 
writers, just as for those who viewed contractualization as emancipatory, the contract of 
employment at common law, “[was] a product of the Industrial Revolution, and nineteenth-century 
laissez-faire its principal justification.”102  
 
(b) Challenges to the Traditional Narrative in England 
Challenges to the traditional narrative of the employment contract’s 19th century origins have 
emerged more recently. The initial objection to the traditional narrative focused primarily on the 
idea that the 19th century was a period of unimpeded contractual regulation of work.103 This 
objection was not concerned specifically with the contract of employment, but rather with the 
extent to which other legal regimes existed and were of significant force in regulating work through 
the 19th century.  Karl Polanyi in the 1940s described the extent of 19th century social legislation in 
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England, refuting the idea of a ‘natural’ self-regulating market that existed without legislative aid.104 
Harry Arthurs pursued this idea further in the 1980s, tracing the growth of English legislation on 
conditions of work in the early 19th century, and the administrative regulatory apparatus that was 
created to enforce such statutes.105 Central to Arthurs’ argument is that rather than withdrawing 
from the active administration of the work relationship in the 19th century as master and servant 
laws receded, the British government was instead highly interventionist over that period.106 In a 
similar vein, Douglas Hay’s research counters the idea that the master and servant system had 
fallen into effective disuse in England by the beginning of the 19th century. Instead, Hay traces the 
persistent rise in master and servant criminal prosecutions in England throughout the 19th century, 
right up until the repeal of the penal sanctions in 1875.107 Robert Steinfeld traces the continuity 
between employers’ property rights over workers’ labour from the law of master and servant into 
the 19th century. Even as central elements of the master and servant system were stripped away in 
the early 19th century, Steinfeld argues that the law continued to treat employment as the lease of 
workers’ labour to their masters for the entire duration of the employment contract. Steinfeld 
argues that an employer’s property interests under the law of master and servant remained 
relatively unchanged within the emerging contractual paradigm of the 19th century. The employer 
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could still “control, use and enjoy the [worker’s] energies” but the legal ability to do so was 
“reimagined as the product of a voluntary transaction between two separate and autonomous 
individuals”.108  
Another direct challenge to the traditional narrative of the emergence and development of the 
contract of employment was mounted by Adrian Merritt in a 1982 article.109 Rather than viewing 
the contract of employment as a 19th century issue, she argues that the process of employment 
contractualization is one of very recent origin, and ongoing. Meritt argues that up until the 20th 
century there were three types of waged-work relationships, quasi-servile relationships of 
household service (“servants”), principal-independent contractor relationships between 
manufacturers and artisans, farmers and skilled farm-workers, purchasers and tradesmen, and 
finally, an emerging notion of employment between employer and employee.110 What occurred 
over the 19th century was the extension of master and servant concepts from quasi-servile 
relationships outwards to transform independent contractors and agricultural workers into 
‘hands’.111  “[T]he notion of a ‘contract of employment’”, Merritt tells us, “was created to allow the 
imposition of the old master-servant relationship on an area of work until then occupied largely by 
the ‘independent’ contract.”112 She concludes that despite the change in nature of the sanctions for 
contract breach from penal to civil, the “underlying content of the employee’s obligations today 
parallels very closely the duties imposed by [master and servant] legislation”.113  
Merritt raises a number of interesting questions about the relationship between master and servant 
statutes and the contract of employment. In particular she highlights questions about the 
relationship between the common law of employment and collective labour law, about the nature 
of different legal categories of waged-work in the 19th century, about the political purposes of 
contractualization, and about the ongoing jurisprudential confusion within the common law of 
employment contracts throughout the 20th century. The problem, however, is that Merritt does not 
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satisfyingly answer many of the questions she raises. It is not clear from her analysis how the 
contractual form served to bring broader categories of waged-workers into the conceptual sphere 
of master and servant relations. At some points she suggests contractualization was the end point 
of the extension of master and servant concepts, but at others she suggests that was the laws of 
master and servant that expanded to cover previously independent contractors.114  
The most express challenge to the traditional history of the contract of employment was recently 
issued by Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson in 2005.115 Deakin and Wilksinson reconstruct the 
historical trajectory of the legal regimes that came to organize the modern labour market from the 
18th century onwards. As part of this project they examine the history of the contract of 
employment, focusing on the process by which it took on a central institutional role in structuring 
the labour market in the mid-20th century. They argue that contrary to the usual focus on the 19th 
century, the contract of employment existed as one legal approach to work among many until the 
mid-20th century. Rather than a homogenous legal definition of contractual employment, the 
different master and servant statutes defined their coverage on the basis of lists of occupations, 
which were subject to different legal rights, obligations and customs.116 Over the late 19th and early 
20th centuries a general notion of employment began to take shape at common law amongst those 
occupations not regulated by statute, but it was only in the 1940s that the contract of employment 
was adopted as the general category of work regulation, as part of the social insurance initiatives of 
the Beveridge Report. In so doing, a unified concept of a contract of service was adopted for all 
waged work, in contrast to contracts for services with independent contractors. 117 The construction 
of a general legal notion of employment in England occurred in tandem with other social, political 
and economic changes that affected the work relationship, such as the growth of collective 
bargaining, the emergence of vertical integration of production processes within enterprises, and 
the growth of the SER.118 Together the combination of vertical integration and the growth of long 
term employment relationships served to standardize and stabilize the employment relationship in 
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mid-20th century England, allowing the long-term open-ended employment contract to emerge and 
the Standard Employment Relationship to dominate the structure of the labour market.119 
Although the doctrinal evolution of the common law of employment is not the focus of their study, 
Deakin and Wilkinson do attend to the broader question of the contractualization of employment. 
They argue that contract of employment cases first emerged at common law in the 1830s and 
1840s, in regards to middle class and professional employment, and it is in only in regards to such 
occupations that one can properly say that work was contractualized in the 19th century. 120 For 
Deakin and Wilkinson, ‘contractualization’ has a particular meaning: it is a process of transforming 
the employment relationship into one of mutual obligations, in which some limitations were placed 
on the employer’s ability to direct the relationship.121 This process was not applied to industrial 
workers in the 19th century, who continued to be regulated by the master and servant acts, and the 
Employee and Workmen Act after the repeal of criminal sanctions.122 It was only in the early years 
of the 20th century that the contractual model of middle class work was extended to industrial, 
agricultural and domestic workers, under the influence of the growing welfare state of the 1930s 
and 1940s.123 Contractualization was therefore complete when the doctrinal process of imposing 
limitations on the employer’s legal right of command merged with the growing institutional use of 
the employment relationship “as a vehicle for channelling and redistributing social and economic 
risks, through the imposition on employers of obligations of revenue collection, and compensation 
for interruptions of earnings”.124 
Deakin and Wilkinson provide a very different history of the employment contract than the 
traditional picture. The key to contextualizing their argument is that they concentrate more on the 
institutional evolution of the contract of employment than its doctrinal evolution. They do not 
argue that the work relationship was not intellectually recast in broad contractual terms over the 
19th century as one of individual exchange, or that there were no common law claims regarding 
employment during that time. Rather, they argue that emerging notions of free-will contract were 
applied only to some workers and not others, and that contract did not serve as the pre-eminent 
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regulatory frame for waged work in the 19th century. According to Deakin and Wilkinson, the 
emergence of a general concept of contractual employment was completed as part of the project of 
the 20th century welfare state, when the common law principles developed for higher status 
workers were extended to the entire waged workforce. Because Deakin and Wilkinson focus on the 
treatment of workers under statutory regimes in the early 20th century, however, what the common 
law of employment contracts consisted of before the 1940s remains unclear. 
(c) The United States 
American scholarship on the history of the contract of employment starts from different premises 
than English research. In the late 19th century American and English approaches to the legal 
regulation of employment took sharply different tracks. At the end of the 19th century the United 
States adopted the at-will model of employment, which permits either party to end the 
employment relationship at any time, for any reason, without warning. The rule provides such a 
starkly different conception of the employment relationship than exists in other legal systems that 
most American scholarship on the contract of employment focuses on its particular history. 
Because of the focus on the emergence of at-will employment, historical research in the United 
States has tended, with some notable exceptions discussed below, to deal primarily with the late 
19th century onwards, when the rule was first enunciated. 
The work of Christopher Tomlins, Robert Steinfeld and Karen Orren provides most of the research 
on the legal regulation of non-unionized work in the United States before the end of the 19th 
century.125 As their studies detail, the relationship between master and servant law and contractual 
approaches to work regulation in the United States was different than in England. In England the 
law of master and servant was a body of statutory law, around which a significant body of case law 
developed, adjudicated and enforced at first instance by magistrates and justices of the peace. 
Common law employment claims only began to take shape in the early 19th century, still heavily 
premised on the substantive content of master and servant law. But in the United States the 
evolution of the employment contract seems to have taken a different track.  Christopher Tomlins 
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argues that English master and servant law, although received in the American colonies during the 
17th century, was used selectively and recalibrated to local practices over the course of the 18th 
century, largely dispensing with the use of penal sanctions.126 Where they were used, penal 
sanctions were deployed around social status structures, targeted at indentured servants and 
slaves, rather than at ‘free’ white wage workers.  White wage earners were instead subjected to a 
civil system of contract, although one in which the damage awards were severe.127  In the 18th 
century the only workers treated as ‘servants’ in relationships of direct social subordination were 
indentured servants.128 Those in other forms of waged work were regulated at common law prior to 
the 19th century.  However, for reasons that are unclear, in the early 19th century the courts began 
to extend the application of master and servant principles, previously reserved for indentured 
servants, by applying English common law doctrines to individuals who were previously in 
customer/supplier or independent contractor relationships. In the result, the master and servant 
legal regime that had been crafted around a particular type of work was extended to a broader 
range of relationships of a commercial nature, and ultimately came to represent a general model 
for waged work, vesting in “the generality of nineteenth-century employers a controlling authority 
over their employees founded upon the preindustrial master’s claim to property in his servant’s 
personal services”.129 Thus, for Tomlins, the English common law contractual approach to 
employment was reinterpreted and reframed by the American judiciary by applying master and 
servant principles to the contract of employment.130  American treatise writers and judges 
constructed a heavily hierarchical general model of employment over the 19th century through the 
use of English master and servant concepts, but they did so utilizing language of contract. By 
“representing employment relations in the voluntarist language of contract”, Tomlins argues, “the 
existence and exercise of power in the employment relationship was [mystified]”. 131 If Tomlins’ 
thesis is correct, then there was a different trajectory in the United States to that of England.  
Although beyond the scope of my own study, there is work to be done in comparing the impact of 
the development of master and servant law and the common law of employment contract in the 
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same judicial venue in the United States, in comparison to their more separate evolution in the 
United Kingdom. Even if the difference in legal venue turns out to be an artificial distinction, it 
suggests that caution be exercised when using American and English research interchangeably. 
Robert Steinfeld’s research emphasizes the thinness of the distinction between free and unfree 
labour.132 By tracing continuities in property notions over workers’ labour along a spectrum from 
slavery to contract, he demonstrates the continuing coercion central to the contractual frame for 
employment regulation. Steinfeld and Karen Orren tie the contractualization of employment in the 
United States to workers’ claims for political equality and citizenship.133 As owners of their own 
labour, workers challenged property limitations on voting rights and political participation. Steinfeld 
notes, however, that in presenting themselves as the owners of commodities, of their own labour, 
workers entrenched a system of market inequality which the law could not attack under a system of 
liberal capitalism.134 Finally, the evolution of property rights in employment has received greater 
attention in the United States than in England. Catherine Fisk details the emergence of intellectual 
property rights in employment, a key element to understanding the property exchanged in 
employment outside of manufacturing work. She argues that in the United States, corporate 
ownership in employee knowledge emerged in tandem with the contractualization of employment. 
Prior to the 19th century ‘knowledge’ was not something to be owned, rather skill was an attribute 
of a craftsmen, and inventions the property of their personal inventors. Fisk and Katherine Stone 
argue that rather than a move from “bondage to freedom”, the contractualization of employment 
represented a shift from “entrepreneurship to dependence” for highly skilled craftspeople and 
inventors.135  Thus, Fisk argues, over the turn of the 20th century employers turned to the law to 
gain property rights over their workers’ knowledge and skill, utilizing the language of contract to do 
so.136   
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As mentioned, however, most American research on the history of the employment contract begins 
in the late 19th century, with the adoption of the at-will employment rule. The first enunciation of 
the rule is commonly attributed to treatise writer Horace Wood’s description of the state of the law 
in the late 19th century.137 In 1877 Wood stated:  
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, 
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it 
by proof. . . .  [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in 
this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants. 
  
 Much of the debate in the literature focuses on the accuracy of this statement. Some agree with 
Wood that the at-will rule was firmly entrenched by the 1870s.138 Others suggest that he overstated 
the degree to which at-will employment had become the norm, and have very different ideas about 
the state of the law regarding employment dissolution at the time. 139 Finally, another body of 
research focuses on the interests that sought the rule’s adoption and on its socioeconomic 
effects.140 Jay Feinman argues that the effect of the at-will employment rule was to subject a 
growing class of salaried middle class workers to increased wage insecurity, so as to ensure that this 
increasingly important group of actors could not rival employers’ workplace authority.141 Katherine 
Stone, however, notes that the adoption of the rule had different effects on different groups of 
workers. Focusing on industrial workers, she argues that the adoption of the rule was beneficial for 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, because it operated to displace the ‘entire contract’ doctrine 
which precluded wage recovery for services already rendered if workers left prior to the end of the 
contract’s term. Moreover, it did not immediately affect higher skilled workers, who maintained 
their power on the basis of their membership in craft unions.142 At a broader level, she argues, the 
adoption of at-will employment had the effect of increasing job mobility, but also in providing 
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employers with the incentive to adopt internal labour markets in the early 20th century to build 
worker loyalty and address the growing problem of worker turnover.143   
American literature on the history of the employment contract in the 19th century is of particular 
interest to the evolution of the law of employment contracts in Ontario because of the social and 
economic similarities between colonial Ontario and some of the Northern American states. 
Twentieth century historical studies of the social and economic structures of the workplace are also 
significant for comparative purposes, given the dominance of American industrial branch plants in 
Ontario as of the early 20th century, and the resulting similarities in labour processes and human 
resource strategies.144 Research on the modern contract of employment at law, however, is of less 
direct relevance, because of the divergence between the at-will model of employment contracts in 
the United States and the Canadian model of wrongful dismissal which, as I will recount, was being 
put into place by the turn of the 20th century.   
As the province of Ontario drew on the laws of England in the context of a society and economy 
increasingly tied to the United States in the early 20th century, so too does this study of the history 
of the employment contract in Ontario. What then is known of the historical trajectory of the 
contract of employment in Ontario?   
(d) The Canadian Literature on the Laws of the Work 
The British colony of Upper Canada was created under English law in 1791, comprised of one 
section of the new colony of New France, joining the colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and the newly created colony of Lower Canada as the British North American 
colonies. The colony of New France was split in two in 1791, formally creating Upper Canada by the 
Canada Act. 145   
English law was statutorily received at the creation of each of the Canadian colonies, but with 
different exceptions and specifications. The cross-colony disparity in reception and development of 
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English law is particularly evident in the history of master and servant law in Canada. The original 
Canadian colonies had very different economies, settlement histories and political cultures. The 
regulation of work in the different colonies reflected these regional variations. The colony of Upper 
Canada appeared to receive English master and servant law in 1791, but that reception was later 
brought into question in the mid-19th century, after which a local statute was enacted.146 The law 
relating to trade union activities, prohibitions on combinations to raise wages in master and servant 
legislation, prohibitions on combinations in statutes, and the common law relating to criminal 
conspiracy, were also of uncertain application in the colony in the early 19th century, until 
legislation was enacted in the 1870s.147   The colony never received the Poor Laws, but did receive 
the general English common law, which included the common law of employment contracts, then in 
its formative years in England itself.148   
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Research on the early work law history of Ontario has focused on controversies over the reception 
and application of the law of master and servant in the first half of the 19th century. Master and 
servant law has also been examined across many of the Canadian provinces.149 Bolstered by studies 
of the social history of trade unionism and the changing labour process over the second half of the 
19th century, significant research on the history of criminal conspiracy laws and labour law has also 
been undertaken,150 as well as studies relating to shareholder, director151 and employer liability for 
wages152, the enforcement of factory legislation153, the common and statutory law of industrial 
accidents154, and poor relief155. Jeremy Webber has sought to provide a general history of the law of 
work in 19th century Ontario, Justice Randall Echlin has produced an overview of the law relating to 
individual work relationships over the 19th and 20th centuries, Mark Thomas has studied the political 
evolution of minimum employment standards in Ontario, and Margaret McCallum has provided an 
overview of early 20th century statutory regulation of the employment relationship.156 At a general 
                                                          
149
 Jerry Bannister, "Law and Labor in Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland," in Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, eds., 
Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004); Paul Craven, “Canada 1670-1935, Symbolic and Instrumental Enforcement in Loyalist North America”, 
in Douglas Hay and Paul Craven eds., Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955  
(North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Ian Pilarczyk, “The Law of Servants and the Servants of 
Law: Enforcing Masters’ Rights in Montreal, 1830-1845” (2001) 46 McGill LJ 779; Ian Pilarczyk, “’Too Well Used by 
His Master: Judicial Enforcement of Servants’ Rights in Montreal, 1830-1845” (2001) 46 McGill LJ 491; Sean 
Cadigan, “Merchant Capital, the State, and Labour in a British Colony: Servant-Master Relations and Capital 
Accumulation in Newfoundland’s Northeast-Coast Fishery, 1775-1799” (1991) Journal of the Canadian Historical 
Association 17; Grace Laing Hogg, The Legal Rights of Masters, Mistresses and Domestic Servants in Montreal, 
1816-1829, Unpublished Thesis University of Montreal, 1989; Craven, supra note 146. 
150
 Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada, 
1900-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek, "The Legacy of PC 1003," 
(1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 357; Craven, Conspiracy, supra note 147; Tucker, Indefinite Area of Toleration, supra note 147.  
151
 Eric Tucker, “Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: From Condition of 
Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy” (2008) 16(2) Law & Hist Rev 57. 
152
 Eric Tucker, “The Law of Employers’ Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: The Search for a Theory” (1984) 22(2) OHLJ 
213. 
153
 Eric Tucker, “Making the Workplace ‘Safe’ in Capitalism: The Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Nineteenth 
Century Ontario” (1988) 21 Labour/Le Travail 45; Lorna Hurl, “Restricting Child Factory Labour in Late Nineteenth 
Century Ontario” (1988) 21 Labour/Le Travail 87. 
154
 Eric Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); RW Kostal, “Legal Justice, Social 
Justice: An Incursion into the Social History of Work-Related Accident Law in Ontario, 1860-86” (1988) 6(1) Law & 
Hist Rev 1. 
155
 Russell Smandych, “Colonial Welfare Laws and Practices: Coping Without an English Poor Law in Upper Canada, 
1792-1837” (1995) 23 Man LJ 214. 
156
 Randall Scott Echlin, “From Master and Servant to Bardal and Beyond: 200 Years of Employment Law in Canada 
1807-2007” (2007) 26(3) Advocates’ Soc J. 11; Mark Thomas, Regulating Flexibility, The Ontario Employment 
Standards Act and the Politics of Flexible Production, 2003, Unpublished Dissertation, chapter 2; Jeremy Webber, 
“Labour and the Law”, in Paul Craven, ed., Labouring Lives: Work and Workers in 19
th
 Century Ontario (Toronto: 
58 
 
level, since the 1970s significant research has been done on the nature of industrial workplaces and 
changes in labour processes, on the origins of labour organizing in Ontario and Canada, and on the 
emergence of a working class consciousness in Ontario.157  
 
As in other Anglo-American jurisdictions, however, studies on the common law treatment of 
employment contracts have been limited. Where it has been described tangentially, it is presented 
as a conceptual whole, already in existence by the 19th century. Paul Craven, for instance, describes 
the outlines of the English common law of employment as it was applied in the early 19th century. 
He suggests that the common law of employment contracts changed little in Ontario between the 
1820s and 1870s.158 Eric Tucker provides an overview of legislative proposals designed to offset the 
common law regime in the last quarter of the 19th century.159 Because his study broadly sketches 
the evolution of individual work law regulation, Tucker delves into specific questions of legislation 
and common law doctrine, but leaves the general contours of the common law of employment 
contracts slightly unclear.160 Jeremy Webber similarly provides an overview of the laws of work in 
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Ontario over the 19th century, but focuses more on standard work practices and the content of 
typical employment contracts rather than on the common law itself.161  
 
There is also a large gap in academic research on the contract of employment at common law 
between the turn of the 20th century and the 1970s. Significant research on collective labour law 
was being produced as of the 1940s, and studies of new work-related statutory regimes began to 
emerge as of the 1960s.162 But the contract of employment at common law was rarely studied 
before the 1970s, except for a few law journal articles, usually focused on the development of 
particular doctrines.163 Research on the contract of employment became more frequent in the 
1970s. Most studies were concerned with the relationship between the common law of 
employment and statutory work regimes, such as between income tax and dismissal, or labour law 
and the common law of employment.164 The first law school course on employment law was 
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offered at Dalhousie University in the 1970s,165 but it was not until after Dalhousie’s Innis Christie 
published the first academic textbook on employment law in 1980, the date at which this study 
ends, that research on the employment relationship at common law became relatively 
widespread.166 Christie noted in Employment Law in Canada that commentary on the employment 
relationship outside of collective labour law was sparse, and that in fact the case law itself was 
relatively undeveloped prior to the 1960s. Nonetheless, in articles from the 1970s and 1980s little 
mention is made of the relative youth of this area of law and legal scholarship. As scholars amassed 
and analyzed the case law of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their results were presented as if the 
field was fully formed, with little indication of its evolution, or of the changing contexts in which 
existing doctrine was now being applied. There is therefore a large gap in our knowledge of the 
development of the common law of employment contracts in Ontario, of the changes over time in 
the reported decisions, and the relationship between the common law of employment and other 
legal regimes regulating the workplace. Even where scholars acknowledge the lack of research in 
the field, the standard approach has been to refer to English and American studies to suggest what 
the Canadian trajectory may have looked like. 
 
This is an insufficient approach to understanding the history of the waged work relationship at 
common law in Canada and Ontario, its largest jurisdiction. As I indicated earlier, a number of 
general questions remain outstanding in terms of the historical evolution of the contract of 
employment at common law in England and in the United States.  We therefore cannot rely on 
English and American analyses to answer questions about the evolution of this area of law in 
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Canada. But further, what we know of the legal history of the Canadian colonies in the 19th century, 
and of Canadian socio-economic development through the 20th century, indicates significant 
differences from the trajectories of the United States and England, and a highly uneven historical 
evolution across the country itself. Given the differences in the legal contexts of the Canadian 
colonies, and given the general questions that remain to be answered about the evolution of the 
common law of employment contracts, in this study I shall focus on the legal history of one 
Canadian province, Ontario, and seek to delineate its changing contours and context, between the 
turn of the 20th century and the end of the 1970s as regards the employment contract at common 
law. First, however, I will briefly describe the emergence of common law employment claims in 
England in the 19th century – legal principles which theoretically applied in Ontario in its first 
century – before outline the content of common law claims in the colonial context of Ontario.  
(3) The Doctrinal Content of Common Law Employment Cases in 19th Century England 
 
As mentioned, although common law claims regarding employment are assumed to have emerged 
in the early 19th century in England, and thereafter exported across its colonies, there has been little 
sustained examination of their content. The common law of employment contracts has either been 
treated as part of a general description of employment law in the 19th century, obscuring the 
differences between master and servant claims and common law claims, has occurred tangentially 
as part of discussions of other work-related legal regimes, or has focused on the evolution of 
particular doctrines. Assembling the research that has been produced, however, as well as 
secondary treatises of the time, nonetheless allows for a preliminary description of the emergence 
of common law employment claims in England in the 19th century. The following account draws in 
particular from the work of Mark Freedland, Robert Steinfeld Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, 
and Sanford Jacoby, as well as secondary texts from the 19th century.167 
At the turn of the 19th century certain types of employment were excluded from coverage of master 
and servant laws. In the 1806 case of Lowther v. Earl of Radnor it was established that the master 
and servant acts applied to all servants, labourers and workmen, except for domestic and menial 
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servants.168 By the 1830s the courts also held that higher status workers were exempt from its 
coverage.169 Common law claims were therefore not the main source of law for workers in the 19th 
century, and indeed prosecutions under master and servant law increased in number through the 
19th century until the repeal of the penal provisions in 1875. In 1813 Lord Ellenborough explained 
that common law claims regarding employment contracts were designed to secure “the adjustment 
of differences between parties of equal rank in trade”, as compared to the law of master and 
servant, which was “meant to secure the disciplining and subordination of the wage-earner”. 170  
But in fact workers at both ends of the social spectrum were excluded from the coverage of master 
and servant law, from domestic servants, to clerks, to bankers, to professionals, and these workers 
brought their employment-related claims to the common law courts. Up until the mid-19th century 
there was little visible conceptual difference in the law of master and servant and the legal 
principles applied at common law regarding employment. The courts of England applied the 
principles developed under the laws of master and servant at common law, and treatises of the era 
made no distinction between claims made before magistrates and those brought to the courts. To 
what extent the common law related to employment and master and servant law should be 
considered different bodies of law is therefore an open question.  
In the early 19th century the courts applied the master and servant presumption of annual hire at 
common law.171  Under the law of master and servant, an employment contract of indefinite 
duration, often referred as a general hire contract, was presumed to be of annual length. The 
presumption of annual hire was a requirement under the Statute of Artificers, and its origins are 
said to relate to the agricultural seasons. Blackstone described it as based on equitable ideas – to 
ensure that the servant would work, and the master would maintain him or her “throughout all the 
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seasons”.172 But as of the 17th century it was also central to the system of poor relief devised by the 
Poor Laws and Laws of Settlement. As Sanford Jacoby explains, each parish was responsible for the 
maintenance and support of its poor and infirm. An indigent worker outside his or her parish of 
birth could be removed for the purposes of poor relief, unless they could demonstrate that they 
were hired in the parish under an annual hire contract (settlement by hire). The existence of an 
annual hire contract was therefore a heavily litigated issue between parishes, as they each sought 
to minimize their support obligations.173 Steinfeld explains that an annual hire contract provided an 
employer with the right of control and possession over the worker’s labour for the entire year. 
Workers who were permitted evenings and weekends off were not considered to be under annual 
hire contracts, even if employed for multiple year contracts. These were referred to as exceptive 
hire contracts and could not establish a settlement by hire.174 In R v. St. John Devizes in 1827 the 
Queen’s Bench explained the situation thus: 
In order to constitute a yearly hiring the contract must be such that the relation of master 
and servant will subsist during the whole of the year, and during the whole of every day in 
the year. That is generally so, as a matter of course, in the case of domestic servants; but in 
the case of servants employed in factories it is frequently not so, for there the contract 
often is, that the servant shall work so many hours in the day. […] It seems to me, that 
unless by the terms of such a contract there is an express exception, which must necessarily 
prevent the relation of master and servant from subsisting during the whole of the year, or 
during the whole of every day in the year for which the contract is made, it is a yearly 
hiring.175 
 
 It was therefore the employer’s right to continuous possession and control over their workers’ time 
and labour that determined the length of the relationship in law.176  
 
Deakin and Jacoby argue that after the settlement by hire was abolished in 1834 the presumption 
of annual hire lost its centrality and was rarely applied under the law of master and servant to 
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manual and industrial workers.177 Nonetheless it continued to be applied at common law.178 The 
annual hire presumption constructed the employment contract as one of fixed term duration, 
either by express agreement or by legal presumption. It could only be dissolved with three months’ 
notice by either party prior to the end of the term, or during the term for cause. In the absence of 
notice or cause the contract renewed itself annually, operating in a manner akin to a modern 
tenancy.179 Indeed, employment contracts sometimes used the language of lease, with workers 
stating that they were ‘letting themselves’ to their employer for the duration of a set term.180 It is 
not clear whether employers’ held the same property-based rights of possession and control over 
their workers’ for the entire year at common law. This seems likely in the context of domestic and 
menial servants, who lived and worked in the home, but less clear in regards to business clerks, 
sales people, journalists, gardeners, etc., who might work during set hours and live apart from their 
employers. Moreover, unlike the industrial model of employment, many workers in the 19th century 
provided services other than the production of physical goods. In the context of employment 
contracts to provide intangible goods, it is unclear how the law conceptualized what the employer 
bought or leased through an employment contract (time, skill, knowledge, etc.), and what were the 
respective property rights that arose from employment in the 19th century. 
 
General employment practice at the turn of the 19th century saw most workers paid annually, or in 
quarterly instalments, so that when they left or were dismissed from their employment within the 
annual term, there would likely be wages outstanding for services already rendered within the pay 
period. Because the annual hire presumption operated to preclude the parties from dissolving an 
employment contract within its term, absent cause, if so dismissed workers in the first half of the 
19th century could bring claims to recover wages before the common law courts. Such claims were 
styled assumpsits for wages, and the existence of cause was central to their determination. But 
workers who quit their employ within the contract’s term were usually precluded from claiming 
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wages owing on the basis of the “entire contract” doctrine. The doctrine was the product of the 
House of Lords’ 1795 decision in Cutter v. Powell, which specified that all the obligations under a 
contract had to be performed before the contractor could recover payment owing. This acted as a 
bar on labour mobility, incentivizing workers to remain in their current positions so as not to forfeit 
the wages they had already earned.  
 
By the 1840s, however, the English courts began to suggest that workers were entitled to more 
than just wages owing if wrongfully dismissed – that they also had an action for breach of contract. 
Although it had been suggested from the 1810s onwards that some form of contractual action lay 
for dismissal without cause within the contractual term, the conceptual basis for such a claim was in 
flux across the first half of the 19th century.181 The question was whether the contract consisted 
only of the master’s promise to pay the worker over the term of the contract, or whether the 
master contracted to maintain the employment relationship over the course of the contract’s 
duration.182 The conundrum in these cases was this: if a worker was dismissed within a fixed term 
contract (as all were presumed to be) without cause, and the contract amounted solely to one for 
remuneration, then the worker could theoretically simply affirm the contract, remain willing and 
able to work for the duration of its term, and then sue for the entire wages owed over the term. 
The idea that a worker could recover for the whole contract without performing their services, and 
without an obligation to mitigate his or her damages, offended the courts’ idea of socially 
productive behaviour.183 But, if the contract was one that included an implied obligation on the 
employer to maintain the worker’s employment for the duration of the term, this suggested, at 
least to the minds of the judiciary, that the employer was covenanting to stay in business for the 
duration of the contract.184 This type of promise seemed one that business people were unlikely to 
make, and thus could not be construed as the intent of the parties.  
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The question was litigated before the House of Lords over the 1840s, culminating in the decision in 
Emmens v. Elderton in 1853.185 In Emmens the House of Lords reversed previous case law and held 
that a contract for hire of a specified duration included an implied obligation to maintain the worker 
in employment, unless expressly contracted against. The House of Lords’ express motivation was to 
avoid what they perceived as worker idleness, where a worker could collect wages without working 
and without having to mitigate their losses. Lord Crompton J. stated that “[i]t would be much to be 
lamented if a servant or agent who was dismissed should be able to say, ‘I could easily get another 
situation as good, or better, but I shall not do so, and instead of claiming the real damage I have 
sustained by the inconvenience and temporary loss of situation, I will bring an action for every 
instalment of salary, till the contemplated period has elapsed”.186 For Baron Parke, who first heard 
the claim for the Exchequer Court, this would be a “pernicious consequence”.187 Motivated to avoid 
worker idleness, the House of Lords opted to construct a contract for hire as a promise to maintain 
the employment relationship by payment of wages (although not the provision of actual work) over 
the term of the contract in exchange for services for its duration.  
[W]herever there is a contract for hiring or employment on the one part, and service for 
wages or salary on the other, for a specified time, there is an engagement on the part of the 
employer to keep the employed in the relation in question during that time, and not merely 
to pay him the wages for the services at the end; and that, in none of these cases, does the 
obligation to keep retained and employed necessarily import an obligation on the part of 
the master to supply work.188  
 
An action for wrongful dismissal, as of 1853, was thus available for breaching the promise to 
maintain the employment contract over its specified or implied duration.  
 
In both claims for wages owing and claims for wrongful dismissal, an employer could defend by 
arguing that they had in fact dismissed the worker for cause such that the worker could not recover, 
as they could under master and servant law189. In wrongful dismissal claims employers could also 
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raise arguments regarding the length of the contract, and that industry custom permitted them to 
dismiss with the appropriate notice, so as to minimize the period over which they had to pay wages 
in the absence of cause. Cause was therefore central to determining the rights between the parties 
at dismissal.  At common law the ability to dismiss for cause was sometimes treated as an implied 
term of the employment contract, but was generally implied as an incident of law in the 19th 
century.190 What constituted sufficient cause to justify dismissal, however, was an open question 
over the course of the century.191  
From the early 19th century it was clear that disobedience was sufficient cause for dismissal. Under 
the law of master and servant workers owed their employers a broad duty of obedience, which, 
coupled with the employer’s possessory rights over his or her workers throughout the annual term, 
allowed masters almost unfettered control over the worker’s actions. This was not a duty founded 
in contract or any type of negotiated agreement, but one implied by law from the subordinated 
nature of the relationship. Matthew Bacon in fact defined the master and servant relationship as 
one in which one party may force obedience of the other.192 In the early part of the century, the 
obedience requirement was very broad, and the orders given did not need to reasonable or fair. 
Thus in Spain v. Arnott a servant in husbandry brought a claim after being dismissed within the 
annual term for refusing to work over his regular dinner hour. The master argued that, as the 
contract was an annual hire and the plaintiff had not performed the entire year’s service, he could 
not recover the wages owing to him, presumably referencing the entire contract doctrine. Lord 
Ellenborough concurred, and then went on to state that if a servant disobeys his master’s orders, 
the master is entitled to turn him away, as the “question really comes to this, whether the master 
or the servant is to have the superior authority”.193  
In addition to disobedience the court added the grounds of gross moral misconduct, (pecuniary or 
otherwise), habitual neglect in business, or conduct calculated to seriously injure the master’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employment relationship, entrusting it instead to the managerial direction of the employer, to be periodically 
assessed by the courts upon challenge.  
190
 Callo v. Brounker (1829) 2 Man. & Ry 502 [Callo] at p. 504. This case is sometimes spelled Callow, instead of 
Callo, and there are variety of different citations and reporters available for it that put it at different dates 
191
 Arding v. Lomax (1855), 10 Ex. 734.  
192
 Mathew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, 7
th
 edition (London : A. Strahan, 1832) at 333.  
193
 Spain supra note 189 at p. 258. Turner v. Robinson, (1833) 5 b & ad 789; John Macdonell, The Law of Master and 
Servant (London: Stevens, 1883) at p.225. 
68 
 
business in the 1829 case of Callo v. Brounker.194 Though the grounds for cause were sometimes 
presented as implied contractual terms 195, for the most part prior to the 1870s they were simply 
seen as obligations that were “implied by law from the relationship of master and servant,” as 
explained by treatise writer Charles Smith in 1852. According to Smith, such duties consisted of the 
following: a servant had a duty to enter the service he had contracted for; a duty to continue the 
work for the duration contracted for; a duty to obey all lawful orders; a duty to be  honest; a duty to 
be diligent in the master’s business; a duty to take good care of the master’s property (failing which 
the servant may be liable in negligence); and a duty to respect one’s master as befitted his station 
in the world.196 Breach of any of these duties justified the worker’s summary dismissal.  
At a general level, however, the courts did not hold tightly to these categories throughout the 19th 
century. What constituted cause sufficient to justify dismissal was held to be a matter of fact197, 
and, until the 1870s, employers were given broad scope in determining what constituted sufficient 
cause.198 Indeed, the courts held that an employer need not state the grounds of dismissal at the 
time of termination, nor need know of sufficient cause at the moment of dismissal, so long as such 
cause was in existence at the time the courts were asked to assess it. Lord Denman, Chief Justice of 
the King’s Bench, stated in Ridgway v. Hungerford that it was “not necessary that a master, having a 
good ground of dismissal, should either state it to the servant, or act upon it. It is enough if it exist, 
and if there be improper conduct in fact.”199 
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Over the course of the 19th century, as increasing numbers of middle class and professional workers 
began bringing suit, a bifurcated standard of cause seemed to emerge. For domestic servants, who 
were to be available to their masters at all times of day, the master’s discretion was considerable on 
issues of cause. The general standard of misconduct, disobedience or neglect from Callo v. Brounker 
was applied, conceived of in explicit terms of social subordination and industrial discipline. 200 The 
scope of employer’s control was clear for industrial workers, who worked outside of the home, and 
were in relationships of general social subordination but not relationships of personal proximity to 
their masters.  Their employment was not regulated at common law, however.201 By the mid-
century, the question began to arise in regards to the work of middle class and higher status 
workers. In the 1861 case of Price v. Mouat, a lace-buyer refused to fold some lace on cards, which 
he viewed as beneath his station, and was dismissed for that refusal. 202 The plaintiff argued that, 
given that the order was one unrelated to the position he was hired for, he was not obligated to 
obey it. The jury at first instance agreed, and on appeal the court upheld the jury’s decision, holding 
that at issue was the question of whether the order given was related to the normal tasks of the 
position, and this was a matter of fact for the jury.203 This case, in 1861, is in sharp contrast to 
decisions like that of Turner v. Mason, where a domestic servant was dismissed for visiting her dying 
mother at night because her employer had expressly refused her request to do so.204 After the mid-
century, and particularly as of the last quarter of the 19th century, the notion of obedience was 
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reformulated and narrowed in regards to upper status workers. For Deakin and Wilkinson, it is this 
process of circumscribing the duty of obedience to the specifics of the position that is the hallmark 
of the contractualization of work relations for higher status workers in the last quarter of the 19th 
century.205   
Other than a demonstration of cause, the only other way to dismiss a worker within the term of 
their contract was if an industry custom of dismissal by notice could be demonstrated. This 
argument first emerged from the work of domestic service. Early in the 19th century employers of 
domestic servants began to argue that it was customary in that industry for annual hire contracts to 
be dissolved on the basis of one month’s notice by either party, or wages in lieu.206 This argument 
was first raised in the case of Robinson v. Hindmann in 1800, where the practice was considered 
sufficiently well established for the courts to accept its existence as customary, and thereafter 
applied by judicial notice.207 Three months notice was also later accepted as industry custom for 
clerks, and the courts permitted evidence of custom to be introduced in other industries.208  In such 
cases the courts examined evidence of usual practice in the industry, but also used the one month 
notice for domestic servants as a yardstick, comparing the relative social status of the industry to 
domestic service, to determine the likelihood of the suggested custom.209 Thus a custom of 
termination by notice served either to eliminate liability, where such notice had been given, or 
reduce damages owed, where the notice was shorter than the unexpired term of the contract.   
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While some lower status workers could be dismissed by notice (which was then also the measure of 
their damages), as of the 1860s, higher status workers could not be dismissed without cause during 
the annual or express term of the employment contract. 210 As Deakin and Wilkinson note, the 
courts demonstrated a clear concern that higher status workers receive greater legal protection in 
regards to dismissal.211 In the 1852 case of Todd v. Kerich, for example, the court distinguished 
between the situation of a governess and a domestic servant. The court stated that “the position 
she holds, the station she occupies in a family, and the manner in which such a person is usually 
treated in society certainly places her in a different situation from that which mere menial or 
domestic servants hold”.212 The measure of damages for a wrongful dismissal claim for workers 
under an annual hire contract was not entirely clear however. In some cases the courts stated that 
a worker under an annual hire contract was entitled to the wages owing over the rest of the year’s 
term, where dismissed without cause.213 But in other cases the courts stated that damages 
constituted the measure of actual loss from dismissal, being the amount of time necessary to find 
comparable employment within the annual term, subject to the duty to mitigate.214 Because 
damages were a question of fact for the jury, the details of what and how damages were assessed is 
not visible often on the face of 19th century reported decisions. Nonetheless, under either approach 
the implied or express fixed length of the contract in law guided the damage assessment. 
By the 1860s the courts of England began to suggest that the question of contract duration for 
general hires was not a presumption of law. Rather, in some industries, custom as to annual hire 
contracts was so well known as to be applicable by judicial notice, such that it resembled a 
presumption of law. 215 In stark contrast from the traditional common law position, for instance, in 
the 1860 case of Fairman v. Oakford Baron Pollock stated that:  “there is no inflexible rule that a 
general hiring is a hiring for a year. Each particular case must depend upon its own 
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circumstances.”216 But if there was no presumption of annual term for a contract without a 
delineated duration, how long should a general hire contract last, and how and when could it be 
dissolved? With increasing frequency in England in the last quarter of the 19th century employers 
argued that their contracts were not of annual length but were rather dissolvable by reasonable 
notice.  To resolve such arguments, the courts would investigate the frequency of wage payments 
and the terms of employment, to determine the intended duration of the parties.217 But if there 
was no clear intention, and no industry practice, towards the end of the 19th century the courts 
began to agree that dismissal could occur if reasonable notice was provided. 218 The presumption of 
annual hire was finally abandoned in England in the 1890s. Nonetheless, in the late 19th century, 
reasonable notice remained only the period of warning that a worker was to receive of impending 
dismissal. Damages were a separate issue.  
 
Just as workers began to bring contractual claims regarding employment to the common law courts, 
beginning in the 1830s industrial workers also sought to make use of emerging negligence doctrines 
to claim that employers held a duty of care to ensure workplace safety.219 The English courts in the 
19th century relied on status-based notions to determine workers’ entitlement to unpaid wages, 
damages for wrongful dismissal, and cause for termination, and dwelled little on contract principles 
to do so. But they took a different approach in regards to employers’ negligence. Drawing on broad 
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contractual notions of employment as a contract between two equal parties, the courts used the 
defence of voluntary assumption of risk, and crafted the “fellow servant” and “common 
employment” doctrines to depict workers as autonomous individual who voluntarily assumed the 
risks involved with their workplace.220 Until the 1880s, workplace safety claims by industrial workers 
were rejected on the basis that workers’ exercised their own will and informed decision-making in 
choosing to work, and that they could contract for increased wages as compensation for potential 
dangers.221  
Thus, as this description suggests, over the 19th century the law of employment contracts was in the 
midst of its early development in England. The courts tended to treat workers as equal contracting 
parties in the decision to enter employment, and in enforcing any explicit contract terms, but used 
their own understanding of status to determine implicit obligations between the parties, and to 
permit for different levels of entitlements on the basis of workers’ social class. The courts 
sometimes suggested that obligations emerged from the implicit intentions of the parties or by 
virtue of implied contractual terms, but for the most part, even after the common law of 
employment contracts began to take its own shape, the courts continued to rely on social status 
notions of subordination and class hierarchy to state obligations at law, without seeking to present 
them in negotiated terms or the language of contract. As the next chapter will detail, however, as of 
the 1890s significant changes were made to the conceptual foundations of the common law of 
employment contracts, which would set in place a nexus of ideas that persisted throughout the 20th 
century, although utilized and deployed in changing circumstances.  
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(4) 19th Century Common Law Cases in a Colonial Context: Ontario 
 
The developing common law of employment contracts described above was theoretically available 
to workers in Ontario in the 19th century.  But the social and economic context of a settler colonial 
society suggests that it was not formally invoked with great frequency prior to the 1890s. To 
understand why not, it is necessary to describe something of the social and economic environment 
of colonial Ontario. 
Until the 1840s Ontario’s economy was overwhelmingly agricultural, and its social culture built 
around the needs and practices of agricultural production.222  There was high labour mobility, both 
geographically and in terms of occupational change. Immigrants to the colony did not primarily seek 
waged work, but instead worked for the time necessary to accumulate enough capital to purchase 
their own lands. Until the mid-19th century farm owners moved in and out of waged relationships, 
depending on their cash-flow needs and debt load, and focusing instead on the development and 
sustainability of their agricultural production.  This meant that a farmer-employer could himself be 
a wage earner at different points in the year, perhaps needing to pay off a debt to the local general 
store.  
People took casual, occasional or seasonal work to clear a debt or complete a purchase; 
their long-term attachment was not to paid employment but to clearing or improving the 
family farm and acquiring property to settle their children. Labour market development was 
quite uneven, constrained by a double scarcity, of workers and of the capacity to pay them, 
although there was no shortage of potential work.223 
Many tasks, primarily in the agricultural field, were accomplished outside of waged relationships,  
through the use of family members, the pooling of labour by neighbours, or by payment in kind and 
sharecropping.224 In particular, much of the domestic work in the colony was performed by family 
members, rather than paid servants. What waged labour did exist was usually in the form of short 
term contracts, often of daily or monthly duration. The colony thus experienced an enduring labour 
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shortage until roughly the 1840s, particularly in regards to the skilled trades.225 Whereas in England 
the master and servant laws strictly regulated apprenticeships and entry into craft fields, because of 
the skill and population shortages in Upper Canada crafts were not so strictly separated, nor 
formally organized, particularly in rural areas.226  Starting in the 1830s and 1840s a growing number 
of unskilled workers began to immigrate to the colony, seeking work on construction gangs, 
railways and public work projects, and providing the first pool of stable waged workers.227 The 
period between 1840 and 1860s saw the first expansion of manufacturing work in Ontario, with 
some household production moving into central locations owned by employers. The burgeoning 
industrial manufacturing sector was based around a growth in trade in the province’s natural 
resources, such as agriculture and forestry, as well as related transportation infrastructure, and 
agricultural implements.228   
 
Labour market organization in early Upper Canada was, therefore, of much greater fluidity than in 
England, which mirrored the attenuated nature of social and class differentiation in the early years 
of the colony. Webber suggests that this period was marked by a lack of recourse to law, where 
parties instead relied on “self-protection – payment by the job, relatively short employment 
contracts, and the ability to leave and find other work, even physical intimidation”.229 Indeed, R.C.B. 
Risk states that in general during the first forty or so years’ of the colony’s young life “the courts 
decided the disputes that were brought to them, but the surviving records and the slim published 
reports suggest that they did not decide a representative, large, and continuing volume of disputes 
about commercial transactions and economic issues, and they decided only a few cases involving 
major issues of principle”.230  
                                                          
225
 Craven, The Law of Master and Servant, supra note 146 at p.179-180; W.C. Pentland, “The Development of a 
Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada”, (1959) 25(4) Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 450; Craig 
Heron "Factory Workers," in Paul Craven, ed., Labouring Lives: Work and Workers in Nineteenth-Century Ontario 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995) at p. 500. But cf, see Allan Greer, “Wage Labour and the Transition to 
Capitalism: A Critique of Pentland” (1985) 15 Labour/Le Travail 7 for a criticism of Pentland’s explanation of the 
timing and causes of the emergence of a waged labouring class in Canada.  
226
 Even in England the apprenticeship regulations for entry into the skilled trades had stopped being strictly 
followed, although the legal regulation remained on the books exist until 1814.   
227
 Pentland, supra note 225; Heron, Factory Workers, supra note 225. 
228
 Heron, ibid at p. 486-487.  
229
 Webber, supra note 156 at p. 115. 
230
 R.C.B. Risk, “The Law and the Economy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Perspective” (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 
403 at p. 406. Risk explains that the five largest types of cases in the early 19
th
 century were (1) the internal 
76 
 
The primary legal regime for the terms of employment by the 1840s was the law of master and 
servant. After some judicial doubt as to whether master and servant law was properly received in 
the colony, the local legislature passed a domestic statute in 1847, in tandem with the growth of a 
local wage-labouring class.231 The new Upper Canadian master and servant statute was modeled on 
the English statutes of the 1820s. It did not contain wage fixing or apprenticeship regulations, and 
focused instead on policing employment contracts. Thus, as in England, it created an expedited 
wage recovery mechanism for workers232, whose contract would be dissolved if they could 
demonstrate employer abuse or substantial wages owing. It also, however, continued to criminalize 
worker breach, imposing jail time for absence or misconduct, as compared to the civil penalties 
imposed on employers. The Act purported to apply to all ‘servants and labourers’, instead of the 
detailed lists of occupations that characterized the 18th century English acts. Importantly, it also 
included domestic workers, which were excluded in England, and was amended to include the 
skilled trades in 1855.233  
According to Paul Craven the passage of the domestic master and servant statute was part of a 
concerted effort at building and controlling a local waged-labouring class.234 Expanding public works 
projects and manufacturing endeavours were creating an ever greater need for low skilled labour, 
but the shape of the colonial economy had provided no incentive to work in that capacity. 
Immigrant workers to Upper Canada thus had held a certain amount of bargaining power.  
Depictions of domestic workers in particular discussed the ‘effrontery’ of their independence and 
assertiveness, their demands for higher wages and respect.235 Indeed, Robert Baldwin suggested 
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that the whole master and servant statute was aimed at household servants, and female labour.236  
Thus as the colony’s first industrial era got underway in the 1840s, and a concerted effort was made 
at forming a local waged labour force to aid in the expansion of nascent industry, the Master and 
Servant Act appears intended to try and curb the potential power of a newly emerging class of 
waged workers – as a tool for the maintenance of social order and industrial discipline.237 
While the law of master and servant appears to have been the primary method of work regulation 
in mid-19th century Ontario, because of the reception of the general English common law at the 
colony’s creation, the common law of employment contracts was also available. Decisions of 
Ontario’s courts began to be reported in the 1830s. Contractual claims regarding employment at 
common law were few and far between through most of the century. It was only as of the 1890s 
that the superior courts began to actively adjudicate questions of employment contracts, and that it 
can be said that a domestic body of case law began to emerge regarding the contract of 
employment at common law.  
The cases that were litigated in the 19th century were guided by the relatively strict application of 
English precedent.238 The Ontario judiciary viewed itself bound to English precedent not just at the 
level of institutional principle but as a matter of constitutional requirement.239 What change could 
be brought to the law was a matter for the English courts or for the local Legislature in regards to 
the common law, and for the Ontario Legislature on issues of statute. This led to rote, formal 
application of existing precedent, often without explanation for the justification behind a given 
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principle, or any deep analysis of the consequences of its application to the facts. Indeed, in some 
cases, no description of the technical claim brought is provided, no case law is cited, no explicit 
explanation of the conceptual principles at stake is given, and the facts are sparsely recorded on the 
face of the decisions.240  
The Upper Canadian judiciary clearly understand that the law was not settled in all areas, and that 
the conditions of a young frontier colony would raise questions to which English law did not attend.  
R.C.B. Risk describes innovations wrought in the area of corporate contracting not under seal (which 
played an important role in employment law cases), but also the unease the judiciary felt in striking 
out completely on their own.241 While they did in some instances turn to American case law on 
questions particular to colonial life, American law seems to have had more resonance for the 
Legislative Assembly and in the creation of new statutes than in regards to the common law. 
According to Risk, American cases were considered only infrequently because Upper Canadian 
jurists viewed them as impermissibly innovative.242 In employment contract cases, American cases 
were infrequently cited in the 19th century.  At an overall level, the particularities of employment in 
a colonial context were dealt with less by judicial innovation, and more simply by the types of cases 
that presented themselves before the courts. Thus, as we shall see, certain types of claims and 
certain types of claimants who were central to the development of the employment contract at 
common law in England did not emerge until the end of the 19th century in Ontario.  
Over the course of the 19th century there were two types of non-contractual cases relating to 
employment that were frequently before the courts.  The first are  “work and labour” claims, which 
concerned claims for payment by service providers who were not considered employees, such as 
architects, builders, etc. Starting in the 1860s Ontarian workers also brought negligence claims 
regarding workplace accidents.243  The courts of Ontario strictly applied English common law 
precedents to bar recovery for workplace accident through the “common employment”, “fellow 
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servant” and “voluntary assumption of risk” doctrines, depicting workers as equal contracting 
parties to the employment relationship, until the 1880s when the province enacted the Workmen’s 
Compensation for Injuries Act.244 Although the local courts used broad classical contract notions to 
deny workers’ negligence claims, there were few cases brought in contract regarding employment 
in Ontario over the 19th century. Those claims that were brought between the 1830s (when Upper 
Canadian cases began to be reported) and the 1890s generally fell within a few classes of cases. The 
first type of employment contract was quite particular, and concerned the power and formalities of 
contracting by municipal corporations in regards to their workers.245 The second, and related to that 
of municipal employment, was whether corporations who hired workers by contracts not under 
seal could be held accountable for their lack of performance.246 The third concerned work disputes 
amongst family members. These cases were of three types: firstly, claims by an individual for wages 
for services rendered to a member of their family.247 Secondly, claims for wages for services 
rendered within the family when the promised inheritance of land was revoked248, and thirdly, 
seduction claims by parents for the lost wages of female family members who became pregnant out 
of wedlock.249 Indeed, seduction, and work and labour claims (discussed below), appear to have 
been the most frequent work-related claims brought in the 19th century.250 By and large, on the 
basis of English precedents, work amongst family members was presumed not to constitute an 
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employment relationship, and claims for wages in such circumstances were almost invariably 
defeated. Given the centrality of family work in the first half of the 19th century, this presumption 
likely acted to remove a significant portion of the population from the law’s application in regards 
to employment, and elided, as did the seduction cases, the overlapping institutions of work and 
family in the colonial economy.  
The fourth set of cases concerned the proper interpretation of terms of written contracts of 
employment, almost invariably brought by workers, and relatively strictly interpreted, as Craven 
notes.251  Such contracts usually appeared to be particularly negotiated between the parties, and 
concerned different types of professional employment. They also sometimes concerned the effect 
of the Statute of Frauds on oral employment contracts.252 Finally, there were claims for wrongful 
dismissal253 and claims for wages254. The courts faithfully applied English precedent to decide such 
cases, but many issues that were frequently before the courts in England simply did not arise in 
Ontario. The presumption of annual hire, for instance, was rarely litigated.255 What evidence exists 
suggests employment contracts were of short term duration, at least until the last quarter of the 
19th century, given the scarcity of waged relationships and the high degree of labour mobility.256 
Prior to the 1890s there was sporadic judicial mention of the annual hire, where the courts 
suggested that the presumption existed in the province, but little consideration of its import.257 
Claims for industry custom of dismissal by notice, interestingly, did not arise until the 1890s. There 
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were also no claims by employers to enforce non-competition covenants in employment contracts 
before the turn of the century. At a broad level, contract claims in Upper Canada were brought 
almost solely by middle class and professional workers in the colony, almost exclusively by men, 
except in regards to family work claims. This stands in contrast to English cases during this time, 
which did see claims from lower status workers and from female servants (primarily domestic 
servants) throughout the 19th century. In contrast to English cases over the 19th century, in Ontario 
there were no cases from domestic workers (other than the family work cases)258 and no 
contractual cases from agricultural labourers or lower level factory workers.259  
Thus at a broad level it appears as though the common law of employment contracts was  simply 
not invoked with any frequency in Ontario prior to the 1890s.  The content of English principles in 
the area differed from the nature of employment practices in the colony.  Unlike the situation in the 
American colonies, where the local judiciary self-consciously adjusted the content of the law to 
local circumstances, in Ontario the specificity of the domestic economy was visible in the types of 
claims that were brought and those that were not, which reflected the nature of the local 
workforce and economy. As the next chapter will explore, the common law of employment 
contracts emerged to greater centrality in Ontario as of the 1890s, as the province underwent its 
Second Industrial Revolution. Major changes occurred in the social and economic structure of the 
province between the 1890s and the 1930s, which brought increasing numbers of claims to the 
common law courts, and in turn effectuated adjustments to the content of the common law of 
employment contracts in England and Ontario. It is to this topic we now turn. 
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(1) Introduction: The Emerging Nexus of Ideas on the Law of Employment Contracts at the 
Turn of the 20th Century 
 
Between 1890 and 1930 Ontario underwent a profound economic, social and political 
transformation. Over this period the province experienced one world war, the beginnings of the 
Great Depression, the first significant entry of women into the workforce, and its second industrial 
revolution.1 The 1890s started on a recessionary note in Ontario, but a period of significant 
economic growth began as of the turn of the 20th century. Economic expansion was provoked by 
changes in technology, through advances in hydro electric power, new manufacturing production 
machinery, and a significant influx of American direct investment. 2 American direct investment 
became a major political and economic force in the province, which was increasingly re-oriented 
towards its southern neighbours and away from the United Kingdom. The focus of production 
shifted from the dominance of family-based agrarian work to waged-labouring in the 
manufacturing, resource, transportation and finance sectors.3 With economic growth came the 
spread of the modern business enterprise that had first emerged in the United States in the mid-
19th century in the railway industry, and a significant capital consolidation movement. Business 
ventures grew in size and scope, with the formation of large-foreign financed “megaprojects”, in 
the words of Craig Heron, and with company mergers.4  The province’s population grew 
                                                          
1
 Craig Heron, “The Second Industrial Revolution in Canada, 1890-1930” in Deian R. Hopkin and Gregory S. Kealey, 
Class, Community and the Labour Movement, (Wales:Llafur/CCLH, 1989) at 48-66. 
2
 For general statistics on the transformation and rapid growth of the Canadian economy over the early 20
th
 
century, see O.J. Firestone, Canada’s Economic Development, 1867-1953 (London: 1958); Robert Craig Brown and 
Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991) at chapter 5; 
Heron , The Second Industrial Revolution, supra note 1 at p.50-53 
3
 Gordon Bertram, “Economic Growth in Canadian Industry, 1870-1915: The Staple Model and the Take Off 
Hypothesis” (1963) 29(2) Can J Eco & Pol Sci 159 at 176-177, 182. Ontario was the primary location for wood 
resource extraction, for resource processing and for the growth of financial intermediary businesses. 
4
 H.G. Stapells, “The Recent Consolidation Movement in Canadian Industry” (unpublished MA Thesis, University of 
Toronto, 1922); Heron, The Second Industrial Revolution, supra note 1 at p. 550-41; Brown and Cook, supra note 2 
at chapter 5; Craig Heron and Bryan Palmer, “Through the Prism of the Strike: Industrial Conflict in Southern 
Ontario, 1901-1914” (1977) 8(4) The Canadian Historical Review 423; Paul Craven, An Impartial Umpire: Industrial 
Relations and the Canadian State, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) 90-110; Graham Lowe, The 
Administrative Revolution: The Growth of Clerical Occupations, 1979, Unpublished Dissertation; Alfred Chandler, 
The Visible Hand (Belknap Press, 1977). 
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significantly, as did non-Anglo-American immigration.5 This was also a period of labour unrest and 
union organizing, of centralized government intervention into the economy, the labour market and 
labour regulation, and of serious political challenges to liberal capitalism, in Ontario and across the 
country.6  
The changing structures of economic activity, of production and of the labour process over the early 
20th century provoked the growth of a waged professional class in Ontario, and these workers 
brought their employment claims to the common law courts with a new degree of frequency. A 
significant white collar workforce had begun to emerge in England as of the 1850s through its 
second industrial revolution, but English employment contract law only began to reorient towards 
this type of work at the turn of the 20th century.7 In the early 20th century English law was applied in 
Ontario just as the provincial economy and labour market were in the midst of the transformations 
described above, and as the expansion of professional work was underway. Thus, if the law of 
employment contracts was slow to respond to the differences created by professional work in 
England, it occurred almost instantaneously in Ontario.  
What did this substantive legal reorientation consist of in the early 20th century? As outlined in the 
last chapter, claims relating to waged employment contracts first emerged at common law in 
England at the turn of the 19th century. The courts applied the substance of master and servant law 
to determine such claims until the mid-19th century, when the common law of employment 
contracts branched out on its own to provide distinct legal claims and remedies, even if ones that 
were still heavily conditioned by master and servant notions of status and subordination. These 
doctrines were applied in Ontario when common law employment claims came before the courts, 
but this did not happen often in the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th century, however, the 
common law of employment was more frequently litigated and was substantively reoriented 
around white collar work. This occurred through three significant legal changes in notions of 
                                                          
5
 Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991, 2
nd
 Edition 
(Toronto: McCelland & Stewart Inc., 1992) at p. 157-159. 
6
 Gregory Kealey, “1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt” (1984) 13 Labour/Le Travail 11. Craven, Impartial Umpire, 
supra note 4  at p. 90-110; Brown and Cook, supra note 2 at chapter 6: Labour and the New Society; Brian 
Bercusson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations, and the General Strike (Montreal 1974); Ross 
McCormack, Reformers, Radicals and Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical Movement, 1897–1919 
(Toronto: 1977). 
7
 Norman Gemmell and Peter Wardley, “The Contribution of Services to British Economic Growth, 1856-1913” 
(1990) 27 Explorations in Economic History, 299 at Table 1(i) p. 301. 
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property and time, and in the tools of managerial control in employment. Through this period the 
courts began to think about the property parameters of labour power, viewing employee time, 
employee skill and knowledge, and the physical and intellectual outputs of workers’ labour as 
separate commodities in law exchanged through contract. The second shift over this period was an 
expansion of the disciplinary tools of the managerial prerogative. As the property parameters of the 
wage-work exchange were narrowed in scope, and as some higher status workers were recast as 
waged-employees instead of independent business people, the courts began to draw on principles 
born of the law of agency to provide employers with new legal tools to control worker discretion. 
Employers continued to use the duty of obedience to manage the work of task-oriented 
employment, but the courts now also developed legal rights that were designed to tie the exercise 
of worker discretion to the needs of the enterprise. Finally, the third legal shift that occurred 
between the 1890s and the 1930s concerned legal notions of employment duration. Over the turn 
of the 20th century the legal presumption of annual hire was abandoned, and such that the 
employment contract was no longer constructed as one bounded in time. This served to alter the 
boundaries of the property purchased through an employment contract, provoking questions about 
how employment contracts could be dissolved and how to determine the loss from dismissal, 
paving the way for the emergence of employment contracts of indefinite duration. Together, these 
three legal changes established a nexus of ideas that created the legal foundations for the 
contractualization of the employment relationship at common law in Ontario.8  
 
This chapter will examine the emergence and deployment of this new nexus of ideas between 1890 
and 1930. The first part will provide a brief overview of the changing nature of the economy and 
labour market in Ontario, with an examination of the growth of a professional waged class of 
workers. The second part will discuss changing notions of property in employment, looking at 
employer attempts to control workers’ time, property and competition, during and post-
                                                          
8
 In the Personal Employment Contract Mark Freedland argues that there is a nexus of ideas between the 
unrestricted notice rule (the right to dismiss with the provision of reasonable notice) and the limited damages rule 
(damages as limited to wages and contractual benefits over the reasonable notice period), which currently 
dominates the conceptual understanding of the employment contract at common law. He argues that this nexus 
obscures a series of doctrinal choices which “systematically minimize the protection accorded to personally 
employed workers in a way that is neither doctrinally inevitable nor neutral in policy terms”. What I attempt to lay 
out in this chapter is the nexus of ideas which predates and was formative of the current wrongfulness/damages 
complex.  See Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford University Press, 2005) at chapter 7. 
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employment. The third part will discuss the emergence of new tools of managerial control aimed at 
worker discretion, which was achieved by expanding existing grounds of cause for dismissal and 
through the migration of implied duties from the law of agency. Finally, the last part will present 
changes to the legal principles regarding employment duration, its effects on wrongful dismissals 
claims and on the understanding of work as a contractual endeavour. Particular attention 
throughout this analysis will be paid to the ways in which the changing composition of the 
workforce affected the law’s understanding of its content.  It is through this era that the common 
law of employment contracts, contract type 2, properly became the law of professional workers. 
(2) Ontario’s Second Industrial Revolution, the Emergence of White Collar Work and the 
Managerial Revolution 
 
Ontario underwent its second industrial revolution over the turn of the 20th century. Its economy 
was increasingly enmeshed with the economies of the rest of the Dominion’s provinces. Canada’s 
gross national product more than doubled between the 1900s and 1910s, with Ontario providing 
the driving force.9 During this period Ontario experienced a sustained growth in manufacturing 
industries, which began to rival agriculture as a source of employment, while changes in its labour 
processes provoked the growth of professional class and managerial work. 10 Large-scale 
corporations became regular features of the economic and political landscape.11  In this context the 
content of the common law of employment contracts was oriented towards professional work 
within medium and large scale firms. 
Ontario had undergone its first industrial revolution over the mid-19th century.12 The period 
between 1840 and 1880 saw the first significant expansion of manufacturing work in Ontario, based 
around a growth in trade in the province’s natural resource products, primarily in the area of 
                                                          
9
  Firestone, supra note 2 at section 3. 
10
 John Baldwin and Alan Green, “The Productivity Differential Between the Canadian and U.S. Manufacturing 
Sectors: A Perspective Drawn from the Early 20
th
 Century” (2008) Canadian Productivity Review; O.J. Firestone, 
Canada’s Economic Development, 1867-1953 (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1958) at table 67 and 68. 
11
 Brown and Cook, Canada, supra note 2 at chapter 5; Lowe, The Administrative Revolution, supra note 4 at 
chapter 4. 
12
 Gregory Kealey, “Toronto’s Industrial Revolution, 1850-1892”, in Canada’s Age of Industry, 1849-1896, Michael 
Cross and Gregory Kealey, eds. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); Craig Heron "Factory Workers," in Paul 
Craven, ed., Labouring Lives: Work and Workers in Nineteenth-Century Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press 1995), 479-590. 
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agriculture and forestry, transportation, and agricultural implements.13  Although Ontario remained 
primarily an agricultural subsistence economy, with endemic labour shortages and only the 
beginnings of a relatively permanent wage-labouring pool, significant changes were nonetheless 
observable in regards to skilled crafts work.14 Between the 1840s and the 1880s manufacturing 
work was increasingly moved out of household production into central locations owned by 
employers. Some manufacturing enterprises grew to significant size over this period, with 
increasing managerial attention paid to changing labour processes.  Within factory employment 
employers began to subdivide and specialize the tasks of skilled workers, just as machinery became 
a bigger facet of the production process.15  In the mid-19th century some industrialists in Ontario 
began to seek methods to increase work output.  They did so through task specialization. This 
involved both a reduction in the number of products a skilled craft worker focused on, and then the 
separation of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled tasks necessary to produce a single good.  In this 
manner there was an increasing subdivision of tasks and specializations, allowing for non-skilled 
workers attracting lower wages to take on tasks that had previously have been done by a single 
skilled crafts worker. This began a process of skill dilution, slowly diminishing the independence of 
skilled craftsmen, transforming them from independent producers working in direct contact with 
clients to waged employees of industrial manufacturers.16   
Through the same period, management techniques slowly began to shift. For most of the first 
industrial revolution, industrial enterprises were typically owned by a single owner, or two or three 
partners, and run by their male family members. Thus a single entrepreneur or small group of 
owners would personally preside over large enterprises, forging close relations with their workers, 
                                                          
13
 Heron, Factory Workers, ibid at p. 486-487.  
14
 W.C. Pentland, “The Development of a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada”, (1959) 25(4) Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, 450; Heron, supra note 12 at p. 500. But cf, see Allan Greer, “Wage Labour and the 
Transition to Capitalism: A Critique of Pentland” (1985) 15 Labour/Le Travail 7 for a criticism of Pentland’s 
explanation of the timing and causes of the emergence of a waged labouring class in Canada.  
15
 Heron, Factory Workers, ibid  at p. 503; 506-508, 510. See Sidney Pollard for a detailed description of the shifting 
labour process and managerial changes in England through the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis 
of Modern Management (Baltimore: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968). See Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (Belknap 
Press, 1977) at chapters 1-4, for a discussion on these processes in the United States. 
16
 Heron, Factory Workers, ibid at p.500-516; Bryan Palmer, A Culture in Conflict: Skilled Workers and Industrial 
Capitalism in Hamilton, Ontario 1860-1915 (Montreal, 1979) at p. 71-95. 
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and directing their operations based on a mix of material care, loyalty, command and punishment.17 
Day-to-day discipline was either directly exercised by the owner or a family member, or, in larger 
enterprises, entrusted to a salaried foreman. Foremen held a significant amount of power in this 
context, undertaking labour recruitment, wage setting, production setting, day-to-day supervision 
and discipline over particular branches of operations. But, other than foremen “ [...] with only rare 
exceptions (notably the railways) we find no large new class of professional factory managers in the 
province’s industries before the end of the nineteenth century.”18  
In the 1880s and 1890s, however, traditional approaches to workplace management began to 
change as the size of individual business enterprises grew.  Alfred Chandler argues that the modern 
business corporation began to dominate economic activity through this period, at least in the 
United States. 19 These were enterprises which operated through multiple units, usually in multiple 
locations, whose interactions and activities were administered by a hierarchy of middle and top 
salaried managers “to coordinate the work of the units under its control”.20 In tandem with the 
growth in the size of business enterprises and manufacturing processes, towards the end of the 19th 
century American businesses began to think strategically about ways of improving labour 
profitability by systematizing manufacturing processes.21 Discussions over the changes necessary to 
                                                          
17
 Heron, ibid; Paul Craven and Tom Traves, “Dimensions of Paternalism: Discipline and Culture in Canadian Railway 
Operations in the 1850s” in On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process in Canada, Craig Heron and Robert Storey 
eds., (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986).  
18
 Heron, Factory Workers, supra note 12 at p. 536. 
19
 The modern business enterprise was characterized by “many distinct operating units and is managed by a 
hierarchy of salaried executives”. Such an enterprise was one in which vertical and horizontal integration could 
occur. But as Chandler has argued, the advantages of such vertical integration could not occur until a “managerial 
hierarchy had been created”, because a “[...] multiunit enterprise without such managers remains little more than 
a federation of autonomous offices”. See Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 15 at p.7. While it Is clear that the 
size of business enterprises grew dramatically over the early 20
th
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statistical information about the legal forms such businesses over this period. We have some statistics for the pre-
Confederation era. See R.C.B. Risk, “The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario” 
(1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 270 at p. 304-305. Brown and Cook indicate that in 1900 53 companies were formed under 
Dominion Charter, while in 1911-912 there were 658.  See Brown and Cook, supra note 2 at chapter 5 at p. 91. See 
AW Currie, “The First Dominion Companies Act” (1962) 3(2) Can J Eco & Pol Sci 387 and Eric Tucker, “Shareholder 
and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: From Condition of Granting Limited Liability to 
Exceptional Remedy” (2008), 26(1) Law & Hist. Rev. 57, for a history of the American and Canadian debates, inter 
alia, over incorporation and limited liability.  
20
 Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 15 at p.7 
21
 Much of the early discussions over reforms to management methods were undertaken by engineers in trade 
journals. Some of their suggestions were for “cost accounting systems to promote vertical integration; production 
and inventory control plans to facilitate horizontal integration; and wage payment plans to stimulate production 
and reduce unit costs”.   Daniel Nelson, Managers and workers: origins of the twentieth-century factory system in 
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modernize management emphasized that the traditional ‘rule of thumb’ approach to manufacturing 
organization was chaotic and wasteful, that it led to difficulties in maintaining managerial control 
over manufacturing operations, and that coordination between activities and in managerial 
relations was necessary.   Whereas the day-to-day control over production had previously resided 
either with owners or with factory foremen, in the 1880s and 1890s conversations began in the 
United States about how to restructure the production process, culminating in the 1920s in the 
ideas of ‘scientific management’ popularized in particular by Frederick Taylor.22  
Systematic and scientific management came to Canada a little later than in the United States. While 
the trade journals and digests informing the American debate in the late 19th century were in 
circulation in Canada, it was not until the early decades of the 20th century that Canadian 
industrialists began to contribute to that conversation and to implement systemized production 
procedures designed around the ‘thrust for efficiency’.23 Heron and Palmer argue that in the early 
20th century in Southern Ontario ‘efficiency’ reorganization of the labour process in the steel 
industry was at the core of industrial disputes.24 This reorganization was closely followed by a major 
wave of direct foreign investment by American companies in Canada, and by the opening of 
American manufacturing branch plants, particularly in Ontario and Quebec.25 It was also during this 
period that the first wave of significant mergers and acquisitions took place in Ontario, 
consolidating capital such that only very few large companies controlled many major Canadian 
industries by 1920.26  
Amongst the “eclectic collection of managerial reforms and innovations” of the early 20th century 
were some of the following: cost accounting and vertical integration methods, the study and 
control of work time, task simplification and standardization, and experiments with payment 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the United States, 1880-1920 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) quoting Litterer at p. 50; Leland Jenks, “Early 
Phases of the Management Movement” (196) 5(3) Administrative Science Quarterly 421 at p. 428-430. 
22
 Taylor’s ideas were of important significance in changing thinking on production organization and management 
techniques, even if perhaps not as widely adopted in the details as is sometimes suggested. Nelson, supra note 21 
at chapter 4; Bryan Palmer, “Class, Conception and Conflict: The Thrust for Efficiency, Managerial Views of Labor 
and the Working Class Rebellion, 1903-1922” (1975) 7 Review of Radical Political Economics 31 at p. 32.  
23
 Craven, Impartial Umpire, supra note 4 at p. 94-100; Palmer, ibid; Heron and Palmer, supra note 4; cf Michael 
Bliss, A living profit: studies in the social history of Canadian business, 1883-1911 (Toronto, 1974) at 11. 
24
 Heron and Palmer, ibid at p. 434-456. 
25
 Michael Bliss, “Canadianizing American Business: The Roots of the Branch Plant” in Close the 49
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 Parallel etc: 
The Americanization of Canada, Ian Lumsden ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). 
26
 Heron and Palmer, supra note 4 at p. 426-427. See generally Stapells, supra note 4. 
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methods and bonus systems.27 All were designed to gain more productivity from workers and 
remove perceived inefficiencies from the labour process. 28 But such an approach required 
coordination of discrete tasks through additional layers of supervisors. The traditional zone of a 
foreman’s discretion under the older factory system was divided into separate jobs that were 
increasingly centralized and undertaken by professional office staff. 29 The result was the creation of 
a longer, larger, more hierarchical and more impersonal managerial chain. The breakdown of 
manufacturing work into more discrete units also created a need to track production, sales, and 
worker input/output, all of which created an information explosion.30 This served to promote 
administrative offices to a more central role in businesses’ structures, and led to a major increase in 
the amount of clerical work and the number of clerical workers. Routine clerical work, previously a 
mid-level skilled trade, was refashioned as an unskilled area for women’s employment, to be 
supervised by male managers.31  
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 Palmer, The Thrust for Efficiency, supra note 22 at p. 32. 
28
 Heron and Palmer, supra note 4 at p. 430.  
29
 In so doing foreman lost their control over hiring and firing, wage setting and production rates setting. Control 
over employment recruitment and training was also centralized, instead of left to the foreman’s discretion, as 
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th
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industry served to reduce their autonomy and control over wage levels. See Craig Heron and Robert Storey, “Work 
and Struggle in the Canadian Steel Industry, 1900-1950”, in On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process in Canada, 
Craig Heron and Robert Storey eds., (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986) at p 219.  
30
 Lowe, The Administrative Revolution, supra note 4. According to Braverman, over this period the office was 
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thirty years of the twentieth century a variety of specialized administrative and managerial positions emerged to 
take on the centralized planning of tasks necessary to coordinate and track the production process. Lowe’s figures 
suggest that between 1911 and 1931, approximately 150 000 new clerical jobs were created in Canada, of which 
34.5% emerged from manufacturing, and 21% from the finance sector. See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly 
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) at p.125; See 
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Canada) 
31
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91 
 
This was not an uncontested process. Adjustments to the labour process, managerial initiatives to 
diminish the independence of craftsmen, and the abandonment of the mutual obligations of a 
paternalist system of employment were a primary cause of labour unrest over the 1880s, and again 
between 1901 and 1914. Urban craftsmen had begun to organize themselves into craft unions in 
the 1850s, but organized trade unionism expanded across the province during the recession of the 
1880s, over a period known as the Great Upheaval.32 Led by the Knights of Labour, skilled and 
unskilled workers, men and women engaged in collective action.33 Labour unrest once again 
intensified in Southern Ontario in the early 20th century, with industrial action combining with 
broader political agitation over the distribution of income and economic resources, in the midst of 
increasing capital consolidation.34 In this context the federal government began to take a more 
active hand in regulating industrial disputes. In 1900 the Conciliation Act was passed, in 1903 the 
Railway Labour Disputes Act was enacted, and then in 1907 the federal government created a 
Labour Department in tandem with the Industrial Disputes Investigations Act (IDIA).35 The social and 
economic impact of economic growth, industrialization and the changing nature of work 
relationships also stimulated provincial forays into minimum labour standards protection, in the 
areas of factory legislation, wage protection, and the regulation of child and female labour.36   
Statistics on the nature of the Canadian workforce suggest that between the 1910s and 1930s the 
percentage of low skilled and managerial classes expanded at either end of the wage scale. Green 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
eds. (Mtl and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986) at chapters 6 and 7. See p. 174 for a statistical 
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 Gregory Kealey and Bryan Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labour in Ontario 1880-1900 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982); Heron, Factory Workers, supra note 12 at p. 554-557. 
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34
 Heron and Palmer, supra note 4; Kealey, 1919, supra note 6. 
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and Green’s research suggests that in 1911 2% of the Canadian workforce was employed as a 
manager or foreman.37 By the beginning of the 1930s, 3.8% of the workforce was so employed. In 
the manufacturing sector, there were 35 000 supervisory and office employees in 1905 in Canada, 
compared to 347 700 production workers. In 1930 there were 84 600 office and supervisory 
workers in manufacturing, compared with 529 800 production workers.38 Coomb’s figures on white 
collar work in Toronto suggest that in 1881 12% of the workforce was engaged in clerical work, 
which rose to 22% by 1911.39 Green and Green’s national figures indicate that in 1922 5% of the 
workforce worked in clerical positions, which grew to 12% by the beginning of the 1930s.40 
Similarly, Paul Craven calculates that between 1901 and 1911 there was a significant national 
increase in the ratio of administrative workers to “productive staff”, but only in certain sectors and 
in large industries. 41  Managerial and professional workers’ wages ranked primarily in the 90th 
percentile and above.42 Skilled manufacturing workers ranked in the 50th to the 75th percentile 
generally, with tailors, artists, physicians and surgeons, along with skilled metal workers in the 75th 
to the 90th percentile.43 At the lower end of the wage distribution were hotel service workers, 
labourers, barbers and cooks, non-metal skilled and semi-skilled workers, sailors, etc. At the bottom 
of the wage distribution were servants and people involved with cleaning services. 44 Green and 
Green’s research suggests that the wage differential between skilled and unskilled work expanded 
significantly in Canada between 1911 and 1931, unlike the American evidence for the same 
period.45  
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Thus, over the first decades of the 20th century in Canada and Ontario, the nature of economic and 
social relations was in profound transition. Of greatest importance for the story told here was the 
expansion of a professional class of workers, whose wage levels were likely higher than the 
maximum recovery levels under its wage recovery mechanism.46 At the turn of the 20th century 
Ontario’s Master and Servant Act was available to recover wages of $40.00 or less. 47  The average 
national wage of industrial workers in 1905 was $375.00 per year. Given that $40.00 would 
represent more than a month’s earning, the Master and Servant wage recovery process was likely 
the more affordable and faster route for industrial production workers.48 The annual national wage 
average of supervisory employees in 1905 was $846.00 however.49 They were therefore more likely 
to bring claims to the Divisional and County courts, which permitted claims ranging between $40.00 
and $200.50 As the number of professional workers grew in size, they brought their employment-
related claims to the common law courts, such that the number of common law employment-
related claims increased in number, and the substance of the law was reoriented to focus primarily 
on professional work. 
                                                          
46
 As first enacted in 1847 the Act applied to “servants and labourers”, and was subsequently amended in 1855 to 
make clear its application to “journeymen or skilled labourers in any trade, calling, craft, or employment”. There 
was very little jurisprudence on the scope of the Act’s coverage over the second half of the 19
th
 century. Eric 
Tucker suggests that the decision In re Joice (1861), 19 UCQB 197, in which a teacher was found not to be covered 
by the Act, was likely motivated by a status-based conception of what constituted a servant. I have not located any 
cases that directly examine the question before the 1964 case of Winkler v High-Test Electrical Manufacturing Ltd., 
[1964] 1 O.R. 386 (H.C.J.) [Winkler]. There were, however, a number of cases on the differences between servants 
and partners for the purposes of the Master and Servant Act. See, for instance, Washburn v. Wright, [1913] O.J. 
No. 808 See also Eric Tucker, Constructing the Liberal Voluntarist Employment Regime: 1850-1879, unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author, at p.52. 
47
 The 1897 revision to the Master and Servant Act permitted masters or servants to bring a complaint to a Justice 
of the Peace regarding the terms of their engagement after its end, including regarding wages owing. See Master 
and Servant Act, RSO 1897, c.157, s.7 and 11. No more than $40 of unpaid wages could be recovered. Justices of 
the Peace were found not to have jurisdiction to award damages for wrongful dismissal in Swanick and Kotinsky 
(Re) (1909), 19 OLR 407. 
48
 Urqurhart and Buckley, supra note 38 at p.99. 
49
 Ibid 
50
 An Act Respecting the County Courts, RSO 1897, c. 55, s.23; An Act Respecting the Division Courts, RSO 1897, 
c.60, s.72. Between the 1890s and the end of the 1920s, there were 9 reported claims by workers for wages at 
common law (including by merchant seamen). See Davieaux v. Algoma Central R.W. Co., [1903] 4 O.L.R. 106; 
Reaume v. Jubinville, [1908] 12 O.W.R. 609 (H.C.J. Div. Ct.); Webster v. Jury Copper Mines Limited, [1908] 12 O.W.R. 
632 (H.C.J.); Bilow v. Larder Lake Proprietary Gold Fields Limited, [1908] 11 O.W.R. 573; Spearman v. Renfrew 
Molybdenium Mines Limited[1919] 15 O.W.N. 343; Mandryx v. Morozuk, [1924] 25 O.W.N. 714 (S.C. H.C.Div); 
Ostrum v. Miyako (The), [1924] 2 D.L.R. 200; Venosta (The) v. Colliers, [1925] Ex.C.R. 212;  Thompson v. City of 
Windsor [1928] 35 O.W.N. 117 (S.C. Ap. Div.) A number of cases were also brought for wrongful dismissal and 
wages owing, a number in which the court proceeded on the basis of quantum meruit, and a number in which the 
courts found the work to fall within the family work presumption against remuneration.  
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(3) Employment Contract Cases Between 1890 and 1930: A general description 
 
As the 20th century got underway, the Ontario bar understood the provincial laws of work to come 
from domestic statutes and the common law of England. Judges continued to use English decisions 
to decide the cases that came before them, and English appellate decisions were considered 
binding. Although American cases had been used in the 19th century by the Ontario judiciary in 
other areas of law, this did not occur with frequency in employment law cases.51 As of the 1890s 
there was some upsurge in the use of American decisions, particularly in property-related claims, 
but generally the Ontario judiciary remained strictly faithful to English legal developments. They 
relied only sporadically on local decisions, and very rarely used precedents from other provinces. 
An increasing number of claims were reported before the common law courts regarding 
employment as of the 1890s, which paralleled the province and country’s economic expansion over 
this time. Unsurprisingly, it is in the area of tort negligence (vicarious liability and workplace safety 
conditions) that the greatest number of common law claims relating to work was brought over this 
era.52 But common law contractual claims also began to be litigated more frequently as of the 
                                                          
51
 J.M. MacIntyre, “The Use of American Cases in Canadian Courts” (1964-1966) 2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 478; Bora Laskin, 
The British Tradition in Canadian Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969) at 98-106; R.C.B. Risk, “The Golden Age: The 
Law about the Market in Nineteenth-Century Ontario” (1976) 26(3) U.T.L.J. 307 at p. 339-340;  R.C.B. Risk, “Sir 
William R. Meredith C.J.O.: The Search for Authority” (1982-1983) 7 Dal. L.J. 713 at p. 720-721.  
52
 These claims are beyond the scope of this project, and relatively little research has been conducted into the 
common law of torts in the workplace between the 1890s and 1930s, although there was a significant amount of 
contemporary commentary on the topic. See, for instance, “Employer’s Liability to Servant: The position of a 
servant who continues work on the faith of his master’s promise to remove a specific cause of danger (note)” 
(1898) 34 Can. L.J. 289; “Liability of an Employer for the Torts of an Independent Contractor (note)” (1904) 40 Can. 
L.J. 529; “Liability of a Master, Apart from Contract, for Tortious Acts Done by a Servant While in Control of 
Vehicles and Horses (notes)” (1911) 47 Can. L.J. 521; D.A. MacRae, “Servants Own Private Ends” (1923) 1 Can. Bar 
Rev. 67. There have, however, been some significant studies of workplace safety and vicarious liability in the 19
th
 
century. See Eric Tucker, “The Law of Employers’ Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: The Search for a Theory” (1984) 
22(2) O.H.J.J. 213; Eric Tucker, “The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety Standards in Ontario, 1860-
1982: From the Market to Politics to…?” (1983) 29 McGill L.J. 261 at 269-282; R. W. Kostal, “Legal Justice, Social 
Justice: An Incursion into the Social History of Work-Related Accident Law in Ontario 1860-1886” (1988) 6(1) Law 
and History Review 1; Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Legal Cultures in the Lands of the 
British Dispora – The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600—1900 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) at 426. Another area of significant litigation over this period, as over the 19
th
 century, was 
in regards to seduction claims, where a father would claim damages for the income lost by a daughter who was 
impregnated out of wedlock. The father could claim as master, whether or not the daughter was in fact remitting 
to the household. For more information on such claims, see Constance Backhouse, “The Tort of Seduction: Fathers 
and Daughters in Nineteenth Century Canada” (1986-1987) 10 Dal. L.J. 45. 
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1890s. As Table 2 demonstrates, there was a significant increase in reported cases between the 
1890s and 1910s, before dropping down in the 1920s.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Reported Employment Contract Cases, 1890-1929 
Decade Wrongful Dismissal Property-Related 
Claims 
Misc Total  
 
1890-1899 5  
 2 of which appealeda 
1 0 6 
1900-1909 18  
 2 of which appealed 
7  
3 of which appealed 
11 36 
1910-1919 22 
2 of which appealed 
6  
3 of which appealed 
5  
1 of which appealed 
33 
1920-1929 15 
3 of which appealed 
4  
Including 1 cross-
claim for WD 
7 26 
a
 The cases are organized by date of decision. The ‘appeals’ category denotes the number of cases decided within 
each decade that was then appealed upwards. Cases that were appealed are only counted once, in the decade in 
which the first reported decision was made.  
 
Civil claims regarding employment contracts were of two main types between 1890 and 1930: 
wrongful dismissal claims, and claims from employers seeking property rights and contractual 
control over the intellectual and physical resources of workers.53 Over this period claims were 
brought by sales agents, machinists, engineers, bakers, jewellers, steamship hands and mariners, 
tailors and seamstresses, managers, superintendents, physicians, etc.54 Domestic servants and 
unskilled industrial workers very rarely brought claims at common law regarding dismissal, although 
they were subject to employer-initiated property claims. Very few women brought claims at 
                                                          
 
53
 There were additionally a few claims by employers against workers for leaving within the terms of their 
contracts, a few claims that were particularly about the interpretation of the written terms of an agreement, and a 
few claims about whether the claimant constituted a worker or partner, so as to have access to the company’s 
financial records. For the latter category, section 3 of the Master and Servant Act , R.S.O. 1914, c.144 s.3(2) created 
a presumption against partnership when workers were paid in shares of the profits, and protected employers from 
having to disclose their financial records to employees.  
54
 According to Green and Green’s national weekly occupational wage distribution for 1921, clerks between the 
ages of 15-24 earned in the 10-25
th
 percentile of workers, while those aged 65 and over earned in the 25-50
th
 
percentile; bakers between 25-65 years of age earned in the 25-50th percentile; machinists between the ages of 
25-65 were in the 50-75
th
 percentile of wage earners; tailors in the 50-75
th
 percentile; physicians were in the 50-
75
th
 percentile of wage earners; managers ranged from the 50-75
th
 percentile upwards depending on industry. See 
Green and Green, supra note 37 at p.41-42. 
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common law regarding work, except occasionally as regards family work.55 For the most part, the 
common law of employment contracts was concerned with the employment relationships of skilled 
craft workers, skilled service workers, sales agents, and managers (from foreman to general 
managers).  All the claims tallied in Table 2 were indexed in legal reports and journals of the time as 
“master and servant” cases.56 
 
(4) What do Wages Buy? Contestation over Property Rights in Employment at the Turn of the 
20th Century 
 
Kenneth Vandevelde and Catherine Fisk each argue that over the course of the 19th century the 
courts’ understanding of property rights was profoundly transformed, from an absolute dominion 
over physical things to a set of relational rights between people over dephysicalized interests of 
value.57 This process is visible in the employment-related case law of the early 20th century. As 
argued in the previous chapter, the courts in the 19th century understood an employment contract 
to provide employers with a general right of ownership over workers’ labour power for the duration 
of the employment contract. This purchase was not solely for working hours, or in regards to a 
particular form of work. Rather employers purchased a worker’s entire labour for the duration of 
the express or implied year term.58 Charles Labatt explained that a master is “viewed as a party who 
                                                          
55
 There are approximately 3 claims by women between 1890 and 1930. 
56
 The indexing system for reported decisions in Ontario was not terribly standardized over the 19
th
 century, but 
became somewhat more so over the early 20
th
 century. ‘Master and servant’ was the general heading for all work-
related claims, including statutory claims, negligence claims, contract claims, etc. But once the general area was 
identified, rather than standardized concept terms, a quite precise explanation of the claim might follow. For 
instance, ‘Master and Servant -- Claim by Engineer against Mining Company for Arrears of Salary’. There was rarely 
a general contract index term heading prior to the early 20
th
 century. And wrongful dismissal claims, even of senior 
managerial employees, were almost always classified as Master and Servant cases instead of contract cases. This 
analysis is based on my perusal of all printed reported decisions in Ontario between 1845 and 1900. For 20
th
 cases I 
have used a series of Quicklaw searches. Quicklaw’s reference librarians explained that they copied index headings 
verbatim of all decisions that they have published online. 
57
 Kenneth Vandevelde, “The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept 
of Property”, (1980) 29 Buff L Rev 325; Catherine Fisk, Working Knowledge: Employee Innovation and the Rise of 
Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1930 (USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2009) at p.9. 
58
 I have found little in the way of judicial discussion on employers’ property rights over workers’ labour at 
common law in the 19
th
 century. William Roberts, the miners’ lawyer, however, explained the master and servant 
acts of the 18
th
 century as conceiving of the relationship of master and servant as one where the “employer had 
unlimited control over the whole of [the servant’s] time”. See William Roberts, Testimony before the Select 
Committee and Royal Commission Report on Master and Servant Law, 1865-1867 (Shannon: Irish University Press 
Series of British Parliamentary Papers) at s. 1657 (regarding master and servant laws). Similarly in settlement cases 
workers who were permitted evenings and weekends off were not considered to be under annual hire contracts, 
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has acquired by the contract of hiring a proprietary interest, more or less complete according to the 
circumstances, in the services of the person hired. In other words, the assumed effect of the 
contract is to vest in the master a right to control for his own benefit the whole or part of the 
earning capacity of the servant”.59 The master’s right of control, and the worker’s corresponding 
duty of obedience, was therefore premised on the employer’s general purchase of labour service 
over the term of the employment contract.  
 
Once the presumption of annual hire was abandoned in the 1890s, as will be discussed below, the 
judicial approach to determining property rights in employment began to change. This occurred as 
Ontario underwent its second industrial revolution, during which the province experienced a large 
growth in industrial manufacturing and service sector employment.60 Between the 1890s and the 
1930 there was an intensification of technological innovation and increasing specialization of 
industrial manufacturing methods. In this context there was a growing emphasis on the economic 
value of information, knowledge and job-specific worker training, and an increase in litigation 
concerning the property entitlements of parties to employment relationships. Employers over this 
period relied on older master and servant concepts such as exclusive service, and rights of 
possession and control throughout the duration of an employment contract to assert entitlements 
to workers’  time, workers’ skills and information gained on the job, and the physical outputs of 
their labour, during and post-employment. But once the employment contract was no longer fixed 
in time, the courts moved away from a general the idea that contracts of hire included workers’ sale 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
even if employment for multiple year contracts. These were referred to as exceptive hire contracts and could not 
establish a settlement by hire. See R v. St John Devizes (1829) M. & R. 680 (QB); Robert Steinfeld, The Invention of 
Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991) at p. 85-86, 157. 
59
 Labatt enunciated this principle in 1913, although, as I argue, in Ontario it was in the midst of reformulation. 
Labatt explained that there were three lines of cases surrounding employers’ interest in workers’ earning 
capacities. One line of cases was premised on the owners’ proprietary interest over that earning capacity, entitling 
an employer to an equitable accounting of any wages earned by the worker outside the job. The second line of 
cases was based on the same principle but concerned an employer’s right to dismiss a servant for extraneous 
work. The third line of cases resulted in the same equitable remedies as the first, but was articulated on the basis 
of workers’ fiduciary obligations to their employers. See C.B. Labbatt, Commentaries on the Law of Master and 
Servant, 2
nd
 Edition (Rochester, Lawyers’ Cooperative Publ., 1913). This book was published in Rochester, New York 
but concerned the laws of England.  
60
According to the Bank of Canada’s report to the 1956 Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects,  in 
1891 24.2% of the Canadian workforce were engaged in service industries, 48.4% in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, and 14.8%  in manufacturing. By 1931 37.9% of the Canadian population worked in service industries, 
31.2% in agriculture et al, and 18.5% in manufacturing. See Bank of Montreal, The Service Industries, vol. 17, 
Report of the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects (Ottawa, 1956) at p.5-6. 
98 
 
of their whole labour power over the duration of its term, and instead began to present labour 
power as a series of different economic commodities capable of sale through contract. And as 
labour service was subdivided into a series of separate commodities, the judiciary increasingly 
determined claims for property entitlements in employment based on whether the particular 
activity was intended to be exchanged by the parties. While Deakin and Wilkinson locate the 
contractualization of employment in the process of limiting the duty of obedience for higher status 
workers, claims regarding property in employment provided a perhaps even clearer locus for 
examining the shift towards understanding employment as an exchange in law. 61 
 
The following section will examine employer claims for property interests over the physical outputs 
of workers’ labour, to all profits gained from their skill and time during the life of an employment 
contract, and to a right of control over deployment of the knowledge and information gained on the 
job, both during and after employment.   
 
(a) Property Rights Over Workers’ Time and the Physical Products of Labour 
 
Over the early 20th century employers and workers fought legal battles over what amount of a 
worker’s skill and time was purchased through a hire contract, and what products of a worker’s 
labour such a contract provided to an employer. Unlike in previous eras, however, as of the 1890s 
the courts of Ontario increasingly looked to the parties’ intentions to determine what property 
rights were the subject of exchange in employment. This was true in regards to copyright and 
patent claims over goods produced by workers, regulated by statute.62  It was also increasingly 
                                                          
61
 Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson argue that the contractualization process was one of transforming the 
employment relationship into one of mutual obligations, in which some limitations were placed on the employer’s 
ability to direct the relationship. Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) at 14-15; 80. This process began for upper status workers in the late 19
th
 century. See for 
instance Price v. Mouat (1862), 11 CB (NS).  
62
 The law stipulated that the employer was not considered the author of a literary work within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act unless an intention could be inferred from the express or implied term of the employment 
agreement that ownership should vest in the employer. Charles Labatt noted that where the issue was to 
determine the intent as implied by the employment agreement, the courts would look not only to its terms but to 
the nature of the work in question. See C.B. Labatt, “Patent and Copyright Law, Considered with Reference to the 
Contract of Employment” (1905) 42 Can. L.J. 529 at p.549. See Sweet v. Benning, (1855) 16 C.B. 459; Lawrence v. 
Aflao, (1904) A.C. 17; Lamb v. Evans, (1893), 1 Ch. 218 [Lamb].By contrast, the general rule in regards to patents 
was that the employer held proprietary rights to any inventions it hired the worker to investigate and/or create, 
but anything discovered or invented beyond what was contracted for was generally the employee’s property .For 
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adopted in regards to basic questions of property entitlement over physical objects made on the 
job. In Copeland-Chatterson v. Business Systems, an employer claimed a right to tools a master tool-
maker made in the workplace during work hours, but took with him upon leaving the company’s 
employ.63 The High Court of Justice approached the question as a matter of whether the employer 
owned the worker’s time when the good was produced. The court noted that it was trade custom 
for tool makers to use their idle time to make tools with materials they had purchased themselves, 
even if with the employer’s machinery. More importantly, there were times of the work day when 
the machines that the tool-maker supervised required no attention. Given that the tool-maker was 
free to sit idle during such times, why should he not use it productively to make his own tools? The 
Court held that “[i]n the absence of a covenant expressly to the contrary, a servant’s spare time is 
his own, and he is not accountable to his master for benefits derived from its use”.64  The only 
recourse available to the employer was for improper use of the factory’s power to make the tool, 
but this would not grant the employer the ownership rights it sought. This was a sharp contrast to 
19th century settlement decisions such as R. v. St John Devizes, where the court assumed that the 
employer owned the worker’s entire time through the day and night unless an explicit contract 
term stated otherwise.65 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ontario patent cases see Piper v. Piper (1904), 3 O.W.R. 451; Campbell v. George N. Morang & Co. (Ltd.) (1905), 6 
O.W.R. 901 (Ont. C.A.) [Campbell]; Imperial Supply v. Grand Truck (1912), 7 D.L.R. 504; Spearman v. Renfrew 
(1919), 15 O.W.N. 343; Equator Manufacturing Co. v. Pendlebury, [1926] 1 D.L.R. 1101 [Equator Manufacturing]; 
Willard’s Chocolates Ltd. v. Bardsely (1928), 35 O.W.N. 92. In Equator Manufacturing the court stated at para 16 
that:  
Generally speaking, the law, I think, is that if a servant makes an invention whilst in the employ of his 
master, the invention belongs to the servant unless the servant was employed for the express purpose of 
inventing.”  
The exception to this rule arose where a relationship of good faith was to be implied “as an obligation arising from 
the contract of service”. In such cases, such as Willard’s ibid at para. 8, the employee effectively acted as trustee 
for his employer in regards to the patent. See also Catherine Fisk’s description of the evolution of patent ideas in 
employment in the United States between the 1830s and the 1930s. Fisk suggests that prior to the 1830s the 
patent system was based on a single-inventor paradigm, but that as production, invention and research became 
more complex and participatory, the law of patents and of master and servant came into increasing interaction. As 
of the mid-19
th
 century the courts increasingly examined what the worker was hired to do. Where the worker 
invented during work hours, at an employer’s facility using their tools, the suggestion as of the 1880s was that the 
invention was done for the employer, who therefore held proprietary rights over it. Fisk, Working Knowledge, 
supra note 57  at p.39-44 and chapters 3 and 4.  
63
 Copeland-Chatterson Co. v. Business Systems Limited (1906) 8 O.W.R. 888 (Ont. H.C.J. T.D.) [Copeland at the TD] 
at para. 23, rev’d by (1907), 10 O.W.R. 819 (Ont. C.A.) [Copeland at the CA] 
64
 Copeland at the CA, ibid at para 10. 
65
 R v. St John Devizes (1829) M. & R. 680 (QB) [St. John Devizes]. 
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The employer in Copeland-Chatterson suggested that it owned anything and everything the 
employee produced during working hours, or on its premises.66 And in at least two other cases over 
the early 20th century, employers asserted ownership over the products of all an employee’s time 
and efforts, even outside of the job.67 In the 1900 case of Jones v. Linde British Refrigeration the 
plaintiff employee brought an action to recover a commission he claimed owing to him after the 
defendant company paid it to his employer instead.68 His employer claimed that the commission 
was earned through his employment, such that they were entitled to it.69 For the Court of Appeal 
Moss J.A. agreed that the general rule was that enunciated in Morison v. Thompson: “the profits 
acquired by a servant or agent in the course of or in connection with his services or agency belong 
to his master or principal”.70But, having originated in the feudal relationship between lord and 
villein, and then extended to apprentices and servants, it could not apply to all types of 
occupations, or to “every class of employee or agent”. Justice Moss noted that in the case of 
partnerships, while partners were bound to devote their time and services for the benefit of the 
partnership, they were also able to make individual profit outside the scope of the relationship, so 
long as they were not in competition with it. This principle, Justice Moss held, should also be 
applied to employees and servants, because “the law is [not] so extreme in the case of employees 
or servants as to prevent them from engaging their minds in other occupations out of the hours of 
their service, where the occupation is not inconsistent with or antagonistic to the master’s business 
                                                          
66
 Copeland, supra note 63. 
67
 Catherine Fisk’s description of property-related claims in the United States suggests that cases concerning the 
use of worker’s time outside of the job were already well established there in the 19
th
 century. See Fisk, Working 
Knowledge, supra note 57 at p. 88-89.  
68
See Jones v. Linde British Refrigeration Co. (1900), 32 O.R. 191 (Ont. H.C.J. Ch. Div), rev’d by (1901), 2 O.L.R. 428 
(Ont. C.A.) [Jones at the C.A.] [Jones] Jones was employed as the managing director of the Cold Storage Company. 
His employer had asked him to advise one of their clients about changes to their plant because of his side 
knowledge in this area. He recommended that this client use the Linde British Refrigeration Company, the 
defendant. Jones had an agreement with the Linde British Refrigeration Company, without his employer’s 
knowledge, for commission on any business he provided to them. But rather than pay him the commission, they 
paid it to his employer, at its request. The justices of the Chancery Division concluded that because Jones’ 
consultation relationship with the defendant began at his employer’s request, the referral occurred as part of his 
employment. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed, holding that his employer had simply suggested that he 
make use of his special skills in regards to an area that he was not called upon to use in their employ. 
69
 The legal question here, as had been stated in the English case of Williamson v. Hine, [1891] 1 Ch.390 at 393 was 
whether Jones acted within the terms of his employment in making this referral, such that its benefits belonged to 
his employer, or whether he acted outside of his employment such that he could receive remuneration for it. 
Williamson v. Hine, [1891] 1 Ch.390 [Williamson] at 393, cited by the Chancery Division in Jones, supra note 68 at 
para 10. 
70
 Jones at the C.A., supra note 68 at para 17; Morison v. Thompson (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. [Morison]. 
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or interest”.71  The Court of Appeal concluded that the worker did not intend the services at issue to 
be for the employer’s benefit, that the employer did not expect to benefit from them, and they 
imposed no loss on the employer. On this basis, the worker was held entitled to the commission. 
 
If there was no common law prohibition on working on one’s own account outside the hours of 
service and outside the bounds of the employment agreement, in the 1904 case of Sheppard 
Publishing Co. v. Harkins the question was whether an exclusive service provision in an employment 
contract could permit an employer to receive an accounting of wages from the worker earned 
outside of work. 72  The worker had expressly agreed to a contract term prohibiting him from 
engaging in any other business during the term of the agreement. The employer brought a claim for 
violation of the exclusive service provision, claiming that the worker had engaged in side projects, 
but rather than requesting damages, the employer instead claimed an accounting on the 
employee’s profits from such ventures. Such an argument seemed to rely on older master and 
servant notions where the employer held the right to control and exclusive possession over the 
worker for the entire contract. The claim was rejected by the Trial Division in Sheppard Publishing 
however. The court now held that the contractual exclusivity requirements must be read with 
limitations.73 The employer was entitled only to nominal damages, not an accounting. This decision 
was partially affirmed on appeal on the Divisional Court, where the justices took the opportunity to 
comment further on the employer’s ownership of worker time.74 The Court noted that the older 
cases that relied on the maxim ‘whatever is acquired by the servant, is acquired for the master’, 
would shock the modern mind. While “[n]o doubt the rights of the master over the person as well 
as the time and labour of his servant were much more extensive formerly than they are today,”75 
such older principles were inconsistent with modern day notions of liberty and citizenship. A 
covenant to provide all one’s time and attention to an employer’s business must be given a 
reasonable construction. It could not mean that the worker was bound to provide services at all 
hours of the day or night, or in times designated for rest and relaxation. Neither could it require the 
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 Jones, ibid at para 17. 
72
 Sheppard Publishing Co. v. Harkins (1904), 4 O.W.R. 477 (Ont. H.C. T.D.), modified by (1905), 9 O.L.R. 504 (CA) 
[Sheppard]. 
73
 Sheppard at the CA ibid, at p. 510; Jones at the CA, supra note 68. 
74
 Sheppard at the CA, ibid. 
75
 Ibid at para. 9. 
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worker to sit in idleness for periods of the work day when no useful work could be provided to 
one’s employer. Anglin J. stated that: 
If he is unable to utilize his time for the benefit and advantage of his employer at that for 
which he is employed, he may, without becoming liable to account for benefits so acquired, 
make other use of it not inconsistent with the discharge of the duties to his employer which 
he has undertaken. To hold otherwise would be in effect to place the employee of the 
present day in a position little, if at all, better than that of the villein of former times.76 
 
Justice Anglin went on to consider English case law on a second question. Although employers could 
not claim an accounting from worker endeavours undertaken during their spare time, could they 
claim profits or income for work done by the worker during time that should have been dedicated 
to the employer?  Justice Anglin noted that the older English cases would answer this question in 
the affirmative, because the law provided employers with ownership rights over a worker’s entire 
time and labour, such that the employer could claim its value or proceeds. Although expressing 
doubt as to its continued soundness, the Court held that the rule remained that the “money 
obtained by the servant by the sale of time and labour which belonged to his mater, [was], in 
contemplation of the law, the proceeds of his master’s property”.77 In other words, the employer 
owned the worker’s labour and all profits from that labour produced during working time.  
 
Inherent in this line of reasoning was the idea that an employer’s property rights over a worker’s 
time and/or labour emerged from, and was limited by, the contractual exchange between them.78 
Employers purchased workers’ time, and all of their efforts during that time. But the terms of such a 
purchase would depend on the particular contract. In Thwaites v. McKillop a worker staked and 
acquired mining claims for himself, which the employer then claimed the right to on the basis that 
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they were obtained during work time.79 The Court of Appeal stated that the rule was not simply 
that “the work done by a servant when in the employ of the master, at least of the character for 
which he is employed, is work done for the master".80 Rather, the principle was that an employer 
would gain the benefits of work done by an employee where that appeared to be what they had 
contracted for, as determined by the employment agreement and the surrounding circumstances. 
In this instance, the Court of Appeal did not think the worker had contracted to obtain the claims 
for his employer. And though the worker had staked the claims on the employer’s time, the only 
remedy was damages, not a property entitlement to the claims for the employer.81  
  
Over the course of the early 20th century the Ontario courts, following English precedents, displayed 
an understanding of the employment relationship which abandoned the notion that employers 
owned the totality of a worker’s time, skill and effort, day and night, during the duration of their 
relationship. As part of a general move away from absolute dominion property rights, the courts 
crafted an understanding of property rights in employment as a series of limited relational rights 
between people based on the nature of the job and the nature of the intended services to be 
exchange between the parties. In so doing labour power was commodified into a set of different 
valuable interests which could be exchanged through contract. A contractual logic clearly emerged 
through property-related cases in this era.  
 
(b) Information, Skill and the Control of Competition 
At the same time as questions about employers’ ownership over labour time and products were 
before the courts, employers also sought legal controls over work-related information and 
competition from current and former employees. At the turn of the 20th century, as employers 
experimented with ‘efficient management’ strategies, innovations in production and business 
methods were perceived as a source of value. Employers were consequently concerned with 
protecting information relating to their particular business and production methods from being 
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disclosed or used by workers, during and after employment. 82 As will be discussed in the following 
section, the English courts began to draw on a series of implied duties from the law of agency to 
elaborate broad duties of confidentiality, good faith and fidelity during employment, which was also 
applied in Ontario. Use and disclosure of employment-related information was held to be ground 
for dismissal. But dismissal simply served to remove a worker, not to prevent that worker from 
subsequently disclosing or using the information gathered on the job.  Employers therefore also 
sought to restrain post-employment use of information and skill, drawing on duties of good faith 
and loyalty, on a duty of confidentiality recast from tort to contract, and on express contractual 
covenants to enjoin post-employment competition and use of confidential information. Employers 
over this period argued that they retained a proprietary interest over work-related information, 
whether held in physical form or in workers’ memories, and also sought to claim a proprietary 
interest in workers’ skills developed through on-the-job training. They requested injunctions to 
enforce their rights and damages to compensate their breach. As Catherine Fisk argues, the courts 
over this era struggled over whether “inchoate knowledge […] could be considered a firm asset”.83   
In the early 1890s in a series of cases the English Court of Appeal held that a worker could not use 
information gained during employment to their employer’s detriment during or post-employment. 
The courts drew on legal principles from the laws of agency and tort to hold that employment 
contracts included implied terms of confidentiality and good faith, such that the use or disclosure of 
confidential information entitled employers to damages and an injunction.84 Where the employee 
took information reduced to physical form, in cases such as Lamb v. Evan, Robb v. Green and 
Merryweather v. Moore, the courts had no difficulty finding a breach of confidentiality, viewing 
such a taking as dishonest and amounting to theft.85 Justice Kekewich stated in Merryweather that a 
worker is not to use “the opportunities which that service gives him of gaining information” except 
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for the purposes of that employment relationship.86  But he went on to suggest that a distinction 
existed between information physically reproduced, or in Fisk’s words, “the tangible embodiments 
of technological creativity”, and information retained in the worker’s memory.87 He noted that 
while compiling work-related information into physical form was a breach of the implied duty of 
confidentiality, a worker could not be prevented from using the knowledge he carried away “in his 
head”.88 The distinction between information in tangible physical form and information retained by 
memory represented, as Fisk argues, an understanding of property as applying to things, rather 
than to ideas.89  
 
The distinction between physical taking and information retained by memory was used to 
determine the line between what a worker could use and what belonged to the employer post-
employment as of the 1890s in Ontario as well. In the 1906 case of Copeland-Chatterson v. Business 
Systems a group of senior employees decided to leave their employ and start a rival business. 90 The 
court held that the workers were not in violation of their duty of good faith because although they 
had solicited clients of their former employer, they did not do so by physically copying any client 
lists. 91 In the absence of a contractual covenant not to compete post-employment, the Court held 
that there was nothing legally wrong with workers going out into business for themselves, even if it 
was a rival business to their former employer. “Competition is itself no ground of action, whether 
damage it may cause”.92 Because the workers were free to use whatever information they retained 
by memory to compete against their former employer, the Court of Appeal held that the most the 
employer could do was to bring a claim for damages alleging that confidential information had been 
disclosed during employment.  
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The courts were clear that there was no protection at common law against post-employment 
competition by a former worker. The most that was available was a restriction on the physical 
taking of employment-related information in tangible form. The courts took a slightly different 
approach in interpreting contractual covenants against post-employment competition. Restrictive 
covenants are contract terms designed to restrain the covenantor from engaging in designated 
activities in a post-transaction period. Anti-competition covenants had been in use in different 
types of business transactions for centuries, but were nonetheless generally considered 
unenforceable as being in restraint of trade prior to the 18th century in England.93 The blanket 
prohibition was relaxed in the early 18th century, particularly as regards the sale of a business or its 
goodwill.94  By 1894 the House of Lords in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd 
explained the principle as such: 
The true view at the present time I think, is this: The public have an interest in every 
person’s carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual. All interference with individual 
liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, 
are contrary to public policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are 
exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be 
justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and 
indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable – reasonable, that is, in 
reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the 
interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the 
party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the 
public. 95 
In the aftermath of Nordenfelt the general principle was that reasonable restrictions on competition 
were valid, so long as they did not afford the covenantee greater protection than was required for 
protecting his or her business interests. 
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 Restrictive employment covenants only began to be litigated in Ontario in the 1880s, as the 
province began to move into its Second industrial revolution and the number of businesses grew.96 
Over the turn of the 20th century cases in Ontario primarily involved two types of employers, those 
in sales-related businesses, who depended heavily on client relationships, and those who developed 
innovative manufacturing processes or products. These cases initially focused primarily on the 
geographic and time restrictions imposed by the covenants.97  The courts used the Nordenfelt 
reasonableness analysis to permit restrictive covenants only insofar as they were narrowly tailored 
to activities that specifically rivaled those of the former employer, and only in the specific 
geographical area in which the former employee used to work. 98  The courts started from the 
premise that it was legitimate for employers to contractually protect themselves from post-
employment competition in some circumstances. They did not immediately flesh out what these 
legitimate circumstances might be, except to suggest that solicitation of clients by former 
employees might justify a non-competition covenant.99  
 
As of the 1910s however the courts of England and Ontario began to examine what constituted 
‘legitimate circumstances’ in which a restrictive covenant could be used. The question of what type 
of information and activities could be restrained arose in George Weston v. Baird, which concerned 
a company that sold cakes and pastries around Toronto. 100 The employer sued to enforce a non-
competition covenant for one year across the city of Toronto against a former salesperson. The 
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Court of Appeal refused to enforce the covenant on the basis that its geographic scope was too 
large, but Justice Lennox also commented on whether the employer sought to restrict the use of 
information over which it had no proprietary right. He noted that the employer did not assert that 
the worker was exposed to trade secrets, or acquired any knowledge of secret methods of 
production, but was instead concerned that the worker had developed relationships with clients 
along his trade route.101 But Justice Lennox specified, there were limits to what an employer could 
restrain by restrictive covenant. As explained by the House of Lords in Herbert Morris, an employer 
was allowed to protect his trade secrets, “such as secret processes of manufacture which may be of 
vast value”, and having his old customers solicited away.102 “But freedom from competition per se 
apart from both these things, however lucrative it might be to [the employer], he is not entitled to 
be protected against. He must be prepared to encounter that even at the hands of a former 
employee”103  
 
Relying on Mason Justice Lennox went on to explain that employers’ proprietary interests were 
limited to what the House of Lords called ‘objective knowledge’:  
Trade secrets, the names of customers, all such things which in sound philosophical 
language are denominated objective knowledge—these may not be given away by a 
servant; they are his master's property [...].On the other hand, a man's aptitudes, his skill, 
his dexterity, his manual or mental ability—all those things which in sound philosophical 
language are not objective,  but subjective—they may and they ought not to be relinquished 
by a servant; they are not his master's property; they are his own property; they are 
himself."104 
Information about “reasonable mode of general organization and management of a business” fell 
into the subjective knowledge category, and therefore could not be restrained from post-
employment use by a worker. The House of Lords in Herbert Morris explained: 
The respondent cannot [...] get rid of the impressions left upon his mind by his experience 
on the appellants' works; they are part of himself; and in my view he violates no obligation 
express or implied arising from the relation in which he stood to the appellants by using in 
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the service of some persons other than them the general knowledge he has acquired of 
their scheme of organization and methods of business.105 
 
Moreover, Justice Lennox noted, as held by the House of Lords in Mason, workers’ skills developed 
during employment did not constitute objective knowledge, and so employers could not use a 
restrictive covenant to say that they would “not have the skill and knowledge acquired in my 
employment imparted to my trade rivals”.106 Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded in George 
Weston, employers could only claim a proprietary interest over something they had created or 
produced.  
The covenantee can only protect that which is his, the product of expenditure of some kind or 
what he has acquired by foresight, industry, energy, enterprise, or skill; something paid for in 
some way by himself or those whose title he has […].107 
 
The Court in George Weston therefore found that the covenant was overbroad in geographical 
scope, and the justices were unmoved by the employer’s argument that the worker could move to 
Montreal or Ottawa to pursue his trade. Justice Lennox stated that the worker “has the right to live 
and labour here, and the people here have the right to the gain resulting from industry and 
legitimate competition”.108 The covenant should not be rectified or severed, because, as Lord Shaw 
stated in Mason, “the real sanction at the back of these covenants is the terror and expense of 
litigation, in which the servant is usually at a great disadvantage, in view of the longer purse of his 
master”.109  
 
In Herbert Morris, Mason and George Weston v. Baird the courts sought to delineate those interests 
over which employers’ held proprietary rights from those worker characteristics that were 
fundamentally inalienable. To do so the courts differentiated activities and interests which were the 
product of some sort of energy expenditure on the part of the employer from workers’ personal 
capabilities. The courts suggested that there were certain personal features that simply could not 
be physically separated from workers, or could not be removed from their minds. Moreover, aside 
from trade secrets and confidential information regarding clients, it was not in the public interest to 
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restrain workers from exercising their skills and trade, even if acquired on the job.  In George 
Weston the Court of Appeal stated that an employer will “not be allowed to appropriate or destroy 
the rights of the State to the benefit which should accrue from the industry, education, skill, 
capacity, or aptitude of its people” through a restrictive covenant.110 The courts were cognizant that 
restrictive covenant cases pitted two liberal freedoms against one another, freedom of contract and 
freedom of trade. In Mason the House of Lords stated: 
[C]onflicting considerations are in such cases immediately presented to the mind. Here is a 
bargain, it is said, between two parties having full contracting power and with their eyes 
open. It is not void or voidable under any of the familiar categories which justify rescission. 
Why then should the law decline to hold parties to it? On the other hand, it is said, here is a 
citizen who has come for a period of years under a restraint which is inconsistent with 
elementary freedom, namely, the freedom to earn his living as best he can. This is a 
freedom which it is not alone in his interest, but in the public interest, that the law should 
protect.111 
 
In Allen Manufacturing Co. v. Murphy the tension between freedom of trade and freedom of 
contract was visible in the different decisions before different court levels.112 At first instance the 
Divisional Court would have enforced a restrictive covenant against a former employee for three 
years against post-employment competition in a similar business anywhere in the Dominion. The 
court felt that the worker was educated in the employer’s special methods and trade secrets, and 
had used them to start himself up in a rival business. This, the Divisional Court stated, “was a very 
easy method of evading a contract, which should be discountenanced by the Court”.113 On appeal, 
however, the judges were more circumspect. They noted that there was a tension between 
enforcing contracts deliberately entered into, and the fact that a power differential existed 
between the parties in employment. The Court of Appeal noted that certain restraints that might be 
entirely reasonable in the sale of a business or goodwill should not be imposed on employees, “to 
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whom the only consideration for their covenant is employment and receipt of wages or 
remuneration for a more or less certain number of years”. 114  
Thus over the early 20th century the courts utilized a contractual approach to determining what 
types of labour service employers purchased through an employment contract. It is in these 
property-related cases that a contractual logic took the most visible hold over the law of 
employment relations between the 1890s and the 1930s. At the same time, the courts sought to 
draw a line between what the employer retained post-employment and what aspects of workers’ 
knowledge and skill could not be permanently alienable. In post-employment restrictive covenant 
cases, freedom of contract was often trumped by freedom of trade. But in both classes of cases the 
courts sought to determine the boundaries of employers’ purchase of labour power and the 
proprietary and contractual rights to which it gave rise during and after employment. 
 
(5) New Managerial Tools and Control over Discretion 
 
In property-related cases over the early 20th century the courts abandoned the idea that an 
employer held absolute property dominion over his or her worker’s labour service for the duration 
of the employment contract. Instead the nature of labour service was refined and subdivided into 
different forms of property rights which were defined by the nature of the exchange. One effect of 
this shift, however, was that the duty of obedience could no longer provide employers with the 
same degree of managerial control as in the 19th century. Once employment was narrowed from a 
general property-based notion of control into a particularized exchange, the duty of obedience now 
applied only to job-related tasks.115 And as professional bureaucratic work increased in proportion 
to the overall labour force – involving work based on the exercise of knowledge and discretion - the 
notion of obedience became increasingly ill-suited to the exercise of managerial control. In this 
context, over the early 20th century the courts added new tools of managerial control by expanding 
the categories of cause to capture activities outside of work, and by drawing on principles from the 
laws of agency to delineate new general obligations in employment. Wrongful dismissal claims were 
a central site for this shift.  
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As the white collar workforce grew over the turn of the 20th century, wrongful dismissal cases 
increased in number, and were the most numerous of all types of contractual employment claims at 
common law over this period. In such cases, the Ontario courts applied English precedent and 
English law to determine the rights between the parties. The common law of wrongful dismissal 
over the 19th century had been organized around the notion of cause, because cause was required 
to dismiss workers within fixed term and annual contracts.  Up until the early 20th century it was not 
clear whether cause was a question of law or a matter of fact.116 The former view prevailed until the 
Privy Council’s decision 1905 in Clouston v. Courry, when the Privy Council held that what amounted 
to conduct justifying dismissal was a matter of fact for the jury.117  The courts of Ontario 
theoretically followed the decision in Clouston in the early decades of the 20th century, repeatedly 
stating that the issue of cause was a matter of fact and evidence, not law.118 The Ontario judiciary 
did not, however, always closely adhere to this principle. In cases where the employment contract 
specified the grounds on which summary dismissal could occur, or where a body of custom had 
arisen regarding the impugned behaviour, the courts implicitly treated the interpretation of 
contractual term or custom as a question of law, using precedent to determine the meaning of 
disobedience or incompetence, for instance.119 And indeed, even where the employment contract 
specified grounds for dismissal, the courts did not interpret those grounds as exhaustive but also 
relied on common law definitions of cause to justify dismissal.120 In practice the factual issue was 
therefore only whether the employee’s behaviour fell below the legal standard.  In this manner the 
judiciary took a strong hand in developing the cause standard, and forged a new set of tools for 
managerial control which became visible in the causes for dismissal in England and in Ontario 
between the 1890s and the end of the 1920s. 
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(a) Cause for Dismissal: A Standard in Flux 
The duty of obedience is generally viewed as the conceptual basis for workers’ obligations to their 
employers, and disobedience as the foundational source of cause for dismissal. That duty was at the 
heart of the master and servant model of workplace discipline, and remained central to the 
emerging shape of employment contract law throughout the 19th century. As Matthew Bacon 
explained in 1813, the employment relationship was definitionally centred on the power to exact 
obedience.121 The general standard of cause in the 19th century was enunciated in Callo v. Brounker 
to include wilful disobedience, moral misconduct (pecuniary or otherwise), or habitual neglect.122    
In the last quarter of the 19th century, however, some treatise writers began explaining cause for 
dismissal beyond its traditional realm.123 New grounds for cause were asserted that covered a larger 
set of activities - activities that were not captured by the now more circumscribed duty of 
obedience, and did not fit within the more command-based cause standard of the 19th century. By 
the 1890s the standard for cause was organized so as to dismiss for three types of behaviours: 
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issues relating to job performance (negligence and incompetence)124, to ignoring employer rules or 
challenging the employer’s authority (disobedience and insubordination)125, and for a general 
category of misconduct. This latter category increasingly included actions outside of work that were 
viewed as injurious to the employer’s business or reputation (general and moral misconduct, 
disloyalty).  
The idea that workers could be dismissed for activities outside the direct scope of their work and 
outside of their time on the job was also applied in Ontario over the turn of the century. In Marshall 
v. Central Railway, for instance, a railway roadmaster was terminated, along with other co-workers, 
for drinking whiskey on the job. The trial judge upheld the dismissal, but was overturned at the 
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Divisional Court, on the grounds that only if it had been demonstrated that the worker could not 
perform his duties from drinking would the dismissal be justified. The Queen’s Bench, however, 
relied on the recent English decision of Pearce v. Foster to hold that employers could discharge for 
activities that might harm their business interest, beyond the immediate administration of job 
tasks.126 In Pearce the English Court of Appeal had stated that: 
It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests 
or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it 
at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant.127 
Armour J. held that in this case the worker had conducted himself in a manner inconsistent with the 
faithful discharge of his duty by drinking on the job, which was likely to be prejudicial to the 
employer, justifying dismissal. 128 The Court did not seek to identify a particular order or work rule 
disobeyed, it did not argue that the conduct reached the standard of gross moral misconduct or 
habitual negligence. But on the basis of the holding in Pearce, which elaborated a broader, more 
abstract standard for discipline, this type of ‘prejudicial’ activity was viewed as an acceptable reason 
for dismissal. 
Similarly, in Denham v. Patrick a worker was dismissed for boasting of adultery to his employer. The 
worker challenged his dismissal on the grounds that he had performed his job tasks well, and thus 
should not be discharged for something unrelated to his work. Dismissal for moral misconduct 
could not simply be based on the employer disapproved of; rather it had to affect some direct 
interest of the employer’s or constitute a breach of the work he had contracted to perform. 129 But 
the Divisional Court disagreed, relying on Pearce v. Foster for the proposition that the misconduct 
need not be in the carrying out of job tasks, so long as it was prejudicial to the employer’s interests 
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or reputation. A single act could constitute such misconduct if there was reason to believe it could 
occur again, and justify summary dismissal.130   
Thus over the early 20th century new grounds for dismissal were added to the traditional grounds of 
insubordination, incompetence and neglect, and behaviour designed to seriously harm the 
employer’s financial interests. These new grounds permitted dismissal for behaviour outside of 
work, even if it did not directly affect employer’s pecuniary interests. 
(b) The Law of Agency and the New Implied Duties of Confidentiality, Loyalty and Good Faith 
At the same time as the courts began to find new bases for dismissing workers for behaviour 
outside the job that was deemed harmful to employers’ interests, they also began to draw 
principles from the laws of agency to explain employment as a general relationship of fidelity, 
loyalty and confidentiality.  
As businesses grew in size and their management increasingly shifted to salaried workers, the 
previous line between independent business people, or agents, and waged-workers, or servants, 
began to falter. Prior to the end of the 19th century, most businesses in Ontario were organized as 
partnerships, and to a lesser extent, as unincorporated joint stock companies.131 Partners and 
shareholders were jointly and severally liable for the enterprises’ debt, such that there was only a 
thin separating line between business ownership and employment, and between partners and 
managerial employees. 132  As explained by Alfred Chandler, “owners managed and managers 
owned”.133  The legal relationship between business owners, partners, senior executives and the 
                                                          
130
 Ibid at para. 22. The Court did not explain on what basis it was assumed that the conduct would repeat, as it 
had happened some 7 years prior. The issue of moral misconduct arose again in McPherson v. Toronto (City) 
(1918), 43 O.L.R. 326 (CA) [McPherson], when a fireman, who was separated from his wife, was dismissed for living 
out of wedlock with a woman who was herself separated. The Chief of the fire brigade considered this behaviour 
to be detrimental to the brigade’s reputation, and when the worker refused to change his living arrangement, he 
was dismissed. Again, there was no issue of poor performance, or disobedience to a job related order. But the 
Court here, at para. 1., cited Marshall, supra note 126, Pearce, supra note 126 and once again held that the rule 
was that conduct which is prejudicial, or likely to be prejudicial to the interests or reputation of the employer is 
sufficient for dismissal, whether learned of before or after dismissal.  
131
 Joint stock companies were effectively large scale partnerships created through a variety of contractual and 
trust mechanisms. See David Kershaw, “The Path of Fiduciary Law” (2011) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 6/11, at p. 9-10.  
132
Eric Tucker, “Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: From Condition of 
Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy” (2008), 26(1) Law & Hist. Rev. 57; Kershaw, ibid. 
133
 Alfred Chandler, “The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism” (1984) 58(4) Bus. Hist. Rev. 473 at 473. 
117 
 
business enterprise was controlled primarily through the law of agency, which sought to tie the 
interests of the different actors together and to the company. But in the late 19th century the legal 
and economic form of business ventures began to shift to reflect the growth in capital pooling and 
coordination needs between larger numbers of people.134 Joint stock company incorporation was 
increasingly adopted, creating legal corporate entities separate from its shareholders.  
As a result of incorporation and the increasing size of business ventures, the ownership and the 
control of business enterprises began to separate, such that those who owned companies were less 
and less often those that ran its day-to-day operations. Instead business direction was undertaken 
by an expanding professional managerial class, increasingly salaried, and conceptualized as waged 
workers.135 Prior to the 1890s only some workers, primarily those engaged with the management of 
businesses and mercantile agents (but also domestic servants in some instances), were understood 
to hold agency-based obligations towards their employer.136 The difference between an agent and a 
servant was that “[t]he servant acts under command, [while] the agent usually acts at his own 
discretion [...]”.137 According to Seavy, the difference was that “[t]he servant sells primarily his 
services measured by time; the agent his ability to produce results”.138   But as the administration of 
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century as the demarcating line for access to protective employment legislation. But I suggest that this distinction 
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business was increasingly undertaken by salaried workers in corporate enterprises, some agents 
were repositioned in law as waged workers. Their work was not premised on obedience to direct 
command, but rather in utilizing knowledge, skill and discretion in an employer’s service. Thus as 
the concept of waged employment grew to include both task-based and discretionary decision-
making employment, the courts increasingly drew on principles from the law of agency to tie the 
exercise of worker discretion to their employers.  
 
Over the turn of the 20th century duties that had been specific to agency employment, duties of 
good faith, fidelity, confidentiality and loyalty were now explained as general incidents of the 
waged work relationship, applicable to all employees.139 This occurred in a number of cases decided 
by the English courts starting in the late 1880s, which were then applied in Ontario. In cases such as 
Pearce v. Foster and Merryweather v. Moore, described above, and Robb v. Green the courts 
considered the wrongful dismissal of workers in agency relationships. 140 Rather than resting their 
analysis solely on the specific duties that agents owed by virtue of their agency relationship, the 
courts described some of those agency-based duties as definitional to all employment relationships. 
In Pearce, for instance, the justices based their analysis of cause for dismissal in misconduct 
prejudicial to the business, and more broadly, in a duty of faithful service to which the worker was 
bound, because fidelity inhered in the very notion of employment. 141 Lord Esher laid down the 
following rule:  
The rule of law is, that where a person has entered into the position of servant, if he does 
anything incompatible with the due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the latter 
has a right to dismiss him. The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that the 
servant shall be in a position to perform his duty duly and faithfully, and if by his own act he 
prevents himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him. (italics added) 142 
In a similar fashion, at the turn of the century the duty of confidentiality was broadened into a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is also evocative of a change in the law of employment contracts over this period, in terms of ideas about the 
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general employment obligation. As Catherine Fisk has argued, the duty of confidentiality was one 
which had previously only applied to agency relationships, but in the 1892 case of Merryweather v. 
Moore the court stated that the employment relationship was necessarily one of confidence between 
employers and employees, “a confidence arising out of the mere fact of employment”.143 Finally in 
1895 case of Robb v. Green the English Court of Appeal considered a request for an injunction and 
damages for breach of contract, when a business manager copied his employer’s customer list and 
then used it to set himself up in a similar business on his own account.144 Lord Escher viewed this as 
dishonest conduct “and a dereliction from the duty which the defendant owed to his employer to act 
towards him with good faith”.145 The trial judge was justified in viewing such conduct as “a breach of 
the trust reposed in the defendant as the servant of the plaintiff in his business”.146 He went on to 
consider whether this constituted a breach of contract, and explained that this “depends upon the 
question whether in a contract of service the Court can imply a stipulation that the servant will act 
with good faith towards his master”.147  Lord Kay answered in the affirmative, holding that the Court 
must imply such a stipulation, because it would necessarily have been in the contemplation of the 
parties when they contracted.148 Lord Justice Smith concurred, stating that he thought it “a necessary 
implication which must be engrafted on such a contract that the servant undertakes to serve his 
master with good faith and fidelity”.149  
These cases were applied in Ontario over the early 20th century.  For example, in McDougal v. Allen in 
1909 the court quoted John Macdonell’s treatise on master and servant law that “[a] servant is 
bound to act with good faith, and to consult the interests of his master, and may be dismissed for 
misconduct injurious thereto, though such misconduct does not relate to the servant's particular 
duties."150 The idea that agents acted in their employer’s stead, and effectuated their employer’s will, 
also justified discharge for behaviour that ruptured the relationship of trust between the parties, 
whether or not the worker was technically in an agency relationship.  In the 1922 case of Tyler v. 
Brown’s Copper and Brass Rolling Mills Ltd., the Ontario High Court held that the superintendent of a 
                                                          
143
 Merryweather, supra note 84. Fisk, Trade Secrets, supra note 87 at p.498. 
144
 Robb, supra note 85. 
145
 Ibid. 
146
 Ibid at p. 316-317 
147
 Ibid at p. 317. 
148
 Ibid at p. 319. 
149
Ibid  at  p.320. 
150
 Van Allen, supra note 124 at para. 24. 
120 
 
mill was dismissed with cause for using violent, insulting and abusive language towards the 
company’s president, imputing deceit to him. Mulock C.J. Ex stated that using this type of language 
had the “effect of destroying harmonious relations between them and made it unreasonable to 
expect that they would be able effectively to co-operate to advance the company’s interests”.151 This 
situation, the Court continued, was entirely the worker’s fault, because with his language, he violated 
his duty to promote the company’s interests in all reasonable ways.152 In Mitchell v. McKenzie the 
Ontario High Court of Justice cited Robb v. Green for the proposition that a bookkeeper in ordinary 
circumstances holds, even if not express, an implied duty of confidentiality which prevented him or 
her from divulging confidential information.153 Similarly, in Copeland-Chatterson v. Business Systems, 
discussed above, the court stated that “it is a necessary implication of a contract of service that the 
servant shall serve his master with good faith and fidelity”.154 Finally, in Cook v. Hinds the court 
considered whether the directors of a joint stock company were paid as employees or as directors, 
on the acknowledged basis that if they were employees, they owed their employer a duty of faithful 
service, “whether they be servants, agents, employees”.155 
Not only were agency-based duties increasingly described as inhering in the broad notion of 
employment over the early 20th century, but the courts also permitted wrongful dismissal claims to 
be brought by workers who might have been considered independent contractors or agents under 
the law of negligence. Between 1890 and the 1930s individuals who were not under direct 
managerial supervision, who bore the risk of profitability, and in some instances, could hire others 
to assist in their contractual tasks, brought wrongful dismissal claims at common law.156 Such 
workers were also sometimes sued in property and competition-based claims, and again were 
considered in the light of employment relations, rather than ones of commercial contract.157  
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To recapitulate, therefore, as the category of waged employees increased to include workers 
previously considered agents in law, agency principles began to seep into the employment law 
analysis. As this occurred the existing categories of cause were expanded to reach behaviour 
outside of the direct confines of the work relationship, and notions of faithful service, 
confidentiality, good faith, loyalty, came to frame the judicial understanding of the work 
relationship. Over the turn of the century, the legal subordination of the employment relationship 
increasingly shifted from a command-based approach based on the personal jurisdiction of the 
master over his workers, to a subordination of workers’ interests in law. Thus in contrast to the 
traditional narrative that locates the origins of the implied contractual duties in the law of master 
and servant, I argue that it is only as property in employment was recast as a particularized 
exchange of time and skill, and white collar workers were reframed as waged-workers that the full 
gamut of implied duties were imported from the laws of agency to define the notion of 
employment at common law.  
(6)  The Death of the Annual Hire: The Law’s Changing Understanding of Time in Employment  
 
Paradoxically, just as the tools of managerial control expanded to cover a wider range of behaviour 
as cause for dismissal, the significance of the “cause” analysis began to recede in importance. Over 
the second half of the 19th century the presumption of annual hire operated very differently for 
higher and lower status workers in England. As detailed in the previous chapter, the presumption 
operated at common law to prevent workers from leaving their employment within the annual 
term without the required notice, absent which they forfeited wages owing and could be sued for 
breach of contract.158 Although the presumption of annual hire theoretically applied at common law 
to domestic servants, menial servants and clerks, by the mid-19th century such workers could be 
dismissed with the notice that was customary in their industry. For higher status workers, however, 
the presumption of annual hire operated differently. If higher status workers under a general hire 
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contract were dismissed without cause within the annual term, they were entitled to wages and 
benefits that would have accrued over the unexpired portion of the contract.   The distinction in the 
use of the presumption was explicitly class-based, with the English courts expressing concern to 
provide greater job security to workers of higher status.159  
For higher status workers, therefore, wrongful dismissal claims revolved around whether cause 
existed to permit for dismissal within the term of the employment contract. In the absence of 
cause, the wrong thus constituted the breach of an implied promise to retain in employment over 
the presumed or express duration of the employment contract.  Damages were assessed on the 
basis of the wages owing over the rest of the term, subject to an employee’s duty to mitigate by 
finding alternative employment. As was the case with other commercial contracts, damages were 
based on the employee’s “actual loss”, as stated by the House of Lords in Beckham v. Drake.160 At 
the turn of the 20th century, however the courts began to move away from conceiving of the 
employment contract in fixed terms, raising a host of new doctrinal questions that moved the 
wrongful dismissal claim further away from general contractual damage principles. Over the last 
quarter of the 19th the century, the question of contract duration was increasingly recast from a 
legal presumption to a matter of fact in England and then Ontario. This characterization had a 
profound effect on the doctrinal structure of the employment contract at common law.  
(a) Employment Duration and the Use of Presumptions 
In the 1890s, after some decades of confusion, the English courts discarded the presumption of 
annual hire. Instead, where there was neither a discernible intention as to contract length nor 
industry practice, dismissal was now said to require reasonable notice. 161 Although the duration of 
the employment contract was fundamental to the evolution of the English common law of 
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employment contracts in the 19th century, the issue of contract length was rarely litigated in 
Ontario prior to the turn of the 20th century, and the courts addressed it explicitly only twice before 
the 1890s.162 But in the 1890s two major cases arose in which professional employees 
unsuccessfully argued that by working past their fixed one year contracts without new agreement 
with their employers on duration, they were now presumed to work under annual hire contracts, 
such that they could not be terminated within the second year term without cause.163  
 
 In Bain v. Anderson the Ontario Court of the Queen’s Bench took a surprisingly hard stance against 
the presumption of annual hire, given its lack of legal centrality over the previous decades. Bain 
concerned the dismissal of a factory foreman who was employed on successive yearly hiring 
contracts over many years.164 The business was sold in the midst of a year term, but the worker 
kept working for the new owners beyond the year with no new express contract. He was then 
terminated for refusing a reduction in salary from the new owners. The worker brought a claim for 
wrongful dismissal, arguing that his employment with the new owners constituted an annual hire 
contract, for which he could not be dismissed without cause. The employer argued instead that at 
the expiry of his last yearly hire contract he worked only under a temporary arrangement as the 
new owners decided how to reorganize their operations. Though the Ontario Court of Chancery had 
held exactly such a situation to be an annual hire contract in Tibbs v. Wilkes, the Queen’s Bench 
now went in another direction and found the period after the fixed term constituted an indefinite 
hire contract.165  The Court noted that although the English courts had once applied the 
presumption of the annual hire to general hire contracts, modern case law took a different 
approach. The modern rule, according to the Queen’s Bench, did not inflexibly hold that a general 
hire amounted to an annual hire in law, but instead that the issue was one to be determined on the 
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facts. 166 Only where there was nothing to qualify the parties’ agreement was the proper factual 
inference that of annual duration. The Court went on to note that some English cases suggested 
that indefinite term hires could be terminated on reasonable notice, but because no notice had 
been given  to the worker here, it did not pronounce on this issue. The case was taken to the Court 
of Appeal, which dismissed the claim.167 The Supreme Court of Canada, however, supported the 
Queen’s Bench’s initial summary of law. The Court stated that: 
It cannot at the present day be contended that, as a rule of law, where no time is limited for 
the duration of the contract of hiring and service, the hiring has to be considered as a hiring 
for a year.  The question is one of fact, or inference from facts, the determination of which 
depends upon the circumstances of each case.168 
With that, the presumption of annual hire was discarded in Canada.169 
As Bain was moving through the courts, the Ontario Court of Appeal was faced with a similar 
question in Harnwell v. Parrry Sound Lumber in 1897.170 The worker in this case was an assistant 
bookkeeper engaged for a year but continued working past the end of the one-year term. His 
employers accepted his services and continued to pay his salary for another five months, when he 
was given three months’ notice of dismissal.  The plaintiff argued that his employment was a 
general hire, and as such was to be presumed annual and therefore he could not be dismissed 
within the second annual term without cause. For that reason, he was owed his salary over the 
remaining portion of the second year of the contract. At first instance Chief Justice Meredith 
canvassed the authorities on the question, citing the numerous cases upholding general hirings as 
annual, based on a presumption of law. He noted, however, that the proper approach was one long 
ago suggested by Chief Justice Denman in Williams v. Byrne in 1837, which was that while the 
length of the contract is always a matter of fact, in some instances the length of notice and method 
of dismissal were so well known as to be presented as questions of law.171 On appeal the Court of 
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Appeal, after examining the historical roots of the presumption, ultimately agreed that there were 
no relevant facts to suggest a second yearly hiring, other than the continued relationship between 
the parties on apparently the same terms. Instead the Court held that “the most that could be said 
[...] is that it was a contract terminable on reasonable notice. In the absence of any evidence of 
usage [...] three months notice ought to be held reasonable”. 172 
With these two cases the presumption of annual hire was abandoned in Ontario, just as it was in 
England. The presumption of annual hire was also discarded at roughly the same time in the United 
States, where the courts moved towards an at-will employment model such that either party could 
dissolve the employment contract at any time for any reason.173 Interestingly, there is some 
evidence that the Court of Appeal in Bain v. Anderson may have held the hiring to have been at-will, 
such that no notice was due, but the Supreme Court makes no mention of the concept of at-will 
employment in its decision, nor do other cases of era in Ontario.174  This is notable because, like the 
United States, the presumption appears never to have taken a strong legal or practical hold in 
Ontario.  In a comment on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Harnwell, Charles Labatt discussed 
Horace Wood’s description of the American at-will rule.175 He specified that for the purposes of his 
commentary he would not refer to American cases, because “for obvious social and economic 
reasons, a hiring for a shorter period than a year will be more readily inferred in that country than 
in England. It would therefore be undesirable, in an article designed for Canadian readers, to rely 
upon the American authorities […]”.176This is intriguing, because his qualifying remarks about the 
nature of employment duration in the particular socioeconomic conditions of the American states 
would seem to apply equally to 19th and early 20th century Ontario.  And indeed over the turn of the 
                                                          
172
 Ibid at para.31.  
173
 See chapter 1, supra notes 137, 138, 140, 142 for an overview of the debate concerning the history of the at-will 
rule. 
174
 Bain  at the CA, supra note 163.  The Court of Appeal’s decision was not reported on the merits. We have only 
the record of their order. The Supreme Court’s summary of the Court of Appeal’s majority decision states that they 
held the relationship to be of a temporary nature. The appellant’s Supreme Court factum, however, states that the 
majority of the Court of Appeal held the relationship to be at-will, such that no notice was required. The 
respondent’s factum does not use the language of at-will employment, and states, in the same terms as the 
Supreme Court, that the Court of Appeal found the relationship to be of a temporary nature, not intended to be 
final. See Appellant and Respondent’s Factums, Bain, supra note 163, on file in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
record’s office, and on file with author.  
175
 Labatt, Right to Terminate, supra note 161 at p. 598. He suggests that Wood’s description of the rule is “too 
sweeping”, because the English presumption still held favour in some states. 
176
 Ibid. 
126 
 
20th century American investment into the Ontario economy was in a state of unparalleled growth, 
with branch plants of American firms beginning to dot the Southern Ontario landscape.177 One 
might have thought, therefore, that the courts would have sought to align Ontario employment 
contract law with that of the United States. But instead the courts of the era appeared to simply 
view the law of Ontario as English law, forestalling any discussion of a move towards American legal 
principles.178  
 
The abandonment of the presumption of annual hire is often viewed as a decisive moment in the 
history of employment contracts in the common law world. It is the moment when English and 
American law began to diverge structurally in the common law regulation of work, and it is usually 
thought of as the moment that ushered in the model of indefinite duration employment that 
prevailed over the mid-20th century.179  Mark Freedland, Sanford Jacoby and Simon Deakin suggest 
that the presumption of annual hire had actually begun to wane in importance in England for 
manual and industrial employment by the mid 19th century, as a reflection of changing employment 
practices and the end of the settlement by hire.180 Jacoby and Brian Etherington argue that 
industrial workers sought shorter contracts to free themselves from the strike-breaking role the 
presumption had played over the mid-19th century, while employers sought the greater flexibility of 
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employment relationships that had no presumed duration.181 What is less clear is why the 
presumption was abandoned in regards to higher status workers, given the job protection function 
it had acquired over the second half of the 19th century. Jacoby suggests that reasonable notice 
dismissal emerged in England through an incremental process of legal change, provoked specifically 
by the growing importance of the position of clerks. In the mid-19th century clerks were held to be 
terminable with three months’ notice, based on industry custom. But as the position of clerk moved 
from operating within small owner-operated businesses to positions situated within bigger 
corporate structures, their work became comparable to that of other salaried corporate employees, 
such that the practice of dismissing clerks by industry custom of notice could apply to a broader 
range of people. Once dismissal by custom-based notice began to spread, it was only a short step 
away to move onto a general model of dismissal by reasonable notice.182 S.C. Churches makes a 
complementary argument.183  He suggests that the abandonment of the presumption of annual hire 
was not specifically because of changing work practices, but was rather driven by legal 
considerations. He argues that the courts sought to move away from a bifurcated standard for 
notice between lower and higher status workers. Reasonable notice provided this tool, because one 
legal concept could be used for all waged workers while retaining the judicial flexibility to provide 
different levels of entitlement to workers of different statuses.184  Jay Feinman argues that the 
annual hire rule may have been abandoned in the United States so as to end its job security 
function for higher status workers. These were workers who were in the process of being recast as 
subordinated waged-workers operating under the managerial control of their employers, rather 
than as business partners or service providers.185 The loss of the security associated with the 
presumption of the annual hire, Feinman argues, may have helped place higher status workers into 
a waged-work frame, who were now dependent on employers for wage stability, like all other 
workers.  
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But while theories abound to explain the abandonment of the presumption of annual hire, outside 
of the United States less attention has been given its effect on legal and work practices in the early 
20th century. Most legal studies either do not examine the consequences of its abandonment, or 
skip between the abandonment at the end of the 19th century and the modern rules of employment 
dismissal as they emerged in the 1960s. The suggestion in existing research is that there was a 
straight transition from annual hires to modern long term indefinite duration employment.186  But 
the trajectory was not so clear. While the law allowed for a legal understanding of long term 
indefinite duration employment once the presumption was discarded, in practice the question of 
contract length arose infrequently in Ontario before the 1920s.187 Instead most wrongful dismissal 
claims over the turn of the century concerned: explicit fixed term contracts; cases where cause was 
established and so there was no analysis of contract length or; the analysis focused on the workers’ 
mitigation efforts.188  Where it arose the Ontario courts generally treated the question of 
employment duration as one of fact, based on the intentions of the parties.189 There was therefore 
no legal presumption of either long term indefinite duration employment or annual length work 
prior to the 1920s.  Just as the law moved away from any presumption of employment lengths, in 
practice contract lengths also appeared to be in flux over the early 20th century. We know little of 
employment tenure in early 20th century Ontario or Canada, but labour markets in the United 
States in the early 20th century appear to have been characterized by very high worker turnover for 
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low skilled and unskilled workers, while highly skilled workers tended to have very long 
employment tenures.190   
 
(a) The Slow Emergence of Dismissal by Reasonable Notice 
Even though the presumption of annual hire was abandoned in Ontario in the 1890s, and even 
though the Ontario Court of Appeal had approved of the idea that general hire contracts were 
presumed to be of indefinite duration, defeasible by reasonable notice, the concept of reasonable 
notice did not receive significant jurisprudential attention in Ontario until the 1920s, when the issue 
began to be litigated with greater frequency. The Ontario Court of Appeal spoke to the question in 
the 1923 case of Pollard v. Gibson.191 There the court characterized Harnwell as establishing the 
principle that: 
[I]n the absence of an express provision to the contrary, or evidence of some usage that 
every one must be considered to know and to contract with reference to, a contract of 
general, indefinite, or yearly hiring and service may be terminated on reasonable notice, 
and that there is no law requiring the notice to end with [the] year.192  
 
This description framed Harnwell as enunciating a presumption of indefinite duration employment, 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.193 A few years later the Court of Appeal took up the 
question again in Messer v. Barrett Corp Ltd. 194 There the Court found the employment agreement 
to be an annual hire contract in its first year, but to become an indefinite term contract after that 
point. Here the Court of Appeal was faced directly with the older approach to contract duration, 
and ruled against it. 
Where there has been a definite hiring for a year and the relationship has continued by 
mutual agreement beyond that term, what is to be taken as the implied agreement as to 
the mode of termination of the contract of hiring? Mr. Bristol contends that it was 
automatically terminated at the end of the second year and each succeeding year, on the 
anniversary of the hiring, without any notice. The opposite contention is that it would 
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continue so long as the parties mutually agreed and could only be terminated by reasonable 
notice. We think the latter view is to be preferred.195 
The court went on to state that if its decision in Pollard had not stated so sufficiently clearly196, it 
was willing to do so now: “[w]here the indefinite hiring arises, as here, after the termination of a 
definite period, then it is clear that the reasonable notice to be given is not required to terminate at 
the end of the year from the hiring, and that the only method of terminating the hiring is by 
reasonable notice”.197 From this moment on reasonable notice was the method of terminating a 
general hire contract, absent cause. 
The length of reasonable notice was held to be a question of fact, however, such that the courts did 
not explain how it was to be assessed. There were some discernible trends. In cases where workers 
were paid by monthly or weekly wages, as opposed to annual salaries, the courts sometimes 
suggested that the pay period was sufficient notice. 198 But for those paid on annual salaries there 
was no direction as to what constituted reasonable notice. Charles Labatt and John MacDonell, 
treatise writers of the era, suggested that reasonableness was primarily a matter of industry 
custom, but that where no custom existed the question was simply a matter for the jury.199 In non-
jury trials judges would often just announce what they viewed as reasonable, which varied 
considerably. 200 By the end of the 1920s, therefore, there was no clear method of determining 
what constituted reasonable notice, and as we shall see, it was only slowly becoming the measure 
of damages for wrongful dismissal. 
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(b) Damages: The Transition from Actual Loss to Reasonable Notice 
By the end of the 1920s the courts had begun to frame the issue of contract length as a 
presumption of indefinite duration employment, which could be brought to an end with the 
provision of reasonable notice. But it was not yet clear that reasonable notice also constituted the 
measure of damages. Prior to the 1920s reasonable notice was literally notice – the amount of time 
that an employer had to provide as notification of impending dismissal.201 Between the 
abandonment of the presumption and the 1920s the courts continued to simply examine the actual 
loss from dismissal.202  As contracts of service were still understood as agreements to retain and pay 
based on “the promise of continuing employment”, workers wrongfully dismissed were primarily 
entitled to loss of wages and other remuneration promised under the contract. 203 The loss was the 
loss of the ability to continue to earn one’s wages.204 Wrongfully dismissed workers were therefore 
entitled to damages for those losses that arose naturally and directly from the employer’s 
breach.205 Quantum of damages was a matter of fact, and thus to be determined by the jury. For 
contracts of fixed term duration, which, as discussed, constituted the greater part of litigated 
wrongful dismissal cases until the 1920s, the calculation of lost wages was relatively 
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straightforward: workers were awarded their salaries over the unexpired portions of their 
contracts, subject to the duty to mitigate, discussed below. If wages were outstanding for work 
already performed, they could be awarded as part of the damages assessment.206 If paid by 
commission, a reasonable projection of anticipated sales and profits over the remainder of the 
contract term was recoverable.207 In the early years of the 20th century if a worker under a general 
hire contract was dismissed without cause or notice, the courts would usually assert that a worker 
was entitled to reasonable notice, would determine the length of the appropriate notice and then 
still go on to fix damages based on a calculation of actual mitigated loss.208 In Cockburn v. Trusts and 
Estates the court quoted from an English Queen’s Bench decision for the proposition that: 
If an action is brought by a servant for a wrongful dismissal soon after the dismissal, the 
Judge tells the jury they must speculate on the chance of his getting a new place and base 
their damages on that. If the action is delayed till the man has got a place, what was matter 
of speculation before becomes certainty then, and the jury calculate accordingly.209 
The measure of loss was the amount of time it took to find a new position, subject to the duty to 
mitigate. 
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Starting in the 1920s, however, the courts in Ontario increasingly moved to assessing damages for 
wrongful dismissal as wages owing over the reasonable notice period.210 This shift was piecemeal 
and unremarked upon. Because it was a question of fact, the method of its determination is not 
visible on the face of decisions of the era, and there was little consistency in the lengths provided in 
the decided cases.211   Generally the courts would simply announce what constituted reasonable 
notice in the circumstances, and then announce the amount of damages owed. Sometimes this was 
phrased to suggest that damages were wages over the reasonable notice period, but usually it was 
difficult to correlate the two.212 The judges would often simply announce a period of notice they 
deemed reasonable, and then a sum owed.213  While it was often not possible to correlate the 
damage awards with wages over the notice period, the courts began to state the award as 
“damages as wages in lieu of notice”.214 Thus as the 1930s got underway, reasonable notice was 
increasingly the length of time over which damages were assessed for wrongful dismissal.  
Even as the concept of reasonable notice increasingly assumed the role of determining the loss 
from wrongful dismissal, the courts over this period never explicitly stated that the breach in a 
wrongful dismissal claim was the failure to provide reasonable notice. And because reasonable 
notice was considered a matter of fact, the courts did not enunciate any principles through which it 
was to be assessed.  Nonetheless, it is only once the legal understanding of employment as a 
relationship of fixed duration was displaced that the complexity of dealing with employment as 
contract becomes visible. 215  It is only after that point that the law had to grapple with how to value 
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 There are other obvious and fundamental problems with considering employment within a contractual frame, 
such as the commodification of labour and the erasure of the market inequality between the parties, but the 
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the loss of indefinite duration employment, and how to manage the changing terms of the 
employment relationship over time.  
(7) Conclusion 
 
The argument of this chapter is that the common law of employment contracts saw three 
significant changes to the boundaries and scope of its organizing concepts between the 1890s and 
1930s. Together these three changes ushered in a nexus of ideas which ‘contractualized’ the 
employment relationship in law. These were changes to the property parameters of labour power, 
changes to the tools of managerial control, and changes to legal notions of time in employment. 
They occurred in relationship to one another, and were provoked in law by the abandonment of the 
presumption of annual hire, and in practice by the changing nature of work and the workforce in 
Ontario through its second industrial revolution. As of the 1890s the courts in England and Ontario 
abandoned the presumption of annual hire, and with it dispatched the legal understanding of 
employment as a relationship of fixed duration. This had a significant effect on the analysis of 
property rights in employment, which moved from an employer’s purchase of a worker’s entire 
labour power over the fixed duration of an employment contract, to a purchase of particular skill, 
time, knowledge, and/or physical goods production. The courts increasingly looked to the nature of 
the job and the nature of intended exchange between the parties to determine what each of them 
owned. Once the employment contract constituted the purchase of particular time, skill etc., the 
duty of obedience could no longer reach workers’ behaviour outside the confines of the job. At the 
same time workers previously understood as agents, who provided knowledge and intellectual 
skills, were recast as waged-workers in law. In this context the courts expanded the categories of 
cause for dismissal to worker behaviour outside of work, and drew from the law of agency to infuse 
the employment contract with a series of implied contractual duties that tied the interests of 
workers to their employers in law.  Through these three legal changes the content of the common 
law of employment contracts was expressly reoriented towards the nature of white collar work, 
which encompassed clerical, skilled and managerial work that took place within corporate 
manufacturing and service enterprises. Although common law claims regarding work were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
problems that mentioned above that arose at the end of the 1920s, are ones that concern the doctrinal 
implications of regulating work through contract. 
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theoretically available to lower status workers, very few such workers appear in the reported 
decisions of the era, such that the effect of these substantive changes on the nature of their 
employment relationships is not visible from the materials used in this study. What is visible is the 
courts’ idea that waged labour consisted in the purchase of labour power, and that employers held 
the right to direct and control the workplace remained fundamentally unchanged over the early 
20th century. What changed was that such entitlements were now placed on a loose contractual 
footing, understood by the common law courts as premised and limited to workers’ acquiescence.  
In this sense one can say that the employment relationship was contractualized at common law 
over the early 20th century. 
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(1) Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the changing nature of waged work between the 1890s and the 
end of the 1920s. During this period workplaces became larger and more bureaucratized. A more 
detailed labour process was put in place in industrial businesses, creating a more finely-tuned 
hierarchy and increasingly centralized management structures concerned with efficiency and labour 
productivity. It is also through this time, and partially because of this process, that white collar and 
managerial work began to expand in Ontario, just as a set of legal changes reoriented the analysis 
of waged work at common law. Legal notions of property in employment and the tools of 
managerial control were adjusted to meet the nature of professional work. Workers’ labour power 
was reconceived as a series of property entitlements to be exchanged through an employment 
contract, and employers were increasingly limited to property rights of control over the content of 
that exchange. At the same time as property rights in employment were narrowed, the tools of 
managerial control began to expand. Employee duties relating to fidelity, loyalty and confidentiality 
that had been primarily features of principle-agent relationships were increasingly generalized and 
presented as necessary incidents of all employment contracts. The new tools of the managerial 
prerogative were now available to control worker discretion as well as to enforce direct obedience. 
As the content of the wage-work exchange was jurisprudentially renegotiated in property and 
wrongful dismissal claims, the courts also reconceptualised the legal understanding of time in 
employment. In the 1890s the courts of Ontario discarded the longstanding legal presumption of 
annual hire, such that the length of an employment existed as a question of fact, rather than a 
presumption of law, until the 1920s. Through that period the concept of reasonable notice slowly 
began to emerge to a place of centrality in the wrongful dismissal analysis, as it was increasingly 
utilized to measure damages for dismissal. The conceptual changes wrought over the turn of the 
20th century knit together an understanding of employment as premised on an exchange between 
the parties, such that by the end of the 1920s one can say that employment was ‘contractualized’ at 
common law.  
In the early 20th century the common law of employment contracts seemed to develop in lockstep 
with the socioeconomic transformations of Ontario’s second industrial revolution. The common law 
of employment contracts was substantively oriented towards white collar workers just as the 
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number of such workers expanded to make up a greater portion of the labour force. The 
simultaneous and intertwined nature of socioeconomic and legal changes in the common law of 
employment contracts came to end by the 1930s however. Between the 1930s and the end of the 
1950s Ontario experienced the upheaval of the Great Depression and the Second World War. It also 
underwent massive transformations to the nature of work and to the composition of the workforce 
with the emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship (SER) within Fordist vertically 
integrated enterprises. But transformations in the nature of work were not as directly reflected in 
the common law of employment contracts over the mid-century as they had been in the early 20th 
century, and the active development of this area of law slowed over this period.  
The few claims that were litigated nonetheless revealed the first suggestions of the changes that 
the advent of the SER and the parallel growth of more tenuous service-sector work would bring to 
employment and to the shape of the Ontario labour market. As compared to the early 20th century, 
there were only two major types of property-related claims over mid-century: claims regarding 
post-employment competition and solicitation, often in non-SER small service enterprises, and 
trade secret and confidential information claims from research-intensive enterprises. Wrongful 
dismissal claims now entrenched a presumption of indefinite duration employment, which began to 
shift the conceptual understanding of the nature of the claim and the measure of damages, giving 
the concept of reasonable notice an expanding analytical role. For the first time the courts began to 
see claims concerning changing terms of work over long-term employment relationships. Finally, 
the question of whether and to what extent long-term agents were able to bring wrongful dismissal 
claims was a subject of judicial investigation. 
The 1930s to 1950s can therefore best be understood as a transitional period, marked by a 
reduction in reported employment contract cases, significant labour market changes, and hints of 
the important legal questions such labour market arrangements would bring to the courts in the 
1960s and 1970s. To examine these developments, this chapter will begin by describing the 
reorientation of the labour market around the paradigm of the Standard Employment Relationship 
within vertically integrated businesses, before examining the visibility and impact of such changes 
on the common law of employment contracts in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. 
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(2) The Emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship in Mid-Century Ontario and the 
Reorganization of the Labour Market 
 
The period between 1930 and 1959 began with the massive unemployment of the Great 
Depression, which at its worst saw one quarter of the Canadian population unemployed, with 
downward pressure on wages and pernicious employer practices.1 Through the mid-period Canada 
experienced the social and economic upheaval of the Second World War, which brought women 
into the workplace in increasing numbers2, saw two periods of full employment3, increasing 
amounts of minimum standards legislation4, periods of profound labour unrest and militancy5, and 
the institutionalization of a system of industrial legality6. Through this period, white collar work 
continued to grow, with increasing numbers of workers working in clerical, professional and 
managerial professions, earning large salaries in comparison to low skilled workers.7 It is also 
through this period that the Standard Employment Relationship (SER) emerged to dominate the 
labour market. 
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 Marcus Klee, “Fighting the Sweatshop in Depression Ontario: Capital, Labour and the Industrial Standards Act”, 
(2000) 45 Labour/Le Travail 13. 
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 Ruth Roach Pierson, They’re Still Women After All: The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto, 
1986); Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong, “The Segregated Participation of Women in the Canadian Labour 
Force, 1941-1971”, (1975) 12(4) Canadian Review of Sociology 370. Statistics Canada, Series C126-129, Persons 
with jobs, class of worker, non-agricultural, by sex, 1931-1945. 
3
 Statistics Canada, Series D491-497, Unemployment Rates, by region, annual averages, 1946-1975. 
4
 Between the 1930s and 1959 the following pieces of legislation were passed or significantly amended: (a) 
Federally - Fair Wages and Eight-Hour Work Day, 1930, S.C., c.30; Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Act, 1935, S.O., 
c.39; Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, S.C. 1940, c. 44.; Canada Fair Employment Practices Act S.C. 1952-53, 
c.19(b) Provincially - Minimum Wages Act, S.O. 1937, c.43., Racial Discrimination Act 1944, S.O. 1944, c. 51; Hours 
of Work and Vacations with Pay Act, S.O. 1944, c.26. An Act to ensure Fair Remuneration to Female Employees, 
S.O. 1951, c.26. Fair Employment Practices Act, 1951, S.O. 1951, c.24. See Paul Malles, Canadian Labour Standards 
in Law, Agreement, and Practice (Economic Council of Canada,1976); Mark Thomas, Regulating Flexibility, The 
Ontario Employment Standards Act and the Politics of Flexible Production, 2003, Unpublished Dissertation, at 
chapter 3, for a general description of employment-related legislation passed over this time period.  
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 Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991, 2
nd
 Edition 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992) at 278-279; Douglas Cruikshank and Gregory Kealey, “Strikes in Canada, 
1891-1950”, (1987) 20 Labour/Le Travail 85. 
6
 Fudge and Vosko, supra note 42 at p. 275-277; Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, ”Pluralism or Fragmentation?: The 
Twentieth Century Employment Law Regime in Canada”, (2000) 46 Labour/Le Travail 251 at 275-276; Judy Fudge 
and Harry Glasbeek, “The Legacy of PC 1003”, (1995) 3(3/4) C.L.E.L.J. 357.  
7
 Alan Green and David Green, “Canada’s Wage Structure in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (with 
comparisons to the United States and Great Britain)”, UBC, Department of Economics, 2007 at p. 43. 
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The Standard Employment Relationship has been defined as employment “which is continuous, 
long term, full time, in at least a medium sized or large establishment […]”8. It is characterized by 
“the trade-off between high levels of subordination and disciplinary control on the part of the 
employer and high levels of stability and welfare/insurance compensations and guarantees for the 
employees”.9 The emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship as the paradigmatic form of 
employment occurred amidst three interlinked developments over the mid-century. The first was 
the rise of vertically integrated corporations utilizing Fordist production methods and “a Taylorist 
division of labor – extreme task fragmentation in a strict authority hierarchy with no worker input – 
based on assembly line production of standardized goods”.10 The second development was an 
increase in the length of workers’ job tenure with a single employer. The third was the development 
of the centrally structured workplace, characterized by standardized work policies and job ladders 
to promote internal mobility.  
Over the mid-20th century the SER came to operate as the paradigmatic form of employment 
around which labour market policies, social wage protections and collective bargaining were 
structured. Medium and large scale workplaces began to design work practices around the frame of 
the SER, institutionalizing policies and benefits to develop worker loyalty to their employers. Some 
of these practices had emerged earlier in the 20th century under the influence of scientific 
management policies and with the changes to the industrial labour process, as detailed in the 
previous chapter. Over the mid-20th century, however, these policies were further developed and 
consolidated, particularly in response to high labour turnover and labour market fluidity. The result 
was the fundamental reorganization of the labour market, focused at a political and legislative level 
around a normative picture of long term, stable work for a male family breadwinner with a single 
employing enterprise.  
 
                                                          
8
 Ulrich Muckenberger, “Non Standard Forms of Work and the Role of Changes in Labour and Social Security 
Regulation”, (1989)  17 Intl. J. of Soc’y of Law 387 at 389.  
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 Alain Supiot et al., Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 1. 
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 Matt Vidal, “Reworking Postfordism: Labor Process Versus Employment Relations” (2011) 5/4 Sociology Compass 
273 at 274, explaining Michel Aglietta’s definition of Fordism. See also Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: 
The US Experience ( London: Verso Classic, 2000 [1979]) 
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(a) Lengthening Job Tenures and Internal Labour Markets 
Historical indicators tracing the precise emergence of the SER are somewhat scarce in Canada.  
There are few studies that analyze the relationship between the rise of scientific management 
strategies, the lengthening of employment duration, and the emergence of internal labour markets 
in Canada, but almost all focus on unionized workplaces.11 Explaining the emergence of the SER in 
Ontario therefore requires assembling existing research on each of these individual developments 
and drawing from more extensive American research. 
American research on labour markets suggest that labour turnover was very high in the early 20th 
century, but employment tenure began to lengthen in the 1920s, followed by the development of 
internal labour markets. Jacoby and Sharma argue that prior to the 1920s a small minority of white 
collar and skilled workers held long-term quasi-permanent jobs, while unskilled and semiskilled 
workers enjoyed little job stability and were highly mobile, with the labour process organized 
primarily under the “drive system” and the foreman’s control.12 In the 1920s, however, the job 
tenure of semi-skilled and low skilled workers also began to grow.13 Laura Owens argues that the 
most significant shift in employment duration in the United States began after 1923.14 Her research 
indicates that in 1913-14, 28.9% of the manufacturing workforce in the United States had job 
tenure of less than one year; 38.2% had between one to five years, and 32.9% had longer than 5 
years. By 1927-1928, 21.5% of workers had a job tenure of less than one year, 41.2% had one to five 
years, and 37.3% had over five years.15  
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 Of these, the application of scientific management practices in Canada has received the most study. See Paul 
Craven, An Impartial Umpire: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
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Working Paper, 2002;  Barton Hamilton and Mary MacKinnon, “Long-term employment relationships in the early 
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12
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1880-1980" (1992) 52(1) The Journal of Economic History 161 at 176-177 
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 Jacoby and Sharma, ibid at p. 175 
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 Laura Owens, The Decline in Turnover of Manufacturing Workers: Case Study Evidence from the 1920s  
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Yale, 1991) at 13. 
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 Ibid at p. 23. 
142 
 
A number of reasons have been offered for the increase in job tenure after the 1920s in the United 
States. The first is that employers explicitly sought to reduce labour turnover. Katherine Stone 
argues that employers waged a battle against the power and control of craft unions and skilled 
workers over the labour process at the end of the 19th century in the United States.16 One effect of 
their successful campaign, however, was an increase in labour turnover and labour mobility. Absent 
standardized methods of organizing internal mobility within a company, and without guilds or 
unions to promote training at a craft level, the only advancement method available to workers was 
job shopping.17 The transient nature of employment in the early 20th century was problematic for 
employers however, because, according to Owens, the fixed costs of worker training also increased 
over this period with the adoption of standardized machinery.18 Firm-specific employee training 
was required, but there was little reason for existing workers to share knowledge with incoming 
workers, given the precariousness of their own job tenure. Stone and Owens therefore suggest that 
employers in the 1910s and 1920s in the United States developed strategies to decrease worker 
training costs, by incentivizing knowledge-sharing amongst employees and reducing labour 
turnover rates.19  
 
The lengthening duration of employment was accompanied by other innovations in employment 
practices. As of the 1920s in the United States workplace policies were increasingly institutionalized 
and managed centrally.20 American research suggests that internal labour markets began to form 
immediately prior to the First World War in a few large workplaces, but expanded more fully as of 
the Second World War, creating “administrative unit[s], such as [manufacturing plants], within 
which the pricing and allocation of labor [wa]s governed by a set of administrative rules and 
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procedures”.21 In such workplaces, there were “defined career paths, limited ports of entry for each 
career path, wages tied to the job (rather than personal characteristics), and pay structures that 
exhibit rigidities across occupations and time”.22 Job classification schemes, wage grids and internal 
progressions ladders created incentives to remain with the firm and to progress up the job ladder 
for increased pay and benefits. Pension and stock option programs, adopted at the turn of the 20th 
century, were now increasingly tied to job tenure to incentivize worker loyalty and longer job 
tenures.23 The deferred nature of pension schemes and seniority promotions could also be used as 
disciplinary tools, so that workers involved in strike actions could be threatened with the loss of 
pension entitlement.24 
 
Jacoby suggests that personnel managers had a significant hand in driving the adoption of such 
policies. Personnel supervisors and shop-floor foremen had engaged in a protracted internal battle 
for control over discipline and dismissal on production lines through the 1910s.25 In the immediate 
lead up to the First World War, labour supply in the United States began to dry up as immigration 
was effectively eliminated, providing workers with greater freedom of movement and bargaining 
power. Faced with difficulties in retaining a stable workforce, employers turned to personnel 
managers to incentivize firm loyalty.26 The importance of personnel managers was lessened with 
the over-supply of labour during the Great Depression, but grew again, and more permanently, in 
the late 1930s and 1940s under the threat of labour shortages and expanding unionization.27 At a 
general level, therefore, Stone argues that by the end of the 1930s, “[t]hroughout corporate 
America, management reduced the skill level of jobs, while at the same time it encouraged 
employee-firm attachment through promotion and retention policies, explicit or de facto seniority 
arrangements, elaborate welfare schemes, and longevity-linked benefit packages”.28 
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To what extent the American analysis is applicable to the Canadian labour market is slightly unclear. 
Questions of employment duration in the 1920s-1940s have been examined in Canada in greatest 
depth by Mary MacKinnon and Barton Hamilton, using pension data from the Canadian Pacific 
Railway (CPR) as of 1903.29 Their study of job tenures between 1903 and 1938 in the mechanical 
department of the CPR suggests that the average duration of employment of workers hired 
between 1919 and 1938 also increased.30 At the CPR, workers hired between 1903 and 1913 
worked for an average of 23.3 months with the company. Workers hired between 1914 and 1918 
worked for an average of 26.2 months. Those hired after the First World War, between 1919 and 
1921, had significantly higher job tenures, with an average duration of 48.9 months, and a median 
of 9 months. This dropped for workers hired between 1922 and 1929, whose tenure dropped down 
to an average of 28.8 months, and 27.1 months for workers hired between 1930 and 1938. Except 
for workers hired between 1919 and 1921, the median job tenure was six months.31 The difference 
in median and average lengths suggests that a few workers may have had very long tenures.32  As in 
the United States, there was a significant decrease in quit rates for workers hired between 1903 
and 1938.33 The work patterns at the CPR suggest a steady stream of temporary quits and layoffs. 
But the company also explicitly sought to develop worker loyalty and to reduce training costs in 
order to maintain firm attachment despite quits and layoffs. It instituted the first private employer 
pension plan in Canada in 1903.34 After 1918 there was a substantial increase in hiring of returning 
army personnel who were previous CPR employees, and during the Great Depression almost all CPR 
hires in the mechanical department were rehires from quits and layoffs.35 In addition, as of the 
1920s the number of apprenticeships increased, and in the 1930s virtually all new hires were 
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apprentices.36 For a variety of reasons, however, it is not clear that CPR’s employment practices are 
indicative of the norms of the era. Owing to its size and the coordination needs of rail transport, 
railways were early innovators in management techniques, as well as the provision of corporate 
welfare and pension programs.37  Moreover, because CPR’s wage rates were above comparable 
jobs, and given its size and the unionization of its workforce, it is quite likely that its work tenures 
would have been somewhat longer than elsewhere in the industrial labour force.  
 
There are no general studies of work tenure in Canada over this period, such that it is difficult to pin 
down the emergence of long-term employment and the growth of internal labour markets in 
Canada. The studies that exist tend to focus on the emergence of scientific management and 
corporate welfare strategies in blue collar work. The existing research suggests that worker-
retention programs began to emerge in the 1910s and 1920s, particularly in Canadian 
manufacturing branch plants of American corporations, but also in the growing finance sector.38  In 
some industries corporate welfare schemes began a little later, in the 1930s and 1940s, in direct 
response to the growth of industrial unionism.39 Trade union membership levels increased 
significantly during and after the Second World War, a period marked by frequent strikes, as well as 
legislative enactments requiring trade union recognition and proceduralizing collective bargaining.40 
David Matheson’s study of collective bargaining agreements in the 1930s and 1940s suggests that 
unions began addressing questions of seniority and formalizing dispute resolution mechanisms as of 
1940.41 Judy Fudge and Leah Vosko argue that “the SER became the normative model of (male) 
employment in Canada in the golden age of rapid growth as workers successfully secured 
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associational rights and as collective bargaining gained legitimacy”. 42 For Fudge and Vosko, the SER 
“was the product of an entente between business and organized labour, mediated by the state, 
which corresponded with the emergence of Fordism as a production regime and endorsed the male 
breadwinner norm and the notion of the family wage”.43  Because most studies focus on the 
changes to blue collar work over the mid-century, we know less about the emergence of standard 
employment in the white collar workforce over this period. It is unclear whether standardized work 
practices and internal job ladders were set in place for white collar work earlier, in tandem, or after 
blue collar work and expanding trade unionization levels.44 Existing studies do not provide specifics 
on the terms and conditions of employment, on how and whether one could progress internally, 
and the standard lengths of employment in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.45 Thus although there is 
research left to be done on the timing and process by which white collar work was brought onto 
SERs, nonetheless reported common law employment contract cases do hint that some white collar 
workers were working in long-term employment by the mid-century, though it would not be until 
the 1960s and 1970s that the nature of common law employment contract cases would come to be 
dominated by issues arising from long-term employment. 
 
(b) Employment-Related Statutory Enactments and Labour Market Segmentation 
 
The period between the 1930s and the end of 1950s also saw significant legislative intervention into 
work relationships, which would have lasting impact on the shape of labour market arrangements 
over the rest of the 20th century. In 1944 the federal government adopted PC 1003, which 
recognized and enshrined the right to freedom of association, proceduralized a system for 
determining worker support for trade union representation, and required employer recognition and 
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collective bargaining with trade union representatives.46  In exchange, unions were barred from 
striking during the term of a collective bargaining agreement or prior to the exhaustion of extended 
conciliation procedures. During the decade that followed WWII unions were able to extract 
significant wage increases, and the standardized work practices and internal job ladders discussed 
above became the norm.47 Workers in the resource sector, in transportation and in mass 
production industries were increasingly unionized, as were the skilled trades.48  
 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Second World War there was a 
growing realization that an unregulated labour market could not be left to provide for the basic 
income and social security needs of the population.49 Between 1930 and the end of the 1950s 
Canadian governments began to put together a frame for social wage protection and substantive 
minimum employment standards, passing new statutes and weaving together existing 
enactments.50 In so doing, they adopted the waged relationship as the primary location for 
alleviating the harsher effects of the market, and the contract of employment as a site for legislative 
intervention. In 1937 the government of Ontario extended to men the minimum wage protection 
that had once been restricted to women and children.51 In 1944 maximum hours of daily and 
weekly work were legislatively fixed, as was annual vacation pay.52 Equal pay legislation was passed 
for women53, and the Fair Employment Practices Act was passed to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of race, colour, and creed.54  The Labour Relations Act of 1950 also prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of trade union membership, and specified that any collective bargaining agreement 
that discriminated on the basis of race or creed was invalid.55 The British North America Act was 
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amended to allocate jurisdiction for a national Unemployment Insurance scheme to the federal 
government, which was then enacted in 1940.56  
 
But the form of labour and employment laws adopted in the post-war era served both to limit 
union strength and to segment the labour market. Professional, managerial and confidential 
employees,  as well as domestic and agricultural workers, were excluded from the protections of 
labour rights legislation, leaving the common law and minimum employment standards to regulate 
their employment relationships.57 At the same time, the system of industrial legality adopted by PC 
1003 proceduralized labour conflicts and served to narrowly delineate acceptable forms of trade 
union activities, while outlawing more radical forms of organizing.58  At least one effect of the 
legalization of trade union activity was to restrict the types of workplaces unions could organize. 
The rules relating to the appropriate bargaining unit, for instance, served to limit the organizing 
strength of trade unions, by recognizing enterprise level bargaining units, so that industry-wide or 
sectoral bargaining never became the norm in Canada.59 With enterprise-level bargaining legally 
required, smaller workplaces and those with multiple locations were difficult to organize, such that 
by the mid-1950s, according to Craig Heron, “the typical union member was a relatively settled, 
semi-skilled male worker within a large industrial corporation”.60  
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Enterprise level bargaining, along with governmental labour policies, helped set in place 
fragmented labour market patterns. 61 Trade unions negotiated wage scales, seniority systems and 
pension plans premised on notions of the family male breadwinner for their members, enshrining 
key elements of the SER into collective bargaining agreements. But the persistence of non-
unionized workers outside of SER relationships also permitted the continued availability of lower 
skilled, casual workers, both within larger workplaces and dispersed through less socially valued 
industries.62 Non-unionized waged workers tended to be female and/or immigrants, working in 
smaller workplaces and more occupationally dispersed. Clerical work, in particular, became 
increasingly feminized at the same time as its wage scale lengthened, demoted from a skilled, male 
dominated field to one viewed as the purview of temporary and part time semi-skilled work.63 The 
construction of female work as a secondary, supplementary form of income within a family unit 
continued the longstanding paternalist approach to work regulation, seeking to return women to 
the home and out of the high skilled jobs they had entered during the war.64 Legislative design and 
governmental policy explicitly targeted men for full employment, and sought to redirect women 
into service sector jobs and low-paying part-time manufacturing work. Ann Porter argues that 
governmental officials viewed the role of women as acting as a labour market reserve, to enter the 
workforce only “under emergency conditions”.65 At an aggregate level, as Fudge and Vosko argue, 
the higher wages earned by unionized workers were sustainable by providing lower wages and less 
job security to non-unionized workers.66  
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Thus while the SER became increasingly entrenched as the normative and aspirational basis for 
both policy and legislative purposes through the mid-1940s and 1950s, the benefits of stable long-
term employment, even amongst workers in SERs, took explicit legal form only in unionized 
workplaces. Upper status workers and the increasingly feminized “reserve” precarious workforce, 
workers under Contracts Type 2 and 3, would continue to be regulated by an amalgam of the 
common law and statutory  minimum standards.67  
 
(3) The Drop in Litigated Common Law Employment Cases over the Mid-Century 
What did the emergence of long-term employment, and of internal labour markets within vertically 
integrated firms, suggest for the common law of employment contracts in the 1930s, 1940s and 
1950s? First and foremost, the number of reported employment contract cases dropped over the 
mid-century. As Table 3, suggests, this drop was experienced primarily in wrongful dismissal claims, 
while the level of property-related cases remained relatively constant with the early 20th century. 
There were only seven reported wrongful dismissal cases between 1930 and 1939 in Ontario, only 
five in the 1940s, and six in the 1950s. The number of reported wrongful dismissal cases appears to 
have been only half the number reported in the decades of the early 20th century.  
Table 3: Summary of Reported Employment Contract Cases, 1930-1959 
Decade 
 
Wrongful Dismissal Property-Related Claims Miscellaneous Total  
 
1930-1939 7a 6   
 1 of which appealed 
1 WD cross-claim 
3 16 
1940-1949 5 1 
 1 of which appealed 
2 8 
1950-1959 6  
1 of which appealed 
6  4 16 
a
 The cases are organized by date of decision. The ‘appeals’ category denotes the number of cases decided within 
each decade that was then appealed upwards. Cases that were appealed are only counted once, in the decade in 
which the first reported decision was made.  
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The poverty and unemployment of the Great Depression era might explain the decline in wrongful 
dismissal rates over the mid-century. In 1933, for instance, 20.5% of the national population was 
unemployed: most people probably could not afford to sue to enforce their work rights.68 The 
economic situation of the 1940s and 1950s was very different however. Job growth was slow as 
Canada entered the Second World War in 1939, but by 1944 jobs were rapidly proliferating, with a 
growth rate of approximately 50% in the civilian workforce between 1939 and 1944.69 Unionization 
rates also began to grow significantly in Canada in the 1940s, such that semi-skilled and skilled 
workers were able to extract significantly higher wages.70 By the 1950s, workers in transportation, 
mass-production, and resource-based industries made up the majority of the unionized 
workforce.71 As table 4 demonstrates, such workers experienced rising wage rates through mid-
1940s and the 1950s.72  
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Table 4: Average annual earnings by decade, 1931-1951 (dollars) 
 1931 1941 1951 
Labourer 480.00 566.00 1 552.00 
Semi-skilled 791.00 933.00 2 132.00 
Skilled 1 042.00 1 052.00 2 292.00 
Clerical, commercial, 
financial 
1 192.00 11 139.00 2 206.00 
Professional 1 924.00 1 553.00 2 944.00 
Managerial 2 468.00 2 082.00 3 603.00 
Table D232-237, Douglas Hartle, “Wages and Working Conditions”, Historical Statistics of Canada, MC Urquhart 
and K. Buckley eds., (Cambridge: University Printing House, 1965 and 1971). 
 
One reason for the decline in wrongful dismissal claims may be that the blue collar middle class was 
increasingly unionized, just as labour demand increased and dismissal rates appeared to drop. This 
class of workers saw its terms of work determined by their collective bargaining agreements rather 
than the common law, contract type 1 as described in Chapter 1, and their workplace disputes 
primarily decided by labour arbitrators.73  Thus the middle segment of the workforce had even less 
use for the common law of employment by the end of the 1950s than they did in the early 20th 
century, while those at the bottom of the wage scale likely could not afford to make use of it. As the 
1960s approached, therefore, the labour market was increasingly segmented at the top and at the 
bottom in regards to both workplace rights and access to legal fora. Those who could afford to sue 
at common law were workers whose employment contracts contained perhaps some negotiated 
content and were otherwise determined by the common law of employment contracts - contracts 
type 2 - adjudicated before the civil courts. Workers at the bottom of the wage scale however, as 
well as middle income earners in non-unionized industries, worked under contract type 3. Their 
employment contracts contained terms set by their employers and they had little access to the 
common law courts to enforce contract rights beyond those provided by the variety of different 
minimum standards legislation of the era.  
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(4) Employer Property-Related Claims : Control over Information  
Although wrongful dismissal claims dropped in number over the mid-century, employers continued 
to sue workers to enforce property-related rights in employment. But while the numbers remained 
constant, by the mid-century fewer types of property-related claims were brought with any 
frequency. 
Over the early decades of the 20th century employers had sought to use the law to protect their 
investments in worker training, to claim ownership over workers’ inventions, time and earnings 
outside of work hours, to control post-employment competition and to enforce workers’ 
confidentiality in the post-employment context.74 By the mid-century, however, employers no 
longer claimed generalized property rights over workers’ time off the job, and rarely sought 
ownership of the product of workers’ skill outside of work. Only one exclusive employment claim 
was brought during this period.75 For large scale enterprises that adopted internal labour market 
structures over the mid-century, the longer job tenures of the SER provided economic protection 
for their firm-specific training.  In this context, property-related claims over the mid-century now 
arose primarily in only two types of situations: claims against post-employment competition and 
solicitation in small non-SER service-based employment, and the protection of trade secrets and 
confidential information in research-based jobs in industrial manufacturing.  
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The most frequent property-related claim asserted by employers between 1930 and the end of the 
1950s involved the enforcement of restrictive covenants, primarily in businesses that depended on 
personal relationships with clients. Eight restrictive covenant cases were litigated between 1930 
and 1959 in Ontario (none in the 1940s). Employers sought to enforce contractual clauses 
restraining the post-employment work of two store managers76, a hair dresser-barber77, a window 
and house cleaner78, a football player79, two doctors80, and an insurance agent81. Such covenants 
were struck down or severed in the majority of cases82, but as of the 1950s the courts began to 
expand the types of property interests that could ground a restrictive covenant, providing 
employers with property rights over some forms of worker knowledge. 
 
In the early 20th century the courts had understood work-related property to reside in the physical 
manifestation of ideas and knowledge – in mechanical drawings, client lists, tools, etc. Workers 
could not take physical things from their employers and use the information they contained post-
employment, because these constituted objective knowledge, which was the property of the 
employer. On the other hand, any knowledge a worker developed on the job that they retained by 
memory could be used post-employment, because the courts had deemed this subjective 
knowledge that was not physically separate from the worker.  But over the mid-century the courts 
began to focus on the value of ideas themselves rather than on their physical manifestation, and 
consequently to view certain elements of workers’ knowledge as employers’ property, which 
workers could not use post-employment.   
In the 1930s and 1940s the judicial analysis of restrictive covenants remained effectively the same 
as in the early 20th century.  In 1935 in Maguire v. Northland Drug Company the Supreme Court 
again stated that such covenants were enforceable only to the extent that they were reasonable in 
time and space, and did not seek to protect more than that which an employer was entitled to 
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protect. The Court cited Mason for the proposition that an employer could protect its proprietary 
rights over secrets of its manufacturing processes, and secret information regarding its customers. 
But, quoting the English case of Leng v. Andrews, “the information and training which an employer 
imparts to his employees become part of the equipment in skill and knowledge of the employee, 
and so are beyond the reach of such a covenant”.83 Unless a worker sought to use or disclose trade 
secrets or information about manufacturing processes, or to solicit clients away, there was no 
proprietary interest whose misappropriation could be contractually enjoined. The Court reiterated 
the position that less latitude was permitted for restrictive covenants in employment than in the 
sale of a business or its goodwill, because of the power differential between the parties.84  
These principles were applied in cases throughout the 1930s, and there were no restrictive 
covenant cases in the 1940s.85 Beginning in the 1950s however, the courts increasingly began to 
consider proprietary interests to vest in information and relationships themselves, rather in their 
physical manifestations, and with this shift judicial concern to protect workers’ ability to compete 
post-employment began to abate. Prior to the 1950s, absent direct solicitation or the physical 
taking of workplace information the courts generally did not enforce covenants that would prevent 
a worker from working in post-employment competition.86 In Maguire the Supreme Court stated 
that customers were free to leave the initial employer’s business and follow the worker so long as 
the worker did not solicit them to do so. In the 1938 case of Adams Furniture Co. of Toronto v. 
McKenna an employer requested an interim injunction to prevent a former employee from starting 
his own business, on the basis that he made use of information in client lists prepared for his former 
employer.87  The court denied the injunction on the basis that the employee had retained the client 
names by memory, which constituted subjective rather than objective information and the worker 
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was therefore free to use it.88 But starting in the 1950s the courts changed track once they began to 
apply the principles set out in the English case of Routh v. Jones.89  
In Routh protection of business goodwill was explicitly recognized as an employer’s legitimate 
proprietary interest, and this goodwill was understood to include relationships with clients. Lord 
Evershed for the Chancery Division specified that:  
[W]here the circumstances are such that the servant has, by virtue of his engagement, been 
put in the position of learning his master's trade secrets, or of acquiring a special or intimate 
knowledge of the affairs of the customers, clients or patients of his master's business or of 
means of influence over them, there exists a subject-matter of contract, a proprietary 
interest or goodwill in the matter which is entitled to protection, since otherwise the master 
would be exposed to unfair competition on the part of his former servant--competition 
flowing not so much from the personal skill of the assistant as from the intimacies and 
knowledge of the master's business acquired by the servant from the circumstances of his 
employment.90 
The English Court of Appeal approved Justice Evershed’s decision.91 It drew a line between workers’ 
acquisition of special or intimate knowledge of the affairs of customers and the means of 
influencing them, and workers’ professional skills and reputation; the former was now a legitimate 
subject for contractual protection from competition, while the latter was not.  
 
The difficulty with the line drawn was that it now permitted restrictions on post-employment 
competition from workers who did not actively solicit former clients or use any transcribed 
information as a means of influencing them. Beginning in the 1950s the courts of Ontario 
increasingly accepted the idea that the mere presence of former employees working in a proximate 
job, either geographically or by job type, could threaten a business’ goodwill because former 
workers might have ‘the means of influencing customers’. Thus in 1952 in Mills v. Gill the courts 
enforced a restrictive covenant against a doctor who had promised not to engage in the practice of 
medicine for five years within five miles of the city of Oshawa after leaving employment with a 
medical clinic.92 The employer was a full service medical clinic, and argued that it had a legitimate 
interest in protecting against the use of personal contacts by the worker and knowledge of the 
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persons coming to the clinic.93 Although there was no evidence that the defendant doctor actually 
solicited the clinic’s customers, the court felt the employer had a legitimate proprietary interest 
worthy of protection. This was especially so in the medical field because doctors were prohibited 
from advertising, such that “the essential element in maintaining their practice lay in the personal 
contact between doctor and patient”.94 The defendant doctor argued that given the large size of 
the clinic, it was unreasonable to require such a covenant. But the court disagreed, finding that in 
fact because of the clinic’s size, “the capital investment involved and the expenses of operation, the 
great opportunity presented to the defendant to gain the acquaintance and knowledge of patients 
and doctors”, it was even more reasonable to require protection than in other cases.95 
 
On this basis - the possession of the “means of influence”, or the simple fact of having had 
relationships with an employer’s clients - the Ontario courts as of the 1950s were increasingly 
prepared to enforce covenants where the worker would be in competition with their former 
employer. The courts in the early 20th century had suggested that to protect against bare 
competition was to rob the community of the benefits of workers’ skill and efforts – that, as the 
court stated in the 1916 case of George Weston v. Baird, employers should not “be allowed to 
appropriate or destroy the rights of the State to the benefit which should accrue from the industry, 
education, skill, capacity, or aptitude of its people”. 96 But after the decision in Routh they now 
suggested that achieving the main goal of protecting employers’ legitimate proprietary rights in 
their business methods and client relations unavoidably involved some incidental protection against 
competition from former employees.97  
 
The courts of Ontario also began to protect trade secrets and confidential information, recognizing 
value in employers’ investments in knowledge accumulation, rather in the physical documents in 
which confidential information was transcribed. Claims regarding trade secrets in employment were 
not litigated prior to 1949 in Ontario.98 Protection of trade secrets was an equitable right that had 
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originally emerged out of relationships of specific confidence, but in England between the 1890s 
and 1920s it increasingly took on a property-based foundation, and was protected by implied 
contract.99 The English case law was invoked in Ontario as of the late 1940s, and thereafter arose 
with relative regularity, as the development of research-intensive products became more 
economically significant. In the employment context trade secret claims typically sought to restrain 
employee use of knowledge of manufacturing processes which the worker had helped develop as 
part of their job, or which was imparted to them during employment.  
 
In R.I. Crain v. Ashton the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain a former employee from 
divulging the manner in which certain parts were assembled to produce a type of continuous form 
press, as well as from building or selling such machines.100 The defendant had created the particular 
type of form presses the plaintiffs used while in its employment. He left to set up a business to 
assemble and sell such presses, on the understanding that he would sell them to the plaintiffs, but 
they ultimately decided to build them themselves and sought to restrain him from selling the 
machines.101 The question was whether trade secrets were embodied in the method of assembling 
the presses. The court, noting the absence of an authoritative definition of a trade secret in English 
or Canadian case law, described it as a proprietary right which lasted only so long as the 
information remained secret. It must be known only by its owner and those “employees to whom it 
was necessary to confide it”.102 But what type of information could be a trade secret? The court 
used the distinction between objective and subjective knowledge from restrictive covenant cases to 
define.103 But objective knowledge was traditionally associated with information contained in 
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physical form, whereas in this case the worker used only his personal skill and memory to remake 
the machines, and therefore took nothing tangible from his employer. 
Recognizing that the value was in the idea rather than its physical reproduction, the Court of Appeal 
now concluded that the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge was separate from 
the form that knowledge took. Whether or not retained by memory, the worker did more than use 
his personal skill and knowledge in making the new machines, because he drew on the objective 
knowledge he developed while making improvements on the presses in the employ of the 
plaintiffs.104 These improvements were the thing he was hired to do, and they were recognized “by 
him as being something which he should preserve solely for his employer”.105 The fact that the 
worker could reproduce the devices without the aid of written materials – blueprints, drawings, etc. 
– did not change the nature of the information which had commercial value and which belonged to 
his employer.106 
In R.I. Crain the Court of Appeal recognized the proprietary interest of the employer in an idea, 
rather than its written form. Underlying this analysis was the idea that confidential information was 
a secret imparted for the purposes of the worker’s employment, and/or developed by him as part 
of his job. He was paid to produce confidential information, and therefore could not take it with 
him post-employment. Although described in proprietary terms, the protection of trade secrets in 
the employment context seemed at least partially designed to protect the value that the employer 
contracted for in hiring the worker. In a similar manner, two years after RI Crain the Ontario High 
Court cited the English decision of Saltman v. Campbell in Reliable Toy Co. v. Collins for the 
proposition that confidential information was not solely information unavailable to the public, but 
also included a document that was valuable and therefore confidential by the “the fact that the 
maker of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced 
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by somebody who goes through the same process”.107 Here the employer had invested in a 
worker’s expenditure of energy and time to produce a document, and that investment rendered its 
contents of value, and therefore, confidential.  
Thus between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s claims regarding property in employment were 
increasingly focused on control over work-related information, in both small service-based 
employment and research-intensive manufacturing enterprises. As companies grew in size and 
vertical integration became the norm in Ontario, as economic competition centered on specialized 
production processes in manufacturing and client relationships in the growing service sector, the 
courts began to recognize that the value of information and knowledge lay in the ideas and 
relationships themselves, rather than in their physical embodiment. This shift started to become 
visible in law in the 1950s, and its result was to allow employers to claim proprietary rights over a 
greater zone of work-related information and employee knowledge than previously permitted. 
(5) Wrongful Dismissal: A Time of Transition 
While the number of property-related cases brought by employers was reported at approximately 
the same levels over the mid-century as they had between the 1890s and 1920s, the number of 
wrongful dismissal cases dropped significantly over the mid-century. Because of this drop in 
numbers the development of the law of wrongful dismissal stalled over the mid-century. 
Nonetheless, some hints of the legal issues that the emerging SER would create for the common 
law were becoming visible. Claims over this era are were brought by store managers108, stock 
exchange brokers, commission and sales agents109, engineers110, a railway brakeman111, a doctor112, 
a teacher113, two general managers114, a vulcanizer115, and a police officer116. Only one wrongful 
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dismissal claim was brought by a woman between 1930 and 1959.117 Ontario judges continued to 
draw primarily on case law from England to develop this area of law, but they also began to cite 
local precedents where possible. Still, they did not cite cases from other Canadian provinces with 
any regularity, and they only rarely used American decisions. In the 1949 trade secret case of R.I. 
Crain v. Ashton the court explained Ritchie J.’s dictum in Sherren v. Pearson, that where an issue 
had not been considered by the courts of Ontario or England, American cases could be canvassed, 
particularly in areas of law modelled on the law of England.118 Such cases, Ritchie J. maintained, 
were not binding authority, but nonetheless were “entitled to the highest respect; they are 
important to us, inasmuch as the same principles of law are applied to a state of things similar, to 
our own, by judges of high character, learning and experience; some, indeed, of very deserved 
celebrity”.119  
(a) The Presumption of Indefinite Hire and The Eclipse of the Legal Standard for Cause 
Although the presumption of annual hire had been abandoned by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1897, it is only as of the 1930s that a presumption of indefinite duration employment came to 
ground the wrongful dismissal analysis. 120 Between the 1890s and the 1920s the question of 
contract duration was a matter of fact, to be determined based on the intent of the parties.  
Claimants continued to argue for the annual hire in the early 20th century, so that they would 
receive compensation for wages owing over the remainder of the contract. But between the 1930s 
and the end of the 1950s job tenure began to lengthen in large scale workplaces, and indefinite 
duration employment was increasingly presented as the default legal presumption. As table 5 
shows, only four fixed-term contracts were litigated in Ontario between 1930 and 1959121, and the 
courts explicitly considered the question of contract length only twice over those years122. Other 
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wrongful dismissal claims either concerned contracts of explicit indefinite duration, or the duration 
issue was not examined in the decision, with the courts seeming to presume indefinite duration 
employment if the relationship lasted over several years. Although the issue of duration continued 
to be framed as a question of fact, in practice where no duration was mentioned in the contract, 
the courts now tended to assume indefinite duration relationships, terminable on reasonable 
notice.123  
Table 5: Employment Duration in Reported Wrongful Dismissal Cases, 1930-1959a 
 
 
Indefinite Duration 
Hire 
Fixed Duration Hire Unstated Duration Total 
1930-1939 5 1 1 (but of multiple years) 7 
1940-1949 2  3 (1 weekly duration) 0 5  
1950-1959 1 (lifetime duration) 1 4 (but of multiple years) 6  
a 
This table depicts the length of employment as described in the reported decisions of each decade. 
Cases that were appealed are only counted once. 
 
As indefinite duration employment became the standard type of employment contract, reasonable 
notice took on greater significance in the analysis of the wrongful dismissal claim, and cause 
receded in analytical importance. Cause was now necessary only for summary dismissal without 
reasonable notice, or to terminate a fixed term contract. Indeed, the legal standard for establishing 
cause enunciated in Callo v. Brounker and applied over the late 19th and early 20th centuries was 
almost entirely invisible between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s.124  The question of cause was 
only considered in six recorded decisions over this period. Batt, writing in 1937, stated that 
disobedience, neglect, misconduct during and outside of service, incompetency and illness were 
grounds for summary dismissal.125 But as to misconduct, on the basis of the 1906 Privy Council 
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decision in Clouston v. Corry, he stated that there was no fixed rule of law defining the degree of 
misconduct justifying dismissal from service.  “It is a question of fact for the jury to say in the 
individual case whether the misconduct in question is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the implied 
or express condition of service.”126 This approach was applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Axelrod v. Beth Jacob of Kitchener.127  
Mark Freedland suggests that the Callo standard of disobedience or neglect tended to be applied in 
England to manual workers, while a general test of misconduct was applied to white collar workers, 
focused on actions incompatible with their duties.128 In Ontario at the mid-century, however, 
because almost all claims were brought by white collar and highly skilled workers, cause was 
generally framed within the general category of misconduct, but a more rigorous standard of 
evidence was required by the courts for the dismissal of higher status workers. For example, the 
trial decision in Abbott v. G.M. Gest involved the dismissal of a branch office manager; the employer 
argued dismissal for cause on the basis of misconduct, firstly arguing that the worker had paid 
insufficient attention to the business, and secondly, for disloyalty. But the court required specific 
evidence to demonstrate the grounds of cause asserted. The Court of Appeal noted that to 
demonstrate the first ground the employer could not simply rely on the branch’s decrease in 
revenue but needed to introduce evidence that the loss was due to the employee’s actions or 
inactions.129 As regards disloyalty, the Court suggested that some attitudes might be incompatible 
“with that loyal service which may rightfully be expected from a servant of the Company” but that 
in this instance such an attitude had not been displayed.130  The Court held that there was 
insufficient evidence of cause for dismissal before it. For lower status workers, however, the courts 
sometimes suggested that the issue was only a factual matter of determining whether misconduct 
had occurred, but beyond that the penalty was for the employer to decide. In Edgeworth v. New 
York Central Railway a baggage handler with twenty years seniority was dismissed for playing a trick 
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on a customer. There the Court held that though the penalty was harsh, any violation of employer 
policies constituted misconduct, and because misconduct was cause for summary dismissal, once 
that was factually determined, it was up to the employer to determine the consequences.131  The 
courts therefore appeared to consider the sufficiency of cause for the summary dismissal of higher 
status workers, while instead examining only its existence for comparatively lower status workers. 
(b) Change in Employment Terms and Contract Variation 
 
As long term indefinite employment became increasingly commonplace in Ontario, the courts 
started to face the question of how to vary the terms of an employment contract over time. It was 
not an issue that had often been litigated before in Ontario, but it became an increasingly pressing 
issue as of the 1950s, as job tenures lengthened and workers remained with their employers 
throughout their careers. Internal job ladders permitted workers to move up within enterprises, 
such that they changed jobs and responsibilities over time. Even absent changes in formal positions, 
an employer’s managerial prerogative theoretically permitted it to change the content of jobs to 
suit its production needs. But how was this to be done in law? How were employment contract 
terms to be changed in relationships that existed over many years? Did each change constitute a 
new contract, and did it require new consideration? Such questions began to be visible in the 
wrongful dismissal case law in the 1950s in particular, as the Standard Employment Relationship 
spread as the paradigm of white collar employment across Ontario. 
 
In a few cases in the 1930s the courts spoke to the question of whether changes to an employment 
contract required new consideration to pass between the parties, or whether an employer’s threat 
of dismissal was itself sufficient consideration to render the variation mutual and binding. The 
Supreme Court spoke to this question incidentally in 1935 in Maguire v. Northland Drug Co, when 
an employer insisted on the addition of a restrictive covenant against post-employment 
competition in an existing contract.132 The employee understood that failure to accept the variation 
would lead to his termination. The Supreme Court held that the non-exercise of the employer’s 
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right to terminate constituted sufficient consideration for the new covenant because it amounted 
to the employer’s agreement to refrain from exercising its right to terminate. 133  
 
The issue arose more directly in the 1957 case Hill v. Peter Gorman. The question was whether 
unilateral variation of an employment contract constituted constructive dismissal, permitting the 
worker to claim wrongful dismissal.134 The worker was employed for an indefinite term as a 
commission salesman under an oral employment contract.135 A year later the president of the 
company instituted a new practice under which 10% would be deducted from the workers’ 
commissions to create a reserve for uncollected accounts. The plaintiff continued to work for the 
company for another sixteen months, until his retirement. However every month when the 
commission was deducted he complained of it to his employer. At trial the employee explained that 
he could not quit, because there was a restrictive covenant in his employment contract, and this 
was the only trade he knew. The trial judge held that the new deduction policy was not a part of the 
express agreement, but was instead a new additional term offered to the worker. The question was 
whether the worker’s continued employment constituted implied consent to the variation in 
employment terms. The trial judge found that there was no such agreement by the employee, and 
Laidlaw J.A. held that there was no basis for varying the trial judge’s finding of fact. Justice McKay 
agreed, stating that continuance of employment alone could not constitute acceptance of an 
attempted contract variation.  It could not be that an employer “has a unilateral right to change a 
contract or that by attempting to make such a change he can force an employee to either accept or 
quit”.136 He stated the law as follows: 
Where an employer attempts to vary the contractual terms, the position of the employee is 
this: He may accept the variation expressly or impliedly in which case there is a new 
contract. He may refuse to accept it and if the employer persists in the attempted variation 
the employee may treat this persistence as a breach of contract and sue the employer for 
damages, or while refusing to accept it he may continue in his employment and if the 
employer permits him to discharge his obligations and the employee makes it plain that he 
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is not accepting the variation, then the employee is entitled to insist on the original 
terms.137 
 
Justice McKay stated that if the employer wished to make changes to the contract term, the proper 
procedure was to terminate the employment contract by proper notice, and offer employment on 
the new terms, but until it was terminated the plaintiff was entitled to insist on the original 
terms.138  
 
(c) Reasonable Notice: Entrenched but Conceptually Undefined 
As previously mentioned, indefinite duration employment was increasingly the norm in wrongful 
dismissal claims over the mid-century, either by explicit agreement of the parties or as found by the 
courts. Because indefinite duration employment contracts could be dissolved with the provision of 
reasonable notice, the concept of reasonable notice assumed increasing centrality to the wrongful 
dismissal analysis over the mid-20th century. The obligation to provide reasonable notice was first 
cast as an implied contractual term in the 1936 case of Carter v. Bell. 139 The Court of Appeal 
explained that the implied obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination was a particular 
incident of the employment relationship that was based primarily on custom. “The master and 
servant, when nothing is said, are presumed to contract with reference to this usage and so a 
stipulation as to notice is implied.”140 From Carter onwards the courts explained indefinite duration 
employment contracts as including the implied term of reasonable notice of dismissal. 
 
Yet despite the growing significance of the concept of reasonable notice, no definitive legal 
formulation was provided for its determination over the mid-century. The appropriate length of 
reasonable notice was considered a question of fact in the circumstances. In Carter v. Bell the Court 
of Appeal stated that six months would usually be sufficient notice for indefinite hire employment 
contracts141, and in a number of cases that followed six months was explained as the maximum 
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permissible notice period. In Norman v. National Life Insurance the Court looked at the length of 
notice awarded by the English courts in other cases, ranging from six months to one year for 
newspaper editors and a steamship First Officer. 142 But citing Harnwell, Messer, Carter and 
Normandin v. Solloway, the court here stated that it seemed to be “well established that six months 
is the maximum notice required to terminate a contract of indefinite hiring”.143 In other cases 
however a variety of periods of reasonable notice were awarded. Most were under six months144, 
but in at least one case, one year was considered appropriate145. For the most part, because the 
question of reasonable notice remained an issue of fact, the judges simply announced what they 
considered reasonable, and offered no legal benchmark to measure against or rationale to explain 
their determination.146 
(d) Reasonable Notice as the Measure of Damages 
As indefinite duration employment contracts became the norm over the mid-century, and 
reasonable notice the method by which such contracts could be dissolved, it also increasingly 
became the measure of damages. 
When the wrongful dismissal claim was first crafted at common law the courts considered the loss 
from dismissal on the same basis as other commercial contracts. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, in the 1849 case of Beckham v. Drake the House of Lords specified that damages for 
wrongful dismissal were to be calculated based on “[w]hat is the usual rate of wages for the 
employment here contracted for, and what time would be lost before a similar employment could 
be obtained”.147 A general contractual analysis of the loss from dismissal was facilitated by the fixed 
duration that the law presumed for the employment relationship. But even after the presumption 
of annual hire was displaced at the turn of the 20th century, the courts in Ontario continued to 
explain wrongful dismissal damages in the same manner as commercial contractual damages. The 
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idea was that the courts should examine the length of time before the worker was likely to secure 
similar employment, which represented the actual loss suffered, and compensate for that period.148  
In practice, however, the basis of damages for wrongful dismissal was in flux in between the 1930s 
and 1950s. Starting in the 1920s, in indefinite duration employment contracts the courts began to 
assess damages based on wages and contractual benefits over the reasonable notice period, rather 
than investigating when comparable employment could have been secured. This approach was not 
yet entirely entrenched. On occasion the courts reverted to the old annual hire system and 
awarded the wages otherwise owing over the balance of the remaining year of the contract.149 
Generally speaking, however, as of the 1930s wages over the reasonable notice period was 
increasingly considered the measure of loss for wrongful dismissal.150 
But even as reasonable notice took on a greater analytical role and was recast as an implied 
contractual right, the courts continued to explain the breach in a wrongful dismissal claim as the 
failure to retain in employment, as was first enunciated in Emmens v. Elderton in the mid-19th 
century.151 In Cemco Electrical Manufacturing Co. v. Van Snellenberg Rand J. (dissenting on other 
grounds) explained that it was “the loss of earnings resulting from a denial of a right to use or 
commit his working capacity profitably that is the substance of his claim”.152 In the context of a 
contract of employment, remuneration was exchanged either for work done, or for the worker’s 
commitment to work in the future. A wrongful dismissal was a repudiation by the employer of the 
obligation to accept the work or the commitment to do so. 
Workers still had a duty to mitigate their losses. In Cemco Justice Rand went on to explain that 
mitigation was a necessary corollary to the award of damages.  Wrongful dismissal amounted to the 
employer’s repudiation of the worker’s obligations under the contract, and, because specific 
performance was not available for employment contracts, “the employee's capacity to work is now 
released to him to be used as he sees fit”.   
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He may decide to waste it or he may demand that the employer make good its full utility. In 
that event, he must act reasonably in seeking to employ it as he would or might have had 
the particular engagement not been made. It is the loss of earnings resulting from a denial 
of a right to use or commit his working capacity profitably that is the substance of his claim, 
and as he must prove his damages, it must appear that they arose from the breach of 
contract.153 
To show that the damage arose by virtue of contractual breach, therefore, the worker had to 
demonstrate that he or she did what was necessary to secure other employment, or they would be 
partially responsible for their own losses.154 
Over the mid-20th century therefore the conceptual underpinnings of the wrongful dismissal claim 
were in flux, and therefore so was the measure of damages. As indefinite duration employment 
became the norm, and once an entitlement to reasonable notice was stated as an implied 
contractual obligation in Carter v. Bell, reasonable notice became the logical period of time over 
which to evaluate the loss.  This was not, however, how the courts explained the conceptual basis 
of the wrongful dismissal claim, which was rather concerned with the employer’s failure to retain 
the worker in employment. 
(e) The Boundaries of the Wrongful Dismissal Claim: Agents, Employees, and Those in the 
Middle  
Over the mid-20th century the number and scope of work-related and social wage statutes 
increased in Ontario and at the federal level. The coverage of such statutes became a question of 
litigation over these decades. The issue of who was a servant or employee had arisen in the early 
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20th century in regards to the coverage of older statutes, such as the winding up of corporations155, 
bankruptcy156 and workmen’s compensation157.  As of the 1940s questions arose over the scope of 
the federal Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940 and the Income Tax of 1948 which created 
differential tax responsibilities for employees and own account self-employed workers.158 In the 
very late 1950s the scope of the Labour Relations Act was also the source of litigation.159 For the 
most part the courts and decision-makers adopted the control test elaborated in the context of tax 
and vicarious liability law to determine who was an employee and who was not for the purposes of 
the different statutes.  
 
The question of who could bring a wrongful dismissal claim was now also presented to the courts 
over the mid-century. Prior to the 1920s sales agents who might, under current law, be considered 
independent contractors, were able to bring wrongful dismissal claims without judicial comment at 
common law. Between 1890 and 1930, five wrongful dismissal cases were brought by workers 
classified as sales agents or commission agents.160 In all but one agent-employee case prior to 1923, 
the status of the work relationship was not raised and did not constitute any part of the 
determination of wrongful dismissal.161 The issue did not arise even in regards to a sales agent paid 
primarily by commission, although the Court spent considerable time determining whether the 
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worker could recover the estimated amount of commission he would have earned over the rest of 
the contract.162  
As described in the previous chapter, over the early 20th century the concept of “agent”, or of 
“independent contractor”, was in flux.  As independent service professionals, whose work was 
based on the exercise of knowledge and discretion, were transformed into waged corporate 
workers, and as clerical work expanded within corporations, the 19th century dividing lines between 
agents and employees began to break down. In this context, the question of whether an agent 
could bring a claim for wrongful dismissal was first brought to the Ontario courts in the 1923 case of 
Pollard v. Gibson.163  A worker under an indefinite exclusive contract to act as a sales representative 
for the employer in Canada and the United States brought a wrongful dismissal claim. The employer 
argued that the claimant was not entitled to reasonable notice, as he was a commission sales agent 
terminable at will. For the first time in Ontario the court in Pollard agreed that were the plaintiff a 
mere commission agent, “the defendants' contention that they had the right to dismiss him without 
notice is undoubtedly well founded and supported by numerous cases”.164 In this instance, 
however, the court concluded that the relationship was not one of a simple commission agent, 
because the plaintiff was not employed ‘by the job’. The court concluded that aspects of the 
employment contract “tied the plaintiff to the defendants and placed him under their control, in 
some respects”.165 But they also stressed the relative permanence of the relationship, by noting 
that the defendant company had the ability to cancel the plaintiff’s hiring of employees, that he was 
in an exclusive representation relationship, and that the defendant company had to confirm all 
orders placed through the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion, however. 
Relying on the English case of Levy v. Goldhill, the Court of Appeal held that if there was no 
obligation on the agent to do work for the defendant, and no obligation on the part of the employer 
to provide work, then the contract was really just one in which the employer would pay if services 
were rendered.166 Based on the nature of the agreement before them the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the worker did not have an obligation to work, despite the exclusive nature of the 
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representation agreement, and therefore he was not entitled to notice of dismissal or to a wrongful 
dismissal claim.  
 
Claims from agents continued to be brought through the 1930s to the end of the 1950s however. In 
the 1933 case of Robinson v. Galt the Court of Appeal allowed a claim for notice from a commission 
agent, although on slightly confusing grounds.167 In the 1936 case of Carter v. Bell the High Court 
took on the question squarely.168 A worker who moved to another province to act as the exclusive 
sales representative of the defendant for an indefinite duration brought a claim for wrongful 
dismissal when terminated without notice. One of the questions before the court was whether the 
plaintiff was a commission agent or whether he was in a master and servant relationship. If he was 
a commission agent, the court thought he could be summarily dismissed without notice, but 
required reasonable notice of dismissal if an employee. The court canvassed English decisions on 
the distinction between agents and servants. The court cited the control test enunciated in Reg. v. 
Walker, which specified that the master must have the right to dictate to the employee both what 
he has to do and how he is to do it.169 Because the defendant held such rights of control over the 
plaintiff’s work in this instance, the conclusion was that the plaintiff was an employee, particularly 
because the defendant retained the right to approve the hiring of each new agent the plaintiff 
retained. 
 The Court of Appeal established a more nuanced standard, however.170 The Court noted that in 
cases where a mercantile agent worked with many clients, and where the employer “exercises no 
immediate control over the agent but leaves him to be his own master”, there was no master and 
servant relationship, such that the contract could be dissolved at will by either party.171  By contrast, 
in indefinite duration master and servant relationships there was an implied contractual obligation 
to provide reasonable notice of dismissal. But the Court of Appeal went on to hold that there was 
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also an intermediate class of cases where the relationship of master and servant might not exist, 
but where there was a degree of permanence beyond the regular type of mercantile agency 
agreement. For such an intermediate class reasonable notice of dismissal was necessary, and a 
wrongful dismissal claim was available to enforce it.172 The Court noted a number of characteristics 
that indicated the permanence of the relationship before it:  the fact that the plaintiff was to recruit 
and train new agents, that the defendant’s approval was required for the subagents’ appointment; 
that the plaintiff was to supervise the subagents on an ongoing basis; that he sought to develop a 
new market for the defendant’s products; that he moved to another province to do this job and 
moved his family with him. All these factors suggested a relationship that could not be dissolved at 
will, even if the method of remuneration otherwise suggested a mercantile relationship.  
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal went on to specify that whether or not reasonable notice of 
dismissal was necessary could not be determined on the basis of the control test. The Court held 
that the determination of employment status had a different purpose under vicarious liability law 
and as regards wrongful dismissal claims.173 In a vicarious liability case the question was whether 
the master should be liable for the acts of their servants because the worker was acting in 
pursuance of their job, executing the employer’s orders, such that the act could be imputed to the 
employer. For wrongful dismissal however, the question was whether there was an implied 
contractual obligation to terminate the contract only upon reasonable notice. The Court of Appeal 
made allusion to the control test, but relied more squarely on the concept of ‘permanence’.174 The 
judges noted that the defendant could not dictate how the worker was to do his work from day to 
do, so long as he provided faithful service. But they also stressed that there were aspects to the 
relationship that tied the parties to one another, and that rendered the claimant economically 
dependent on the employer. These were different questions in law, which necessitated a different 
approach. In this case the Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to three months 
notice. On the basis of this decision, a claim of wrongful dismissal was open to “employees” but also 
an intermediary class of more permanent agents. What this suggests is that, at least until the end of 
the 1950s, the courts did not police the availability of wrongful dismissal claims to the same degree 
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as they did claims under work-related statutes, or as regards vicarious liability. On another level, it 
also suggests the extent to which the permanence of the relationship, and the ongoing nature of 
the obligations between the parties had come to define the courts’ understanding of the 
employment contract at common law.  
 
(6) Conclusion 
 
Over the mid-20th century the SER came to operate as the paradigmatic form of employment 
around which labour market policies, social wage protections and collective bargaining were 
structured. The transformation of the labour market was not immediately visible in common law 
claims over the mid-century. Nonetheless, suggestions of its impact could be discerned. Whereas 
employers claimed a broad set of entitlements over workers’ labour in property-related claims in 
the early 20th century, by the mid-century only two types of claims were brought with any 
frequency. These were claims to enforce restrictive covenants against post-employment 
competition and solicitation by former workers in small service sector enterprises, who did not 
necessarily have the firm attachment of workers in large mass production companies. The second 
type of claim was for trade secret and confidential information protection in research-intensive 
businesses. In the first decades of the 20th century legal approaches to notions of property rights in 
employment initiated a series of conceptual changes to other aspects of employment contract law, 
in particular to the tools of managerial control. By the mid-20th century, however, property-related 
claims were more specialized and applied only to some types of work.  
 
Wrongful dismissal claims dropped in number over the mid-20th century, as the province went 
through the Great Depression and two periods of full employment, during and after the Second 
World War. Despite the paucity of wrongful dismissal litigation over this period, certain features of 
the emerging Standard Employment Relationship started to present themselves to the courts. 
Indefinite duration employment became increasingly standard and entrenched as a presumption of 
law. As this occurred, cause for dismissal was asserted less frequently, while reasonable notice of 
dismissal became the centre of the wrongful dismissal claim, to determine both the method and the 
damages owing upon wrongful dismissal. For the first time the courts were presented with 
175 
 
questions about how to analyze changes to employment contracts over long term employment. As 
Ontario entered the 1960s, all of these questions and more would come before the courts as they 
grappled in law with the changing social, economic and psychological realities of work that 
reoriented the labour market over the mid-20th century. 
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(1) Introduction: The Construction of the Modern Law of Employment Contracts 
The previous chapter described the emergence of long-term employment relationships over the 
mid-twentieth century. Provoked by the increasing standardization of work practices and the 
availability of internal mobility through set job ladders, the average job tenure of workers began to 
lengthen over the 1940s and 1950s in Canada. The move towards internal labour markets was 
based on a mixture of employer concerns with cutting the costs of worker training through 
increased employee retention, and the desire of workers and trade unions to institute objective 
work systems instead of the discretion-based drive system. These changes were only suggested in 
litigation over employment contracts over the mid-century. But as Table 5 reports, in the 1960s and 
1970s workers brought claims to the common law courts in increasing numbers, particularly in the 
1970s, when the local effects of the first post-war global economic recession became apparent. 
Between 1930 and the end of the 1950s, 18 wrongful dismissal decisions were reported at common 
law in Ontario. Between 1960 and 1979, there were 75. There were also 43 property-related 
decisions during the latter two decades, compared with 13 between 1930 and 1959.  
 
Table 5: Summary of Reported Employment Contract Cases 1960-1979 
Decade Wrongful Dismissal Property-related 
Claims 
Miscellaneous Total 
1960-1969 19 
4 of which appealeda 
10  
4 of which appealed 
6  35 
1970-1979 56  
5 of which appealed 
33  
4 of which appealed 
5 94 
a
 The cases are organized by date of decision. The ‘appeals’ category denotes the number of cases decided within 
each decade that was then appealed upwards. Cases that were appealed are only counted once, in the decade in 
which the first reported decision was made.  
 
The context in which workers brought such cases was now very different to the previous era. Over 
the mid-century the usual labour market arrangement moved from the early 20th century norm of 
short-term job duration for a highly mobile workforce, towards a norm of stable ongoing and open-
ended employment relationships. The paradigmatic Standard Employment Relationship (SER) that 
emerged in the 1940s and 1950s in Ontario assumed increasing centrality to the legal regulation of 
the labour market, but also took on a larger social and political role. As relationships spanned longer 
durations, the workplace became an increasingly fundamental site for the construction of social 
identity and bonds of community. In this context, workers approached the courts with different 
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expectations and understandings of what they invested in their careers and in what they stood to 
lose at termination. 
 
It is over the 1960s and 1970s that the modern law of employment contracts was constructed in 
Ontario, as new struggles over property entitlements dominated litigated claims. This occurred in 
the context of increasing service sector employment, and increasing contestation regarding the 
role, rights and obligations of workers in creating their employers profits. It also occurred in the 
context of wrongful dismissal claims, as workers in SERs increasingly sought legal recognition of 
their psychological, social and economic investments in their employers’ enterprise.   As the courts 
considered issues relating to the employment contract in the 1960s and 1970s they were now faced 
for the first time with claims brought by workers who had spent multiple years with the same 
employer, many of whom had worked their way up the corporate ladder. The judiciary had to 
grapple with the evolving nature of the employment relationship, where employees might work in a 
variety of different capacities over time, and would likely go through at least one promotion, 
demotion, or transfer over the lifetime of the relationship. As the labour market was refashioned 
around the SER in the post-war period, and workers spent an increasing numbers of years with 
particular employers, the courts had to determine whether the nature of job loss, in social, 
psychological, economic and legal terms, was the same in the 1960s and 1970s as in previous eras 
of shorter term employment.1 But faced with such questions, the courts in this era chose to 
refashion the legal frame that had been slowly assembled over the early 20th century to entrench 
the wrongfulness/damages nexus as the sole basis for determining workers’ entitlements upon 
dismissal, rather than giving legal recognition to the changing property parameters of the work 
relationship.2 They did so at the same time as questions surfaced concerning the relationship 
between the common law of employment contracts and the increasing number of statutory work-
related regimes enacted since the mid-century. Together these decisions operated to entrench the 
common law of employment contracts as the substantive residual category for modern work 
regulation in Ontario. 
 
                                                          
1
 Katherine Stone, “The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and 
Employment Law” (2001) 48(3) UCLA L. Rev. 519. 
2
 See supra chapter 1 at s. 1(a) for further discussion on the wrongfulness/damages complex.  
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(2) The Unruly 1960s and 1970s and the End of the Post-War Era of Prosperity 
The 1960s and 1970s were a period of social, political and economic transition, marked by profound 
labour unrest across Canada and the world. The 1960s began in Canada with a sharp spike in 
unemployment rates, after 15 years of relative full employment. 3 Inflationary pressures began to 
make their mark in the early 1970s, as two international oil crises destabilized the global economy, 
raising the prices of raw materials, and throwing macroeconomic policies into turmoil, in Canada 
and abroad.4  Labour market composition and demographics underwent a significant change during 
this period. Agricultural work declined steadily, manufacturing work continued at a stable pace but 
did not grow to the degree of service sector work, which grew exponentially.5 In the late 1960s, 8 
out of every 10 new jobs came from service industries.6 By 1971 the service sector accounted for 
50.58% of employment in Canada, manufacturing 27.81% and the agricultural sector only 11.7%.7 
The growth in service sector work in the 1960s, but particularly in the 1970s, brought increasing 
numbers of women into the workforce.8 A significant amount of service sector work was part time 
and short term, however, creating whole sectors of work that ran parallel to the SERs of large 
manufacturing and corporate work.  
 
Unionization rates continued to grow slowly in the 1960s but plateaued in the 1970s.9 Public sector 
employment grew significantly over this period and was increasingly unionized. Employment in this 
sector was overwhelmingly female, such that its unionization brought large numbers of women into 
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unions for the first time in Canada and in Ontario.10 The period was also marked by a visible move 
towards rank and file militancy within unions and waves of industrial unrest, peaking with the strike 
wave of 1966, primarily provoked by younger workers.11 By the very late 1970s stagnation in the 
manufacturing sector began to slowly diminish the role of the Standard Employment Relationship 
as the typical form of labour market arrangement. This process was intensified by the growth of 
employment in knowledge-intensive industries and an expansion in technological development, 
which, by the late 1970s, began to change the organization of the workplace.12 Rather than the 
Fordist value placed on long-term economic planning and stability, by the late 1970s and early 
1980s, some businesses began to orient themselves towards short term on-demand just-in-time 
production, seeking to instill flexibility into their labour costs and labour arrangements.13  
 
These economic trends took shape amidst the profound political and social unrest of the 1960s and 
1970s across the industrialized world. As elsewhere, the late 1960s were a period of social 
turbulence, with civil rights, labour and feminist activism mobilizing across Canada.14  In the midst 
of this tumultuous era, new regimes of workplace and labour market regulation were enacted in 
Ontario, and across the country.15 In Ontario in 1962 existing anti-discrimination statutes regulating 
discrete private sector relationships were amalgamated into the Human Rights Code.16  Through the 
1960s and 1970s tax courts were also increasingly called upon to determine the tax implications of 
different types of income-producing activities, the contours of Unemployment Insurance and 
provincial welfare schemes were adjudicated, just as arbitral decisions interpreting collective 
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bargaining agreements of trade unions members were increasingly subject to judicial review.17 Of 
particular significance was the enactment of minimum work standards legislation across the 
country. In Ontario this took the form of the Employment Standards Act in 1968, which 
amalgamated and expanded existing legislation.18 Over the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, a growing 
number of legal regimes regulated the workplace. 
 
 
(3) The Labour Market of the 1960s and 1970s: The SER and Short Term Employment 
Industries 
(a) Social, Psychological and Economic Functioning of the SER: Employment Contracts 
without the Law 
In the 1960s and 1970s the courts faced employment cases which now directly raised questions 
regarding the changes spurned by the growth of the SER over the mid-century. Such work 
relationships were often built over many years, during which a worker might take on wholly 
different roles within the same organization for the same employer, such that both parties made 
substantial reciprocal investment in the relationship. But instead of adapting the common law to 
meet this changing context, the judiciary chose not to re-conceptualize the law’s application to 
workplace relations. Instead, the courts entrenched an approach in which the day-to- day 
interactions of the employment relationship continued to operate within a normative frame 
derived from the implied terms of loyalty, fidelity, obedience and confidentiality, bolstered by job-
terms (if any) agreed between the parties or laid down unilaterally by the employer through 
workplace policies. The common law was to have no other active role.19  The case law of the era 
hints at the long term dynamism of these relationships, but the common law dealt with those 
changes mainly peripherally, as factors affecting the calculation of monies owing between the 
parties after their relationship came to an end. With these decisions the courts chose a limited role 
for the law which minimized its intervention in the regulation of the ongoing relations and instead 
contributed a “framework for cooperation”, according to David Marsden, or an “incomplete 
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contract by design”, in the words of Hugh Collins.20 The common law was to intervene only at 
certain key moments of the relationship, primarily to pass judgment on rights and obligations upon 
its dissolution.  
 
As David Marsden has argued, the open-ended employment relationship “relie[d] on a whole 
system of incentives to secure its effectiveness” built on its long-term duration.21 Marsden suggests 
that the employment relationship of the post-war era was built on a set of psychological, economic 
and legal contracts.22 The psychological contract was two-fold. At a broad level it rested on a series 
of tacit understandings of the expected behaviour between the parties and of their respective 
obligations towards each other. These expectations evolved from workplace rules that delineated 
the tasks a worker would be expected to undertake, how salary and benefits would be apportioned, 
and how workers could progress upwards on an internal job ladder. This was buttressed by 
professional training and social expectations associated with specific skill sets and job titles. These 
rules and expectations could be counted on to be respected to the extent that there was a 
relationship of trust between the parties.23 That trust, in turn, was built on economic incentives that 
provided a rationale for expecting their implementation, and more broadly on the property 
parameters of the employment contract set in place over previous eras.  
 The economic contract, or the SER, was premised on a wage model built over a relationship of long 
duration within internal labour markets. Labour economic research modelling the career wage 
trajectory in internal labour markets demonstrates the mutual investment of workers and 
employers over long periods of time, which incentivized loyalty to the relationship by both parties.24 
The model suggests that at the beginning of the relationship workers and employers invested in the 
worker’s skill and knowledge development. Some of that investment focused on developing general 
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skills which the worker could subsequently sell on the labour market, but some was specific to the 
employer’s organization and non-negotiable outside the firm.25 Compensation for this mutual 
investment in firm-specific knowledge was spread over time. At the beginning of the relationship a 
worker was paid at a rate equal to his or her benefit to the firm, as both the worker and the firm 
invested in the acquisition of general human capital and firm-specific knowledge. In the second 
phase of the relationship the worker had gained sufficient knowledge to become useful to the 
employer, but was paid less than the amount of the value they produce for their employer, and also 
less than they would command on the labour market. The reason to continue in such employment 
despite underpayment was the workers’ expectation that the relationship would be ongoing and 
that their wages would continue to rise over time. In the next phase of the relationship, phase 
three, the worker would hold significant firm-specific capital, such that he or she was worth more to 
their employer than they were to other employers. In this phase the worker was paid more than the 
amount they would fetch on the labour market, but still less than the value they produced for their 
employer. In the last phase of the relationship, in the worker’s later working years, their 
productivity might have dropped off, but their compensation did not. Their wage level would 
continue to rise or level out, and they would be paid more than the value they produced for their 
employer.26 The employer was able to spread the cost of training over time, and retained the ability 
to adjust the content of the work the employee performed to suit the changing needs of the 
organization. Workers acquiesced to the employer’s unilateral control and deferred compensation 
because they expected to receive a steadily rising wage over time, thereby alleviating the risks 
associated with fluctuations in demand for the employer’s product and their own services, and the 
elimination of a reduction in salary once their own productivity levels dropped off in later years.27 
Thus, in this model, workers “receive[d] a promise of job security and a wage rate later in their 
working lives that [wa]s greater than the value of both their marginal product and their opportunity 
wage”.28  The worker accepted the open-ended nature of the relationship and the development of 
skills for which they would not receive compensation on the general labour market, in exchange for 
the implied promise of job security and the continued financial recognition of long-term service. In 
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this sense, the long term open-ended employment contract was effectively, in the words of Alain 
Supiot, the exchange of subordination for security.29 
The obligations and expectations described above were inscribed in law only for some workers.  In 
unionized environments collective bargaining agreements codified workplace rules, job tasks, pay 
grids, seniority principles for advancement, and methods of resolving workplace disputes, rendering 
the structures of internal labour markets legally enforceable under contract type 1.30 Beginning in 
1968 in Ontario with the enactment of the Employment Standards Act, non-unionized workers’ 
investment in their employment relationships also received some measure of recognition through 
the creation of statutory mandatory minimum notice periods, based on the length of employment 
tenure.31 Outside the unionized workplace, for workers under Contract types 2 and 3, these general 
minimum employment terms represented the only legal recognition of the changing employment 
bargain in the context of long term employment relationships. 
(b) The Growth of the Service Sector and Short Term Work 
 
While the SER emerged into a position of normative and labour market centrality, short-term part 
time work also became an important feature of the labour market in the 1960s, but particularly in 
the 1970s. This was due to the steady growth of service sector employment from mid-century 
onwards. The service sector provided two very different types of work. At one end of the spectrum, 
jobs were highly precarious – short-term or temporary, often shift-based or part time, unskilled, 
often in small and isolated workplaces, rendering them difficult to regulate and difficult to 
organize.32 At the other end of the spectrum were professional knowledge-based workers. Such 
work was highly skilled, developed through post-secondary education rather than on the job or 
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vocational training. It often focused on communications, trade, financial and business sector 
services, and tended to be highly remunerated.33  
 
As compared to manufacturing work, a significant portion of service sector employment was short-
term and undertaken by female workers. In 1976, 6 out of 10 Canadian part timers were women 
working in service sector employment.34 Magun argued that: 
A large segment of service manpower is still only modestly skilled, whereas the proportion 
of unskilled workers in the goods sector has been shrinking rapidly. In commercial services 
such as wholesale and retail trade, and banking, there are secondary family workers who 
receive lower pay and have less permanent tenure than the average work in the goods-
producing industries. In addition, service workers have higher rates of unemployment, and 
their average work experience is, consequently, shorter.35 
 
Many have argued that the growth of the SER in the 1940s and 1950s was made possible only by 
the existence of a complementary precarious labour force.36 Because enterprises built around the 
SER did not adjust their permanent workforce to meet fluctuations in production needs, they 
needed a contingent workforce to meet upsurges in demand, and drew from smaller related 
enterprises which employed a shorter term workforce to do so. But this was a different 
phenomenon than what emerged from service sector employment in the 1970s. As of the 1970s 
whole enterprises began to be built on short-duration employment models instead of the SER. 
Rather than job segmentation within occupations and enterprises, with the rise of the service sector 
the Ontario and Canadian economies began to experience significant segmentation of the labour 
force.  
The enhanced segmentation was reflected in the employment contract claims of the 1960s and 
1970s. A number of property-related claims over these decades concerned the work of service 
sector employees, and often regarding workers in short-term high-turnover non-unionized jobs. 
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These were often not workers in SERs, and indeed, it was the very fact of short term employment 
that created information disclosure and competition concerns for employers in these sectors. By 
contrast, wrongful dismissal claims in the 1960s and 1970s were brought primarily by workers in 
longer term employment relationships, and the nature of their work shaped the issues litigated 
over these decades.  37  
(4) Property Rights in Employment in an Age of Service 
 
Unlike wrongful dismissal claims in the 1960s and 1970s, property-related claims often involved 
workers in the growing service sector. Service sector work shifted the nature of the property 
exchange involved in the employment contract in several ways. The basis of blue collar 
manufacturing was an exchange of wages for the worker’s labour time, time to be used for the 
production of a tangible good. Employer profit was generated through the sale of such goods. In 
service work, profit was generated through the development of long-term client loyalty, leading to 
repeat transactions. For some service companies that loyalty was largely developed through the 
knowledge and expertise of its employees, whereas for others it was a worker’s ability to develop 
rapport with clients that engendered loyalty. In both contexts, companies’ profits were based on 
the intellectual and interpersonal skills of workers, rather than the tangible goods they produced. 
Because competition between service-based companies was highly dependent on client 
relationships, those relationships, and information regarding client preferences, were of significant 
value for service-based enterprises. For service sector employers that offered SERs, the long-term 
nature of the employment relationships served to protect the value of the information and client 
relationships against competition from former workers, even where the law could not. But a 
significant portion of service industry work was precarious, part-time, short-term work, in which the 
information-protection function of long-term employment did not operate. As they had in over 
earlier decades, in the 1960s and 1970s employers with high-turnover work relationships turned to 
the law to protect information and client-loyalty. Employers argued for recognition of their 
proprietary interest in client relationships as an element of goodwill, primarily through the 
enforcement of non-competition and non-solicitation terms in employee contracts.  
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While there was no major increase in the number of property-related claims at common law 
between the 1950s and 1960s, during the 1960s a number of important precedents were 
established.38 Unlike wrongful dismissal claims during this period, however, the case law concerning 
property rights in employment continued to draw primarily from English case law, with a few 
isolated references to Ontario precedents, and occasionally those from other provinces. As Table 6 
demonstrates, the number of decisions in the 1970s increased, however, from 10 to 33, of which 12 
were made between 1978 and 1979. By the 1970s, most claims concerned the interpretation and 
application of contractual restrictive covenants, rather than implied common law rights and 
obligations.  
Table 6: Property-Related Claims Between 1930-1979* 
Decade Restrictive 
Covenantsa 
Restrictive 
Covenants 
and WD 
Counterclaim 
Trade 
Secrets and 
Confidential 
Information 
at CL 
Trade 
Secret/Confide
ntial Info and 
WD 
counterclaim 
Implied 
Contractua
l Duties 
Express 
Contractual 
Exclusivity 
Total 
1960-69 3 1  3 2  4 0 12 
1970-79 25 0 2 0 6 0 33 
*  
Cases are listed by decade of decision. 
 
a 
The restrictive covenant cases do not include cases concerning the sale of a business, unless there was a separate 
employment-related covenant concluded in conjunction with the sale.  
 
In the 1970s claims to enforce restrictive covenants, trade secrets and confidential information 
usually involved an employer request for an interim or interlocutory injunction to prevent the 
former employee from soliciting former clients prior to a hearing on the merits, rendering his or her 
continued employment in a competitive business very difficult. 39  Prior to the mid-1970s, an 
applicant for an interlocutory injunction had to demonstrate a strong prima facie case, that the 
balance of convenience favoured them, and that they would suffer irreparable harm not 
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compensable by way of damages in its absence.40 As many judges were keenly aware, however, to 
find that a strong prima facie case existed meant that the courts had in effect to pronounce 
themselves on the merits of the claim without the benefit of a full evidentiary record.41 
Consequently the outcome of such applications was often to end the legal dispute. Of the 33 claims 
requesting the enforcement of a restrictive covenant in the 1970s, 21 applications for interim or 
interlocutory injunctions were heard without any further reported decisions on the merits. This was 
especially problematic because the stakes were so high. The courts struggled with how to balance 
the interests of the parties. To do so, when an interim injunction was granted it was usually only 
against client solicitation and use and disclosure of confidential information, rather than the 
enforcement of non-competition covenants to explicitly preclude the worker from continuing in 
their competing employment. But a restriction on solicitation could produce the same effect if the 
worker was employed by a business that depended on soliciting clients of the former employer. For 
employers, especially in small competitive service-based enterprises, a competing employee in 
possession of confidential information, a trade secret, or significant client loyalty could seriously 
damage the viability of the business, particularly over the two to three year hiatus before a trial on 
the merits. The question was complicated by the mid-1970s, when the general legal standard for 
interim injunctions began to change, from a “strong prima facie case” to a “serious issue to be 
tried”. 42 This was a lower standard for the applicant to meet, and had the benefit of not requiring 
the courts to prejudge the merits of the claim to grant the injunction, but given the issues at stake 
in the employment context, it also made it easier for employers secure injunctions to restrain 
workers’ post-employment activities. 
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(a) Trade Connections and Restrictive Covenants 
As discussed in the previous chapter, up until the 1950s the courts had held that workers were free 
to compete in the post-employment context so long as they did not actively use any information or 
knowledge that arose from anything over which the employer held a proprietary right, using the 
concepts of “objective” and “subjective” knowledge to draw a demarcating line. 43 In the 1950s, 
however, the courts began to suggest that an employer held a proprietary interest in client-related 
information that a worker was exposed to on the job, regardless of the form it took. 44   This trend 
continued into the 1960s and 1970s, when the courts articulated the idea that service sector 
enterprises held a proprietary interest in “trade connections” as an element of goodwill.  
In the earlier case of Herbert Morris v. Saxelby the House of Lords had specified that while the 
goodwill of a business was necessarily exposed to competition on the market, a worker should not 
be able to “take advantage of his employer’s trade connections or use information confidentially 
obtained”.45 In the 1960s and 1970s the courts focused in on the concept of trade connections in 
service sector employment, which, they suggested, was the primary basis for the goodwill of such 
enterprises. Although the courts had begun to address the proprietary value of client relationships 
in the 1950s, whether or not they were a legitimate proprietary interest remained jurisprudentially 
confused in the 1960s. In Ian Martin Associates v. Reale, for instance, the High Court of Justice 
acknowledged that trade connections could establish a proprietary right, but expressed skepticism 
that such a right could arise solely from the employer’s expenditure of time in assembling 
information regarding clients.46 By contrast, in PCO Services v. Rumleski the court easily accepted 
the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant without explicitly examining the existence of a 
proprietary interest, or the geographical and temporal scope of the covenant.  Instead they focused 
on the employer’s investment in training the worker and permitting him the opportunity to develop 
client relations. The court explained that the expense and time of training a successor justified the 
enforcement of the restrictive covenant.47 By the 1970s, however, the courts had developed an 
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analytical basis for providing a proprietary right over trade connections. There was growing 
consensus that in some industries a business’ value derived primarily from its client relationships, 
and that those client relations constituted a proprietary interest that was the legitimate source of 
contractual protection post-employment. 
 As in previous decades, a restrictive covenant against competition or solicitation could be enforced 
if the worker took client information in physical form. Rather than focusing on the dishonesty 
involved in doing so, as in the past, the courts were now more concerned with the effect on 
business’ goodwill and trade connections of using such information.48  In Creditel of Canada v. 
Faultless et al the court held that the employer had established a prima facie special interest in the 
goodwill that resulted from the rapport built by the employees in their interactions with clients.49 
This was because “the defendant had taken or kept documents of the plaintiff, which were or might 
be of use to a competing company, with which the defendants took up employment, in obtaining 
customers from the plaintiff”. 50  
Trade connections were also recognized as an element of goodwill permitting for contractual 
protection in the absence of workers’ physical taking of information. In the 1973 decision of Jiffy 
Foods Ltd. v. Chomski a catering truck supervisor with a non-solicitation clause in his employment 
contract set himself up in competitive business post-employment, calling on his previous customers 
in the same area as his previous employer. 51 An application for an interlocutory injunction was 
initially refused, on the basis that the customers had not contracted with the employer, and 
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therefore the employer did not hold any proprietary rights over them.52 On appeal the Divisional 
Court disagreed however. The judges held that there was really no question but that the worker’s 
actions would cause irreparable harm to the employer, because the “appellant's business clearly 
depends upon the creation and servicing of sales routes”.53 The court agreed that the employer had 
no proprietary interest over its customers per se, but also held that it did hold a proprietary interest 
in the business’ goodwill, which was based on the development of client relationships. Allowing the 
worker to work for a competitor would threaten that goodwill, because the worker had enjoyed 
special opportunities to become acquainted with the employer’s customers and to acquire intimate 
knowledge of their needs. He had handled customers’ complaints and had personal relationships 
with them. To allow the worker to work for a competitor would effectively be to permit him to 
“appropriate [the company’s] goodwill unto himself”. 54 This, the court agreed, a restrictive 
covenant could prevent a worker from doing.  
In Herbert Morris and in Routh the courts had focused on whether workers were in a position to 
take advantage of special information regarding clients collected by their former employers. But the 
courts now also began to suggest that that the mere presence of former employees in a 
competitive business could damage the value of an employer’s trade connections. The issue was 
not whether the worker took advantage of special knowledge or solicited former clients, but rather 
that clients might be tempted to follow the worker based on loyalty alone, even in the absence of 
direct post-employment client solicitation. In JG Collins Insurance v. Elseley the Supreme Court 
explicitly acknowledged that protecting trade connections might require per se prohibitions on 
workers’ post-employment competition.55 The defendant sold his insurance business and was hired 
to act as its manager. There was a restrictive covenant in the sale agreement as well as a non-
competition clause in the employment contract. By the time the employee resigned from his 
employment, the sales covenant had expired, but the employment clause remained in force. The 
worker argued that there may have been grounds for the employer to protect against solicitation of 
clients, but that this was a bare restraint on competition, of a type that the courts had held 
unenforceable as in restraint of trade. The Court disagreed however. They held that the employer 
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held a legitimate proprietary interest in the business’ trade connections. While ordinarily a restraint 
on solicitation would be sufficient to protect such trade connections, the Court explained:  
[I]n exceptional cases […] the nature of the employment may justify a covenant prohibiting 
an employee not only from soliciting customers, but also from establishing his own business 
or working for others so as to be likely to appropriate the employer's trade connection 
through his acquaintance with the employer's customers. This may indeed be the only 
effective covenant to protect the proprietary interest of the employer. A simple non-
solicitation clause would not suffice. 56 
Here the worker was responsible for all client interactions for many years, through which personal 
relationships were established. Even though he did not solicit their business after leaving the 
company, at least two hundred clients followed him to his new business. The Court held that a non-
solicitation covenant alone would not have been sufficient to protect the employer’s interests 
because of the influence the worker held over the business’ clients. On this basis, an injunction was 
ordered restraining the worker from carrying on, being engaged with or having a concern in a 
general insurance agency for five years within the geographical ambit in which the employer had 
done business.57 
In other cases, however, the courts examined whether the worker had an actual ability to influence 
the client base before enforcing restrictive covenants.58 In Drake International v. Kollar, the court 
was of the opinion that the employment agency business at issue was not strongly dependent on 
client loyalty, because many of its clients simultaneously dealt with their competitors. This 
differentiated the case from Jiffy, and given that there was no particular company loyalty from the 
clients, there was nothing of value that the worker could interfere with by working for a competitor. 
On this basis, the court refused the interlocutory injunction.59 In Cradle Pictures (Canada) v. Penner 
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the court came to a similar conclusion.60   The employer had a business taking baby pictures in 
hospital nurseries. She employed the defendant to assist her, and to communicate with the various 
hospitals and troubleshoot problems. There was a non-competition clause in the employment 
contract. The employer argued that she held a legitimate business interest in trade connections, 
which the worker could undermine because he was exposed to her specialized know-how and had 
the ability to influence customers. The court agreed that there was a legitimate interest in 
protecting trade connections, but quoted the Privy Council’s decision in Stenhouse Australia Ltd. v. 
Phillips to explain the difficulties in drawing property lines between worker and employer in trade 
connection cases.61 The justices stated that: 
Leaving aside the case of misuse of trade secrets or confidential information ... the 
employer's claim for protection must be based on the identification of some advantage 
or asset inherent in the business which can properly be regarded as, in a general sense, 
his property, and which it would be unjust to allow the employee to appropriate for his 
own purposes, even though he, the employee, may have contributed to its creation. For 
while it may be true that an employee is entitled - and is to be encouraged - to build up 
his own qualities of skill and experience, it is equally his duty to develop and improve his 
employer's business for the benefit of his employer. These two obligations interlock 
during his employment: after its termination they diverge and mark the boundary 
between what the employee may take with him and what he may legitimately be asked 
to leave behind to his employers.62 
On this basis the court in Cradle Pictures held that only a non-solicitation clause was necessary to 
protect the employer’s interest in its trade, and that the non-competition clause in the contract was 
unreasonable in the circumstances.63  
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during his term as the plaintiff's representative.” 
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Underlying the growing legal recognition of an employer’s proprietary rights over its trade 
connections was the sense that the value the parties’ received from their employment contract was 
also diminished by post-employment worker competition in the service sector. As the Privy Council 
noted in Stenhouse, and as suggested in Cradle Pictures, in the service sector workers were 
specifically hired to develop client relationships and build their employer’s goodwill.64  If workers 
could control that goodwill and threaten it post-employment, then the employer would lose the 
value it contracted for through the employment contract. The worker would be able to leave with 
the very thing the employer had hired the worker to provide. In Jiffy the court noted that the 
worker was the “beneficiary of the goodwill generated by the appellant's efforts in setting up the 
route”.65 To allow the worker to work for a competitor would effectively be to permit him to 
“appropriate [the company’s] goodwill unto himself”. 66 Indeed, in some cases the issue was that 
the employees themselves constituted the business goodwill.67 In DCF v. Gellman the court 
considered whether a group of workers could be restrained from starting their own competing 
company in the absence of non-competition restrictive covenants.68 Prior to leaving their employer 
and starting their own company, the workers had come together to make a purchase offer to the 
employer. The court noted that: 
The evidence indicates that the defendants, in offering to purchase the business, 
deliberately refrained from placing any value on good will because as more than one of 
them stated in the course of the evidence or on their examinations for discovery, that would 
in effect be purchasing themselves. In other words, they were fully conscious of the fact 
that their personal abilities represented the only commodity the plaintiff corporations had 
for sale […].69 
 
The idea that the employment contract constituted a purchase of a worker’s skill and efforts to 
develop client relationships could have brought restrictive covenant cases in service employment 
into close alignment with the jurisprudence regarding restrictive covenants in the sale of a business 
or goodwill. The courts understood such transactions as involving the buyer’s purchase of the 
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 Stenhouse, supra note 62; Cradle Pictures, supra note 60. 
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 Jiffy Foods supra note 51 at para 9. 
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 DCF Systems Ltd. v. Gellman (1978), 41 C.P.R. (2d) 145 [DCF Systems] 
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director who left with the workers, and found him in breach of fiduciary duty. 
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 DCF Systems ibid at para 51. 
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goodwill or client relationships from the seller, for which the seller could negotiate compensation 
for the agreement not to compete or solicit post-sale. Such a covenant was logical because without 
it the seller could undermine the value of buyer’s purchase. In JG Collins the Supreme Court 
explained that: ` 
A person seeking to sell his business might find himself with an unsaleable commodity if 
denied the right to assure the purchaser that he, the vendor, would not later enter into 
competition. Difficulty lies in definition of the time during which, and the area within which, 
the non-competitive covenant is to operate, but if these are reasonable, the courts will 
normally give effect to the covenant.70 
 
In employment cases the courts purported to treat restrictive covenants with greater suspicion, on 
the basis that workers did not receive consideration for the restrictions, and because the effect of a 
restrictive covenant could be to render a worker incapable of working in their field and in their 
town of residence, which was a very high price to pay.  In JG Collins the Court went on to explain 
that 
A different situation, at least in theory, obtains in the negotiation of a contract of 
employment where an imbalance of bargaining power may lead to oppression and a denial 
of the right of the employee to exploit, following termination of employment, in the public 
interest and in his own interest, knowledge and skills obtained during employment.71 
 
 But once the courts began to view the value of service-related businesses as the development of 
goodwill and client relationships, and to conceive of the employment contract as the purchase a 
worker’s time, skill and service to develop that goodwill and relationships, the suggestion was that 
post-employment competition, like post-sale competition, undermined the value of the employer’s 
initial purchase, and therefore the concern for workers’ ability to work and offer their skills to the 
community began to abate. While in practice the two areas were on a path to conceptual 
alignment, the courts nonetheless continued to profess their adherence to the idea that restrictive 
covenants in employment should be more strictly construed than those associated with the sale of 
a business.  
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(b) Confidential Information: The Common Law’s Protections Against Workers’ Competitive 
Advantage 
In the 1960s and 1970s there were five reported confidential information and trade secrets claims 
at common law72, and two reported claims for the enforcement of secrecy agreements73. During 
this period the rules pertaining to protecting trade secrets and confidential information remained 
largely intact, but their rationale began to change. As with restrictive covenants, the courts were 
now concerned to prevent workers from taking advantage of opportunities that arose through 
employment to the detriment of their employers, but also to the detriment of general business 
interests. 
In the 1940s and 1950s the courts in Ontario had provided definitional clarity to the difference 
between a trade secret and confidential information – a distinction that applied at common law and 
as regards restrictive covenants.  In R.I. Crain v. Ashton, the Ontario High Court of Justice held that a 
trade secret was a process, formula, pattern, etc.74 The process or formula had to maintain a 
necessary indicia of secrecy, such that its details were guarded and its confidentiality made clear to 
employees. A trade secret differed from a patent insofar as it lost the protection of the law once it 
had been discovered, or could be discovered by examination. Thus, once a product was on the 
market and the methods for its creation and reproduction were discernible by analysis, it was no 
longer considered a trade secret. By contrast, protection of confidential information could include 
information which was in the public domain, but was assembled by some effort of the claimant. In 
the English case of Saltman Engineering the Court of Appeal explained that: 
It is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a formula, a plan, a sketch, or 
something of that kind, which is the result of work done by the maker upon materials which 
may be available for the use of anybody; but what makes it confidential is the fact that the 
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maker of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be 
produced by somebody who goes through the same process.75 
This was simply a restating of the older notion of “objective knowledge”, which had determined 
what an employee could and could not use or divulge post-employment, based on their implied 
duty of confidentiality. After Saltman Engineering was decided in 1948 the courts increasingly 
suggested that confidential information was not solely information that retained value by virtue of 
its scarcity, or because it was the source of an employer’s proprietary right. Rather, in the 1960s 
and 1970s the courts began to suggest that confidential information was any information that an 
employee could use to an employer’s detriment post-employment. The protection of confidential 
information, by this logic, was less about protecting confidentiality and more about protecting an 
employer from a former employee’s use of work-related information to develop a competitive 
advantage.  
In the 1966 Supreme Court decision in Pre-Cam Exploration & Development Ltd. v. McTavish a 
worker was employed to inspect certain mining prospects for a client of his employer.76 In the 
course of that work he discovered a valuable mining site adjacent to the one he had been asked to 
investigate. He did not report this to employer, but instead resigned and staked the sites for 
himself. The Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench held that the worker had perpetrated a fraud on his 
employer, and therefore that the claims were to be transferred to the employer’s client. The Court 
of Appeal disagreed. The court focused on what he had been contracted to do. He was engaged to 
operate certain machinery and record certain readings at particular mine sites.  According to the 
Court of Appeal, he was not hired to find valuable mining sites adjacent to the ones already claimed 
by the employer. He performed the services he was hired for, and thereafter resigned. The 
information regarding the mining claims was not confidential in nature, and he was not told to treat 
it as such. The worker therefore performed his contractual obligations, so that any other duty he 
might be under to his employer could arise only by way of fiduciary duty, which the Court of Appeal 
declined to find in this case.77 The Supreme Court of Canada came to a different conclusion, holding 
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 Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd et al v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. (1948), 65 RPC 203 reprinted in [1963] 3 All ER 
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that the worker held the mining claims in trust for his employer. The Court held that the employee 
McTavish was only able to stake the claims on the basis of highly confidential information he had 
acquired in employment, and that there was an implied term of his employment contract that he 
could not use such information for himself, during or post-employment. The Court did not explain 
what information was confidential or why it was so. But the justices clearly felt that the worker had 
taken advantage of an opportunity that he gained solely from his employment to the detriment of 
his employer, and this he should not be permitted to do. 78   
The idea that workers should be precluded from taking advantage of opportunities that arose 
through employment was rendered explicit in the late 1970s. The Ontario courts initially applied the 
1960 English decision of Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd et al in 1979.79 In Terrapin 
the court granted an interlocutory injunction against the use by former employees of a set of 
building plans.80 The employees claimed that the information was no longer confidential because 
once the plaintiffs built the buildings, their methods were discernible and in the public realm. This 
argument was in keeping with earlier ideas about confidential information, but was now rejected. 
Roxburgh J. held that if the information was confidential when acquired, it could not be used by 
workers even after it became available to the public. The reason to enjoin the use of confidential 
information was to restrict the holder of the information from using it as a “springboard for 
activities” to the detriment of its creator. Even where all the features were published and generally 
ascertainable, “the possessor of the confidential information still has a long start over any member 
of the public”.81 Roxburgh J went on to explain that in his view, this was “inherent in the principle 
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upon which the Saltman case rests that the possessor of such information must be placed under a 
special disability in the field of competition to ensure that he does not get an unfair start”.82  
Underlying the case law on information and competition over this period was the idea that workers 
should not be able to damage employers’ client relationships or reap the benefits of an opportunity 
for knowledge provided through their employment. This was based both on the specific nature of 
profit making in service sector industries, but also on the idea that the allowing post-employment 
competition could eliminate the value employers purchased from workers through the employment 
contract. The focus was wholly on the consideration employers sought through providing 
employment, with no complementary examination of whether workers bargained for more than 
wages in service sector employment.  A similar process was underway in regards to highly skilled 
knowledge work and corporate managers, but there the courts increasingly approached the issue 
through the purview of fiduciary duties, a subject beyond the scope of this research.83 In general 
then, the tenuous line that the courts had drawn between employers’ property and workers’ self-
ownership of knowledge and skill was all but gone by the end of the 1970s. 
(5) Wrongful Dismissal 
While property-related claims in the 1960s and 1970s often arose from short-term service sector 
employment, wrongful dismissal claims over these decades were brought primarily by workers in 
SERs. Between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s the average length of employment in reported 
wrongful dismissal claims cases was 2.75 years, with a median of 2 years. As Table 7 documents, in 
the 1960s, by contrast, the average was significantly higher at 9.6 years, with a median of 5.5 
years.84 In the 1970s the average was 5.4 years, and the median was 2 years.85 The number of such 
reported decisions grew over this period, starting slowly in the 1960s, and then rapidly in the 1970s, 
although the absolute number of claims remained relatively small. Moreover, the approach to 
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adjudication changed over this decade, as the Ontario courts established a number of significant 
precedents. For the first time they now engaged in-depth analysis of prior cases, and drew from 
precedents across the country. As a result the jurisprudential approach to wrongful dismissal began 
to diverge from that the United Kingdom, in part as well because of its adoption of statutory unjust 
dismissal legislation in 1971.86 While wrongful dismissal claims had always been brought mostly by 
upper status male workers in Ontario, by the 1960s this area of law became the almost exclusive 
purview of male managerial workers.87 Of the 17 claims reported on the merits in the 1960s, only 
three were from non-managerial workers. In the 1970s, of 31 claims, eleven were non-managerial.88 
The non-managerial claimants included sales agents, doctors, a radio sports announcer, a television 
host, but also a shipwright and a pipe fitter. Over these two decades only two claims were brought 
by women.89  
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Table 7: Summary of Reported Wrongful Dismissal Cases 1960-1979a  
Decade 
 
Total Claims Indefinite 
Duration 
Employment 
Fixed 
Duration 
Employment 
Unstated 
Duration 
Avg Job 
Tenure in 
Years c 
Avg Length 
of Notice 
When 
Awarded in 
Months d 
1960-1969 19 Total (4 appeals) =  
17 on the merits  
2 procedural WD-
related motions 
3 0 16 (but multiple 
year employ) 
9.6 years 6.8 
1970-1979 56 Total (5 appeals) =  
40 on the merits 
b
 
16 WD-related procedural 
motions 
13 1 42 6  years 
Median 1.6 
years  
8.4 
Totals 79 16 1 63 7.8 7.6 
a
 The cases are organized by decade of decision. The ‘appeals’ category denotes the number of cases decided 
within each decade that were then appealed upwards. Cases that were appealed are only counted once, in the 
decade in which the first reported decision was made. A case was classified as being of indefinite duration, 
fixed, or unstated, based on the court’s explanation of the nature of the relationship.  
b 
Decisions “on the merits” include motions which concerned substantive points of law. 
 
“WD-related 
procedural motions” are procedural motions arising out of wrongful dismissal cases, that did not involve a 
consideration of substantive law relating to dismissal.  
c 
“Average Job Tenure in Years” reports the average length of employment in the reported substantive 
decisions of the decade in question.  
d 
“Average notice awarded in months” reports the average length of reasonable notice where awarded in 
decisions decided in the decade in question. 
 
As workers and employers in SERs came before the courts in the 1960s and 1970s, they now 
presented the courts with an altogether different employment arrangement than in previous eras. 
Workers now moved within single enterprises through internal job ladders, and could be promoted, 
demoted, or transferred. Employers’ ability to unilaterally change elements of the job relationship 
thus represented a very different managerial prerogative than when employment was of a shorter 
duration within smaller enterprises. In this context the courts had to resolve tensions between the 
boundaries of the managerial prerogative and of a commercial contractual analysis of unilateral 
changes to contract terms. At the same time, in claims for mental distress damages workers asked 
the courts to acknowledge that job security was a part of the SER bargain. Instead the courts chose 
to develop an analysis of loss from dismissal that focused solely on the entitlement to reasonable 
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notice. The only place in which the social, psychological and economic significance of long-term 
employment would be acknowledged was within the analysis of cause for dismissal.  
(a) The (Re)Legalization of the Cause Standard for Dismissal 
Cause had been all but ignored in wrongful dismissal claims over mid-century, but re-emerged as a 
central concern in the 1960s and 1970s. In the few cases in which the courts spoke to cause in the 
earlier period, they had presented it as a question of fact, and applied it in a relatively categorical 
fashion.90 As of the 1960s, however, cause re-emerged as a central jurisprudential concern in the 
analysis wrongful dismissal. In the 1960s, cause was seriously considered in 9 of the 17 cases 
decided on the merits. In the 1970s, it was given significant treatment in 12 of out of 33 cases.91 
 The courts continued to cite the 1906 Privy Council decision of Clouston v. Corry for the principle 
that cause amounted to the factual existence of misconduct that was inconsistent with the 
fulfilment of the conditions of service.92 Because of the generality of this statement, however, they 
also began to look more closely at existing case law, and to analogize the impugned conduct to, or 
distinguish it from previous cases to determine the acceptability of the grounds relied upon for 
summary dismissal.93 In the late 1960s the courts began to cite the more specific standard provided 
by Justice Schroeder’s dissenting Court of Appeal decision in the 1967 case of R. v. Arthurs.94 In 
Arthurs Schroeder J. specified that: 
 If an employee has been guilty of serious misconduct, habitual neglect of duty, 
incompetence, or conduct incompatible with his duties, or prejudicial to the employer's 
business, or if he has been guilty of wilful disobedience to the employer's orders in a matter 
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 See chapter 3, supra note 128 at p. 164-166. 
91
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 Regina v. Arthurs, Ex Parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co., [1967] 2 OR 49 (CA) [Arthurs]. This case was not one that 
concerned wrongful dismissal at common law, but rather came before the Supreme Court on a motion to quash an 
arbitration award.  
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of substance, the law recognizes the employer's right summarily to dismiss the delinquent 
employee.95 
This was in fact the standard for cause first enunciated in England in the mid-19th century in Callo v. 
Brounker, and applied in Ontario into the early 20th century, but was cited by Justice Schroeder 
without attribution. The courts in the 1960s and 1970s used this standard to begin to flesh out legal 
principles to determine the existence of different types of cause, but they also, in some instances, 
suggested that some procedural requirements might be necessary before summary dismissal would 
be justified.  Thus although they continued to characterize “cause” as an issue of fact, in practice 
the courts in the 1960s and 1970s treated it as a mixed question of fact and law.96  
Employee disobedience remained one of the primary grounds for summary dismissal. If the 
employee refused a direct order, further analysis was seldom provided, as the courts shied away 
from interfering with the employer’s managerial prerogative.97 In some instances however, the 
courts were willing to question the reasonableness of the order itself. In Patrick v. Duplate, the 
Court noted the longstanding rule that “wilful disobedience to a lawful and reasonable order 
constitutes justification for summary dismissal”, and specified that the disobedience must be a 
wilful and deliberate refusal to do something the employee knows the employer wants him or her 
to do, rather than a mere act of carelessness.98 The court noted that there were relatively few 
reported cases that considered what constituted lawfulness or reasonableness as regards an 
employer’s orders, but also suggested that: 
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It seems clear that an order is lawful if it requires the servant to perform a task within the 
ambit of his duties under the contract of employment, or when it goes to the manner in 
which the servant is to perform his duties.99 
Given the more impersonal nature of corporate organization, and the nature of professional 
employment in business and service sectors, direct disobedience was relatively rare.100 Instead 
disobedience tended to be cited along with insolence101 or other misconduct to demonstrate the 
general problems with a worker’s character and his or her attitude towards their work.  
The ground of cause that gave rise to controversy most frequently was that of incompetence or 
inefficiency. The traditional analysis of competency concerned whether the worker misrepresented 
that he or she possessed the necessary skills to do the job. This was a formulation clearly related to 
skilled workers in the discrete employment relationships of the late 19th century. In the 1960s and 
1970s, incompetence was increasingly asserted to dismiss workers whom their employers felt were 
not sufficiently productive. The courts struggled with the issue because it seemed to pit the 
managerial prerogative against the long-term and changing nature of the employment relationship. 
On the one hand, the continued acceptance of the managerial prerogative led the courts to affirm 
employers’ need for business efficiency, and their right to institute policy changes and new 
methods of work, to which workers would have to conform. As Landreville J. stated in Ditchfield v. 
Gibson, “[i]t is not for the employee to persist in methods which, in the opinion of the new 
management, may be archaic and inefficient”.102 Nor was it the place of the courts to review the 
policies of an employer. On the other hand, how was efficiency to be determined in jobs for which 
no specific professional training was required, and where workers moved laterally and vertically 
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from position to position within the same organization? Was it to be measured only in regards to 
the current job assignment of a worker, or on the basis of their overall performance with the 
employer? The decisions on this issue demonstrated a growing concern for fairness to workers who 
had spent many years in different positions within an organization. 
The case law was clear that the onus was on the employer to establish incompetence. In O’Keefe v. 
HF Hayhurst Co. the court cited from Harris’ treatise and from the 1913 case of Carveth v. Railway 
Asbestos Packing that “more than mere dissatisfaction” need be established.103 The court in 
O’Keefe specified that competence could only be measured based on an objective performance 
standard. If the employer could not provide evidence of such a standard, or at the very least, a job 
description, no evaluation was possible and cause could not be found.104 This approach was applied 
in Kelly v. Woolworth, where a long-serving employee had difficulties delivering the desired results 
once promoted to general manager of a department store.105 The court, quoting from an English  
treatise, stated that “incompetence is obviously a ground for dismissal: indeed, incompetence 
resulting in failure to perform the duties of the service destroys the whole reality of the contract 
from the point of view of the master”.106 The author of the treatise noted, however, that the degree 
of skill and competence required of the employee would vary with the nature of the position, and 
as regards unskilled or semi-skilled work, incompetence would be more in the nature of neglect or 
disobedience. He also conceded that “[t]he difficulty lies in establishing the standard and in proving 
that the servant has failed to attain that standard”.107  
 In a number of cases over these decades the courts also attempted to introduce a warning or other 
procedural requirement before an employee could be dismissed for incompetence. In Ditchfield v. 
Gibson, for instance, the court held that where an employee was found to be inefficient, his or her 
faults had to be drawn to the employee’s attention and an opportunity afforded to correct them 
prior to dismissal.108 In Kelly the court hinted at the employer’s responsibility for not addressing the 
worker’s shortcoming once promoted, given that his lifelong career with the organization had 
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otherwise been unblemished.109 The court cited a 1972 Manitoba Queen’s Bench case where the 
court stated that “[i]ncompetence, of course, is a cause for dismissal, but hardly without notice, 
unless the incompetence be gross to the point where it merges with other factors of greater 
severity, which I do not find here”.110  The court awarded the worker twelve months’ notice, even 
while finding that there were grounds for cause.111 In a third instance, in Reilly v. Steelcase Canada 
Keith J. suggested that the maxim of audi alteram partem might apply to dismissals, obligating the 
employer to provide some form of procedural fairness mechanism to allow a worker to present 
their case before they could be terminated.112   
 
The general category of “misconduct” also continued to be good grounds for dismissal over this 
period, which could include behaviour outside of work.113 The English cases of Clouston v. Corry and 
Pearce v. Foster continued to be the leading authorities on this issue, such that any conduct which 
was prejudicial to the interests or reputation of the employer was considered a violation of the duty 
of good faith and justified dismissal. 114 The courts over this period, however, generally required  
proof of some specific impact on the employer’s interests, or a demonstration of actual prejudice, 
in order to support a finding of cause dismissal.115 
As this discussion demonstrates, in the 1960s and 1970s the courts were more willing to 
substantively analyze the behaviour asserted as cause by employers before upholding summary 
dismissal than they had been in previous eras. Within the wrongful dismissal framework 
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constructed over these decades, the analysis of cause for dismissal was the main jurisprudential 
location for engaging with the effects of job loss for long-term employees.  
(b) Internal Job Mobility and Changing Employment Terms as Contract Variation 
The contractual significance of changing employment terms became more prominent during the 
1960s and 1970s. Constructive dismissal and unilateral variations to job terms through demotions, 
for instance, was found in five reported cases in the 1960s and 1970s.116 The question of variation 
was tied to cause, because a change in working conditions by the employer could be viewed either 
as a reasonable order that required obedience, or as a material change to the terms of the contract 
requiring new consensus between the parties. More broadly, the issue brought into focus the 
uneasy relationship between the managerial prerogative and a contractual understanding of long-
term employment relationships. 
In Hill v. Peter Gorman the Court of Appeal in 1957 had held that an employer could not unilaterally 
amend the terms of an employment contract.117 The employer instead had to provide notice of a 
desire to vary the terms of the agreement; the employee could either expressly or impliedly accept, 
in which case a new contract would be formed on the new terms. If the employee refused, the 
employer could discharge the worker with proper notice. However, if the employer simply imposed 
the new terms, the worker could treat that as a breach of contract by the employer, consider him or 
herself dismissed, and sue for wrongful dismissal.118 Where employees remained on the job after 
new terms were introduced, they were usually treated as having accepted the variation, unless they 
explicitly and repeatedly objected.119  
This simple contractual analysis belied what was actually a very difficult and conflicted legal 
question. With the internal labour market structures set in place in the 1940s and 1950s workers 
increasingly progressed up the ranks within a single employer’s organization over the course of 
their careers, such that the nature of their responsibilities and their compensation changed over 
time. As corporate size and complexity grew, workers could be redeployed laterally, demoted, 
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promoted, and transferred to different offices and positions in Canada or abroad. The courts 
therefore had to determine how to analyze such changes in contractual terms - how to square 
notions of the managerial prerogative with the contractual requirements of consensus ad idem? 
The courts did so by attempting to delineate the types of job restructuring decisions which were 
within the ambit of the managerial prerogative, and had to be obeyed, and those managerial 
decisions which fundamentally altered the terms of the bargain, which required consensus. 
Interestingly in such claims workers sought the strict application of the contractual principles of 
consensus ad idem to argue for protection of their workplace interests. 
The courts addressed the question of contractual variation by drawing a line between demotions 
and transfers. Transfers were generally considered orders and valid exercises of the managerial 
prerogative, at least if without significant change to job responsibilities, salary or location.120 The 
Supreme Court in Filion v. City of Montreal considered the dismissal of a worker who refused a 
transfer to another division within the same department. The Court held that the employer was 
entitled to transfer the worker as needed, because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to impose a 
rigidity upon the administration of the Department which would be unjustifiable and 
unworkable”.121 This was echoed in Ontario in Canadian Bechtel v. Mollonkopf, where the Court of 
Appeal held that “[t]he plaintiff had no vested right in the particular job initially given to him. If the 
employer, although mistaken, acted in good faith and in the protection of its own business 
interests, the plaintiff would have had no right to refuse the transfer”.122  
Explicit and implicit demotions, however, were treated as fundamental alterations of the contract 
which the employee could treat as a dismissal. 123 Demotions need not be express, but instead could 
flow from organizational changes which adversely affected a worker’s status, even if there was no 
change to salary or job functions. The Supreme Court of British Columbia in Burton v. MacMillan 
Bloedel Ltd held that a corporate restructuring which placed a department head under the direct 
supervision of a Vice President effectively amounted to a demotion, rather than an instance of 
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wilful worker disobedience as was asserted by the employer. 124Although the worker would not 
have suffered a loss of income by the restructuring, he would have become effectively subordinate 
to another executive with whom he had had significant disagreements in the past. The court relied 
on O’Grady v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, stating that a substantial loss of prestige, 
embarrassment and humiliation would have attended this alteration of employment terms, and 
that the changes to the nature of his role amounted to a fundamental breach of contract.125  Burton 
was applied in Ontario to a corporate director who was given diminished responsibilities such as to 
constitute a demotion which he could justifiably treat as a dismissal.126 The recognition of demotion 
as constructive dismissal represented a degree of judicial acknowledgment of the significance of 
social relationships within the workplace, providing workers with a modicum of control over their 
workplace futures by permitting them the ability to refuse to endure its social stigma and sue for 
wrongful dismissal. The courts did not, however, elaborate a general rule concerning the scope of 
the managerial prerogative, nor did they explain the legal basis for its existence over this period. 
 
(c) The Legalization of Reasonable Notice:  Re-employability and Fairness  
Just as the courts struggled with using a transactional contractual frame to regulate long term, 
changing employment relationships, indefinite duration employment relationships also created 
conceptual difficulties for determining the damages that arose from wrongful dismissal. While the 
older presumption of annual or fixed term employment was abandoned at the turn of the 19th 
century, only in the 1930s did the courts begin to equate the absence of specified duration with 
indefinite duration employment, for which reasonable notice of dismissal was necessary, absent 
cause.127 But prior to the 1960s the length of reasonable notice was considered a question of fact. It 
is difficult to conclude, therefore, that prior to the 1960s the courts viewed reasonable notice as a 
form of protection for workers, or as anything other than a contractual assessment of damages. 
There was no obvious sense in the case law that there was a policy issue at stake in determining its 
length.  
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This began to change in the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s most employment relationships were 
described by the parties as of indefinite duration, and the analysis now focused on how to 
determine the length of reasonable notice.128  Outside of fixed duration contracts, in only 
Lazarowicz v. Orenda Engines Ltd, the first wrongful dismissal of the 1960s, did an employer argue 
that the worker was not under an indefinite duration contract.129 After finding against the employer 
on the question of contract length and concluding that Lazarowicz was hired on an indefinite 
duration contract, the court also examined how to determine the length of reasonable notice. To do 
so the judges canvassed the periods of notice awarded in previous cases, comparing the character 
of their jobs to that of the plaintiff in this case. The court noted that the plaintiff in Mitchell v. Sky 
was a vulcanizer, and received two months’ notice.130 The plaintiff in Abbott v. Guest was an 
engineer like the plaintiff here, and received four months.131 The court concluded that Lazarowicz 
should receive more than the vulcanizer, but less than the engineer in Abbott because he lacked 
Abbott’s managerial responsibilities. The court therefore awarded him three months notice, based 
on a comparison with workers of lower and higher status. This decision was approved on appeal to 
the Court of Appeal, but the court also specified that to determine the length of reasonable notice, 
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courts should examine what the parties would both have viewed as reasonable if they had turned 
their minds to the question at the time of contract.132 
While the Court of Appeal’s in Lazarowicz took a “contractual intent” approach to determining 
reasonable notice, the trial court was focused explicitly on social status, suggesting that the more 
‘important’ the job, the higher the notice award due.133 This approach was consistent with the 
analysis of notice and damages for dismissal in the early days of common law employment claims. 
In 19th century English cases lower status workers were often dismissible on notice of a length fixed 
by custom, such as one month for domestic servants, and three months for clerks.134 Upper status 
workers were presumed to work on annual duration contracts unless otherwise specified, entitled 
to contractual damages for loss of employment over the year-term, subject to mitigation.  The 
courts were explicit about the class-based nature of the differential entitlement to notice and 
damages, with custom in different types of work hierarchically ranked, with one month notice for 
domestic servants acting as the lowest benchmark.135  Fixing notice lengths and yearly-hire damages 
on the basis of status levels in the context of 19th century labour markets was premised on the idea 
that skilled jobs were fewer in number and harder to find than unskilled and semi-skilled work. A 
focus on the extent of workers’ training and skill might serve as a marker for both their social 
standing and chances of re-employment. In Ontario the length of reasonable notice was an issue of 
fact until the 1960s, rendering the bases on which it was awarded invisible on the face of decisions 
of the era. But in Alberta the idea that notice was to be at least partly determined by reference to 
the worker’s social class was clear in the early 20th century. In 1908 the Alberta Court of Appeal held 
in Speakman v. City of Calgary that reasonable notice would depend on the position in which a 
worker was engaged, their class standing in the community, having regard to their profession and 
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the probable difficulty they could encounter in finding comparable employment.136 This case was 
not cited in the reported decisions of Ontario until the 1970s, but it did suggest an approach to the 
determination of notice that continued to view class-standing as related to the employability of the 
worker.  
Just after Lazarowicz in 1960 the Ontario High Court of Justice articulated what remains the leading 
statement of law on the determination of reasonable notice in Bardal v. Globe and Mail Ltd.137 
There the court considered what length of notice was appropriate for an advertising circulation 
manager with 16.5 years of service. The court rejected the rule stated in the Canadian Encyclopedic 
Digest, based on the 1938 decision in Norman v. National Life Insurance, that six months’ wages 
was the maximum recoverable damages in indefinite hire contracts.138 Instead the court held that 
there was no fixed rule of law on the length of reasonable notice. In a much-cited passage, Chief 
Justice McRuer stated that “[t]here can be no catalogue laid down as to what is reasonable notice in 
particular classes of cases”.139 The courts, he stated, must examine the facts of each specific case, 
taking into consideration: 
[T]he character of the employment, the length of service of the servant, the age of the 
servant and the availability of similar employment, having regard to the experience, training 
and qualifications of the servant.140 
 In applying these factors to the case before him, Justice McRuer noted that Bardal had a lifetime of 
training in the management of newspaper advertising, of which there were few comparable jobs 
available in Canada. On that basis, he awarded Bardal one year’s reasonable notice.  
Justice McRuer did not cite specific authority for his formulation of the reasonable notice factors, 
nor did he provide an explicit rationale for its purpose. Based on his subsequent statement in the 
labour case of R. v. Canadian Pacific Railway decided a year later, he nonetheless clearly 
understood the very serious effects of the loss of employment for workers in standard employment 
relationships. In deciding that workers did not lose their employment at common law while on 
lawful strike Justice McRuer stated that: 
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If I were to come to any other conclusion […] an employer will be at liberty to lay down 
terms that employees could not be expected to accept with the consequence that if they 
went on strike they would lose all their pension rights, their insurance rights and seniority 
rights. To so interpret the law would destroy the apparent security built up by old and 
experienced employees and leave it subject to the will of the employer.141  
Still, recognition of the vested rights of long-term workers and of their difficulties in finding re-
employment was not made explicit in Bardal.  While it is now often said that reasonable notice is 
designed as a cushion to ease the financial blow of unemployment142, the courts in Ontario made 
no mention of ‘cushioning’ in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did they provide any other explicit 
statement of reasonable notice’s purpose.  
 
Courts in other provinces were also faced with questions concerning the purpose of reasonable 
notice, and how to determine its length. The Alberta Supreme Court addressed the question in the 
1966 decision of Chadburn v. Sinclair Canada Oil Company, canvassing jurisprudence and treatises 
on the issue.143 The court quoted from an 1876 Scottish decision in Morrison v. Abernathy School 
Board, where Lord Deas explained the purpose of notice as such: 
 
The object in both classes of cases is the same,—to give the servant a fair opportunity of 
looking out for and obtaining another situation, instead of being thrown suddenly and 
unexpectedly upon the world, with, it may be a wife and family to support, and no means, 
either from savings or otherwise, of supporting either himself or them. 
 
It is even more necessary that this rule should be applicable to the higher class of servants, 
such as managers and other officers of banks, insurance offices, railway companies, and 
many other companies and employers, than to those in an inferior position, because it is 
much more expedient and much more common that such persons should hold their 
appointments during pleasure than that servants of an inferior class should do so; and there 
is a more clear implication in the one case than in the other that a considerable period of 
employment is reasonably to be expected, although not actually stipulated for.144  
 
The court in Chadburn also referred to the English decision of Sowdon v. Mills, which had been cited 
in early 20th century Ontario, and treatises in the field for the proposition that wrongful dismissal 
damages were based on the probable amount of time needed before new employment could be 
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secured.145 The author Diamond concluded that the primary objective of reasonable notice was “to 
enable the servant to obtain similar employment elsewhere, or the master to obtain a servant”.146 
The court in Chadburn also referred to the factors laid down in Speakman in 1908, and to the 
decision in Bardal. But, the court held, “what is reasonable is in part founded on social and 
economic conditions of the time for the reason that these conditions would govern the opportunity 
of the employee in obtaining similar employment”.147 The court cited the Manitoba decision of 
Duncan v. Cockshutt Farm Equipment to hold that current economic factors should be used to give 
effect to changing economic conditions in calculating the necessary time for workers to find new 
employment.148  
Unlike the decision in Chadburn, the court in Bardal appeared to apply an analysis of the labour 
market prospects of higher versus lower status workers that dated from the 19th century. In the 19th 
and early 20th century differential compensation was based on the dual notion that higher income 
workers were socially superior, and therefore entitled to greater warning of dismissal, and that they 
faced a more limited job market. A similar analysis underlined the Bardal metrics, which appeared 
to focus on recognition of long-term service, and on using proxy measures for potential re-
employability, based on the factors of age, experience, training and qualifications. The Bardal 
standard was not immediately embraced by the Ontario courts, but was applied with increased 
regularity by the mid-1960s, and implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in DH Howden v. 
Sparling in 1970.149 By the 1970s, Bardal was cited in almost every wrongful dismissal case in 
Ontario where no cause was established.  
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The courts in the 1960s and 1970s appeared especially concerned to protect the interests of older, 
long-term managerial employees. 150 The decisions often focused on the degree to which a worker 
had invested in their employer, helping to build the organization’s success, only to be let go after 
many years of service. Such concerns were an implicit recognition of the nature of the SER, and the 
delayed investments and entitlements workers accumulated over their years of employment. In the 
1974 British Columbia case of Carey v. F. Drexel, the court noted that: 
An employee who has devoted a large part of his working life to a particular employer, 
working up through the ranks, developing expertise and knowledge in the affairs of his 
employer and enjoying the rewards of his efforts is placed in extremely difficult 
circumstances when he is suddenly released into the labour market. The level he has 
achieved and the specialized knowledge he has attained may make it extremely difficult for 
him to obtain other suitable employment.151  
This statement again reflects an understanding that workers acquired firm-specific knowledge that 
could not be traded on the open labour market. The courts also appeared to view higher income 
professional work as operating within smaller and more competitive labour markets than those 
resorted to by lower income workers. For this reason they suggested that higher status workers 
faced greater difficulty in finding new employment. This view was apparently shared by the courts 
in Ontario. In Johnston v. Northwood Pulp the Ontario court noted that an interim general manager 
who spent his entire working life in the lumber industry was entitled to 12 months’ notice, as 
positions similar to that from which he was dismissed were extremely scarce, particularly at the 
level of responsibility he held.152 The court went on to state that: 
He had been engaged for an indefinite period. In view of the success which he had with 
Eagle and the esteem in which he was held by the officers of that company, he could 
reasonably look forward to many years of profitable employment. This was terminated on 
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April 22, 1966, at which time he was approximately 57 years of age. This alone would render 
it difficult for him to secure a position in any way comparable to that which he had held.153 
Similarly in Cowan v. Sidsamhar Investments Ltd., a bar manager and head waitress were awarded 6 
months’  notice after being falsely accused of theft, on the basis that managerial positions were 
difficult to come by.154 In Thiessen v. Leduc, an influential decision of the Alberta Supreme Court, 
Justice McDonald held that a municipal chief police constable of three years was entitled to 10 
months reasonable notice. This was a lower amount than had been awarded to other managerial 
employees in cases from the 1960s and 1970s around the country, but the court noted that in those 
cases the workers all occupied senior managerial positions and had been in the employ of their 
employers for long periods of time, which justified an increased notice period.155  
 By the end of the 1970s, therefore, Bardal was the primary judicial statement on the determination 
of reasonable notice. While, in Ontario at least, this meant that the courts did not include labour 
market evidence and factors relevant to the current state of the economy, the Bardal factors did 
permit for some judicial recognition of long-term service, and it became standard to lengthen the 
notice award for long-serving managerial employees156. According to Geoffrey England, this 
amounted to bringing fairness in the back door.157  The length of reasonable notice terms ordered 
lengthened through these decades. Whereas the average length of notice between 1930 and 1959 
was 3.9 months in the reported decisions of that era, in the 1960s it rose to 6.9 months in the 
1960s, with a median of 6 months. By the 1970s, the average notice period rose to 8.3 months. The 
12 months awarded in Bardal seemed to operate as a benchmark for the notice periods of senior 
managerial employees, and the factors enunciated in that case allowed the courts a measure of 
flexibility in the way they determined what was appropriate in the circumstances. 
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(d) The Changing Nature of the Breach and the Unchanging Nature of the Loss in Wrongful 
Dismissal Claims. 
 
As a substantive approach to reasonable notice was elaborated in the 1960s and 1970s, a subtle but 
significant shift in the explanation of the contractual breach for wrongful dismissal occurred. The 
initial construction of the wrongful dismissal claim in the mid-19th century was based on a promise 
to retain and the promise to remain in employment, or Freedland’s second tier of promises, but 
those promises lasted only over the annual hire-fixed term contract duration. 158 The breach, in the 
mid-19th century, was of the promise to retain, and it was this loss that was compensable. The 
breach continued to be stated as “not allowing the plaintiff to discharge his duties” after the 
abandonment of the annual hire rule, and the failure to retain remained central to the depiction of 
the breach in wrongful dismissal claims into the 1940s.159  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Justice Rand, dissenting on other grounds, explained in the 1947 case of Cemco Chemical 
Engineering v. Snellenberg that “[i]t is the loss of earnings resulting from a denial of a right to use or 
commit his working capacity profitably that is the substance of his claim […].160  
But as indefinite duration employment became increasingly linked to reasonable notice dismissal, 
and as employment relationships lengthened in time and grew in socio-economic value, the 
obligation to retain slowly began to fall out of view. By the 1960s the breach in a wrongful dismissal 
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claim was increasingly presented as the failure to provide reasonable notice. In Bardal the Court of 
Appeal stated that: 
The contractual obligation is to give reasonable notice and to continue the servant in his 
employment. If the servant is dismissed without reasonable notice he is entitled to the 
damages that flow from the failure to observe this contractual obligation which damages 
the servant is bound in law to mitigate to the best of his ability. (my italics)161  
The court went on to say that the damages to be assessed were those which flowed from “the 
failure of the defendant to give a year's notice”, without mentioning any breach from the obligation 
to maintain in employment.162  The failure to give reasonable notice increasingly displaced the 
promise to retain as the basis for the breach in a wrongful dismissal claim. However, the same 
failure also served to narrow the understanding of loss from wrongful dismissal, just as the courts 
were confronted with increasing worker demands for recognition of the social and economic losses 
stemming from dismissal from long-service employment. Once the breach was solely from failure to 
provide reasonable notice of dismissal, the broad and multifaceted social, psychological and 
economic effects of dismissal were almost wholly obscured in law. Dismissal itself was no longer a 
legal wrong, and the loss of employment arose only from a failure to provide reasonable notice.  
Workers in the 1960s and 1970s also began to claim compensation beyond contractual benefits 
over the reasonable notice period. 163  This in part reflected the increasing complexity of 
compensation methods in the era of the SER, particularly for managerial employees. Compensation 
packages now routinely included such items as fringe benefits (medical, dental, life insurance), 
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pension plans, business expenses, share options, etc. But it also reflected the increased economic, 
social and psychological loss that workers felt as a result of dismissal.  Claims for reputational harm 
and mental distress as a result of dismissal poured in over the 1970s, and were resoundingly 
rejected by the courts in Ontario. To justify this rejection the courts resuscitated the 1909 House of 
Lords decision in Addis v. Gramophone, which had not been directly applied in Ontario in wrongful 
dismissal claims prior to the 1960s.164 One of the issues before the law lords in Addis was whether 
damages could be awarded for the “abrupt and oppressive” manner in which the worker had been 
dismissed, and for any losses he sustained by the reputational harm he then faced. Four of the five 
judges vehemently concluded that these sorts of damages were not available in a claim for contract 
breach. Lord Gorrell in Addis stated that he was “unable to find either authority or principle for the 
contention that he is entitled to have damages for the manner in which his discharge took place”.165 
The law lords suggested that compensation for reputational harm or for mental distress was 
punitive in nature and thus properly the subject of tort claims, not contract actions, because, as 
Lord Atkinson explained, “damages for breach of contract were in the nature of compensation, not 
punishment”. He went on to state that: 
In many other cases of breach of contract there may be circumstances of malice, fraud, 
defamation, or violence, which would sustain an action of tort as an alternative remedy to 
an action for breach of contract. If one should select the former mode of redress, he may, 
no doubt, recover exemplary damages, or what is sometimes styled vindictive damages; but 
if he should choose to seek redress in the form of an action for breach of contract, he lets in 
all the consequences of that form of action.166 
 
It was not entirely clear from Addis whether what was barred was compensation for losses that 
arose from the manner of dismissal, or from the fact of dismissal. Lord Loreburn suggested that 
both were precluded, stating that “[i]f there be a dismissal without notice the employer must pay 
an indemnity; but that indemnity cannot include compensation either for the injured feelings of the 
servant, or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that his having been dismissed of itself makes it 
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more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment”.167 As Mark Freedland has argued, however, 
none of the other law lords spoke to the losses that arose from the fact of dismissal.168  
 
As modern contract law was forged over the first half of the 19th century, with its theoretical 
reliance on individual freedom and privately negotiated terms, liability for breach of contract was 
said to lie only for those breaches that arose from the terms of the contract agreed to by the 
parties.169 This was distinguished from torts law as it developed in the early 20th century, where a 
duty was imposed at law to use care towards one’s neighbour. Based in law rather than in private 
agreement, torts law could award compensation for both violation of that duty of care, and punitive 
damages lay as a statement of opprobrium for egregiously wrongful conduct at law.170 But in the 
contractual context, where the rights and obligations were deemed to arise only from agreement 
between the parties, punitive damages were thought to amount to the imposition of a fine for 
“unworthy conduct”. Such a fine was then remitted to the plaintiff rather than the state, effectively 
over-compensating the plaintiff.171 Accompanying this theoretical difference between tort and 
contract liability was the idea that there was no moral wrong involved in the breach of contract – 
that contracts were impersonal transactional commercial relationships, and so long as the breach 
was financially compensated, no residual harm required redress.  
Freedland suggests that the House of Lord’s vehemence in Addis was motivated, at a narrow level, 
by a desire to limit the ability of juries to impose large discretionary jury awards for dismissal, as 
had been suggested by the House of Lords in Clouston v. Corry, decided a few years prior.172 At a 
broader level, Freedland argues that the decision was based on a move to entrench a transactional, 
commercial understanding of employment as opposed to a tort-based approach focused on dignity 
and personal obligation.173 This certainly complements the trend over the turn of the 20th century 
to formulate obligations between the parties to employment contracts as implied contractual terms 
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rather than as tort-based duties.174 But as the courts in Ontario turned to the question of 
employment damages in the 1970s, they did so in a very different context than had the House of 
Lords in Addis. The application of the limited damages rule in the 1970s occurred in response to a 
significant legal push towards providing some limited recognition in law of the expanded social, 
economic and psychological significance of employment that had been set in place during the post-
war period. 
 Considering the issue in the 1970s for the first time in Ontario, the courts refused not only to 
recognize losses that arose from the manner of dismissal, but also to acknowledge that dismissal 
itself could cause significant harm to workers’ ability to find new employment, even if this was 
plainly foreseeable and quantifiable. The courts over this period not only minimized the economic 
harm of dismissal, but by refusing to compensate for anything but loss over the reasonable notice 
period, they maintained the position that there was no minimal standard of treatment required of 
employers in the manner of effectuating dismissal. As appellant’s counsel later argued in the 1989 
case of Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, this effectively meant “that the law 
requires a higher standard of conduct from the tortfeasor, a stranger, than it does from the parties to 
an established relationship under a contract”.175 In circumscribing the scope of damages for dismissal 
in the 1970s, the courts explicitly refused recognition of the relational nature of the modern long 
term open-ended employment contract, in both economic and social terms. In so doing, they 
reinforced the legal view of employment as a depersonalized commercial exchange, rather than a 
highly social institution.  
 
In Ontario the issue of reputational harm and mental distress arose only twice in reported decisions 
prior to the 1960s. 176  However, there were eight instances of claims for damages for loss to 
reputation and for mental distress in the 1960s and 1970s, most of which arose in 1978 and 1979. 
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The question first received substantial treatment in Peso Silver Mines v. Cropper in 1966, when a 
worker responded to a claim by his employer for an accounting and payment with a counter-claim 
for wrongful dismissal.177 In trial judge in the initial decision found in favour of the employee, and 
increased the amount of reasonable notice awarded because of the manner in which he had been 
dismissed. This was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which considered such an increase in notice 
to be akin to punitive damages, which, they held, were not available in contract except in the case 
of a breached promise to marry, or in cases where there was an implied agreement not to harm 
reputation.178 The Court of Appeal’s holding was upheld by the Supreme Court, with very little 
commentary.179 Although not explicitly stated in Peso Silver Mine, subsequent decisions 
characterize it as applying Addis v. Gramophone to preclude compensation for reputational harm or 
mental distress.180   
 
Damages for reputational harm or mental distress were not expressly claimed after Peso Silver 
Mines until the late 1970s.181 But in 1978 and 1979 there were 7 reported decisions on the issue.182 
In McMinn v. Town of Oakville the High Court considered an appeal from a Master’s order to strike 
out certain paragraphs of a statement of claim for wrongful dismissal. 183 The worker claimed 
damages for wrongful dismissal and for loss of reputation, because the dismissal was publicized in 
the local newspapers, which, the worker claimed, harmed his professional reputation. The issue was 
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whether a claim for wrongful dismissal could be joined with a claim for damages for loss of 
reputation. The claim here was not compensation for the manner of dismissal, but for the effects of 
dismissal itself, that is, that the dismissal itself diminished the worker’s ability to find new 
employment. The court did not consider this distinction, however, and continued to treat the issue 
as one of punitive damages. It canvassed the decision in Addis, noting that it was still good law, and 
had found support from the Supreme Court in Peso Silver Mines. The court acknowledged that 
there was a separate category of cases which applied to employment contracts of artists, where the 
promotion of the artist’s reputation could be viewed as a central part of the contract’s 
consideration. In such cases, the claimant could recover damages flowing both from the breach of 
contract and from the loss of the opportunity to enhance his or her reputation.184 The court in 
McMinn attempted to distinguish this latter class of cases from ordinary wrongful dismissal claims 
on the basis that in ordinary cases damages for injury to reputation would not have been 
considered a part of the contract.185 Finally, the court considered whether there had been an 
erosion of the Addis principle in regards to compensation for mental distress.  In 1976 in Cox v. 
Phillips Industries the English Court of Queen’s Bench allowed a worker recovery for mental distress 
and vexation after a wrongful demotion.186 The court in McMinn held that the Addis rule continued 
to stand. Cox was distinguishable because vexation, distress, general disappointment and 
frustration of the plaintiff were within the contemplation of the parties to that contract, and 
therefore a legitimate head of damage. The court went on to acknowledge that while there had 
been a slight erosion on the issue of mental distress, the issue before it was reputational harm, in 
regards to which the law had not changed. On this basis, the court ordered the paragraphs relating 
to reputational loss struck from the statement of claim.  
The issue of reputational harm continued to be argued and rejected in the wake of McMinn. In 
Clancy v. Family Services Bureau the Court of Appeal considered an application to strike paragraphs 
from a statement of claim for wrongful dismissal.187 The worker in Clancy sought to enlarge the 
class of cases concerning artists by arguing that his dismissal denied him the opportunity to increase 
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his reputation as a debt/creditor counsellor.188 The court rejected the claim out of hand, stating 
that there was nothing on the facts to take this case out of the ordinary type of employment 
contract and place this worker into the artist category, and therefore loss of reputation was not 
cognizable as a head of damage. Again the Court of Appeal characterized damages reputational 
harm not as compensation tangible loss but instead as a form of punishment. 
Vindictive damages cannot be given in an action for breach of contract for employment. 
Damages cannot include compensation for the manner of the dismissal, for the employee's 
injured feelings, or for the loss the employee may sustain from the fact that the dismissal 
itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain other employment.189 
The following year in White v. Triarch, however, the High Court refused a similar application to 
strike.190 There the plaintiff claimed damages for reputational harm, arguing that on the basis of his 
relationship with his employer it was an implied term of the contract that neither party would 
improperly harm the other’s reputation. The court refused to strike out that part of the claim. The 
court noted that there had been a subtle change of late in regards to damages for mental distress, 
citing Delmotte v. John Labatt Ltd and suggesting that the law was not clear in regards to either type 
of damages.191 Following closely on the decision in McMinn the High Court had considered had a 
motion to strike out a statement of claim in the 1978 case of Delmotte. The court noted that the 
law was subtly shifting on the issue of mental distress damages in contract, and cited English and 
Canadian mental distress contract cases that had begun to award damages where the loss was 
attributable to a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach.192 The court distinguished the 
case at bar from McMinn and refused to strike out the claim, stating that the law was not so clear 
on the issue of mental distress that it should not be permitted to be adjudicated.193 The court in 
White used this shift in mental distress damages to suggest that it was in the interest of the 
common law for appellate courts to “consider afresh whether non-material elements of injury in 
breach of contract cases, including injury to reputation, may be the subject of compensation in 
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awarding damages for the breach”.194 No reported decision on the merits appears to have followed 
this case procedural holding however.  
What these claims demonstrate is that there was a serious push by claimants and their lawyers in 
the late 1970s to expand the types of loss compensable for wrongful dismissal. But courts instead 
sought to entrench a vision of employment as impersonal commercial transaction in the 1960s and 
1970s, explicitly refusing to acknowledge the social and psychological losses from dismissal in long 
term employment relationships, and limiting damages to the failure to provide reasonable notice of 
dismissal in the absence of cause.  But ironically, the refusal to recognize reputational and mental 
distress damages also required the courts to move the analysis of employment contracts further 
away from general commercial contractual principles. It required the courts to deny that 
employment security was a central part of the SER bargain, and to claim that, unlike contracts 
where peace of mind was the very thing contracted for, mental distress was not a foreseeable 
consequence of dismissal. 195  Moreover, unlike commercial contracts, specific performance was not 
available in employment contract claims, such that reinstatement was not available at common law. 
By the end of the 1970s, therefore, the wrongfulness/damages nexus grounded the wrongful 
dismissal analysis, rendering it wholly different from commercial contracts. Rather than evaluating 
the economic, reputational and psychological losses that flowed from the fact of dismissal, rather 
than ordering specific enforcement to remedy the loss from dismissal, the courts entrenched a 
limited concept of losses from dismissal based on the failure to warn of impending dismissal.  
(6) Rights Segmentation and Entrenching the Many Lives of the Contract of Employment 
 
With the proliferation of employment-related statutes in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts were 
increasingly called upon to determine the scope of statutory coverage, and their relationship to the 
common law of employment contracts. The result of both these processes was the development of 
general categories of worker-types, entrenching in law the labour market segmentation that had 
emerged in the mid-20th century, and reaffirming the common law of employment contracts as the 
residual category for regulating the work of non-unionized employees.  
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The common law of employment stood as the primary legal regime for determining terms and 
conditions of work in Ontario after the repeal of the penal sanctions of the Master and Servant Act 
in the 1870s. Work-related statutes enacted as of the 1880s tended to apply to enumerated types 
of employment, and therefore supplemented or amended the common law for those workers that 
fell under their coverage, rather than displacing it as the general regulatory frame.196 The courts 
tended to determine the scope of statutory coverage by assuming a difference between workers 
under “contracts of service” and “contracts for services”, a distinction premised on the English 
“control test” which examined the employer’s right to exercise control over the manner of work.197 
But they also examined the purposes of the particular statute and the wording of the application 
provisions.198  The Workmen’s Compensation for Injuries Act, for instance, applied to workmen and 
others engaged in manual work, but not to domestic and menial servants.199 The courts used the 
control test to determine whether someone was a workman or an independent contractor, and 
held that people under the latter status were excluded from coverage under the Act.200 But that 
was not the only operating distinction: where the courts thought the claimant was not an 
independent contractor, they went on to use principles of statutory interpretation to determine 
whether the claimant was of the type of worker covered by the statute.  
 
Starting in the mid-1940s, however, as the number of work-related statutes increased, the courts 
began to suggest that there was a “general” common law approach to determining employee 
status. This general definition was increasingly used to define access to statutory rights and 
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entitlements, while statutory purpose and specific definitions began to recede in interpretive 
importance.201 The courts suggested that the general approach to employee status was predicated 
on the notion of employer control, the 19th century English concept, although they also made use of 
a variety of newer variants, such as the Montreal Locomotive four-fold test, or the organization 
test.202 The use of a “general” definition of employee status was visible in judicial interpretation of 
labour rights at mid-century. After initially determining access to the federal Wartime Labour 
Relations Regulation 1944 based on whether the workers in question would benefit from collective 
bargaining, by the mid-1940s the courts began to suggest that, in the absence of a statutory 
definition of “employee”, access to the Regulation should be based on the definition of “employee” 
under the “general law”.203 The Ontario Labour Relations Act passed in the 1940s also provided no 
general definition of employee, but excluded managerial and confidential employees204, 
“professionals”205, domestic workers, workers in agriculture, horticulture, teachers, firefighters and 
police officers, and a variety of other governmental employees206. With a few exceptions labour 
boards and reviewing courts in Ontario concluded that independent contractors were not properly 
within the scope of labour legislation, and closed access to labour rights to all but those who met 
the Montreal Locomotive four-fold test, until the LRA was amended in 1970s to provide bargaining 
rights to an intermediary class of “dependent contractors”.207 Similarly, in the 1950s the courts 
drew on the “control test” and the four-fold to determine tax entitlements and obligations under 
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the ITA. 208  Using treatises on master and servant law, vicarious liability law and the interpretation 
of early 20th century British social legislation, the courts in the 1950s determined what constituted 
“income from employment” based on the distinction between contracts of service and for services. 
In the 1960s the courts also considered the availability of the wage recovery processes of the 
Master and Servant Act for managerial workers209, and who was an “employee” for purposes of the 
application of the new Employment Standards Act.210  
 
The Employment Standards Act defined an employee to “include a person who performs any work 
or supplies any services to an employer, does homework for an employer, receives any instruction, 
or training in the activity, business, work, trade, occupation or profession of the employer”.211 It 
excluded a variety of professionals, as well as agricultural workers, ambulance workers and 
managerial and supervisory employees from certain of its provision.212 The scope of the Act’s 
coverage was first litigated before the Ontario courts in the 1973 case of Re Becker Milk and 
Director of Employment Standards of the Ontario Ministry of Labour et al.213 There a referee, 
Professor Donald Carter, canvassed the definition of an “employer”, which specified that it was 
someone who had “control or direction of, or is directly or indirectly responsible for, the 
employment of another”. This suggested to the referee that the definition of employment seemed 
to “contemplate some type of control over the persons rendering service” 214. Professor Carter 
stated that the “control test is the traditional test used to distinguish between the employment 
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situation and the situation where work or services are supplied by an independent contractor."215 
He then applied the fourfold test from Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive to determine which status 
was held by the workers in this case.216 In a subsequent decision the same referee further explained 
his approach to the definition of “employee” under the ESA.217  
 
The definition of "employer" in the Act is potentially very wide, being couched in terms of 
control or direction of "employment" or in the alternative responsibility for "employment". 
A search of the dictionaries reveals that the term "employment" can be given a number of 
interpretations, including not only the notion of work or occupation but also the notion of a 
business. Consequently, it might be possible to construe the Employment Standards Act as 
applying to any situation where one person supplies any work or services to another person. 
The subject matter of the legislation indicates that the Legislature did not contemplate the 
regulation of the supply of services by independent businessmen but, rather, was 
concerned with those situations where the supplier of services was tied to another by an 
employment relationship.218 
  
Professor Carter’s concern was that the Act not be read so broadly as to include people who were 
not “truly” employees, but rather independent service providers.219 The Divisional Court agreed, 
noting somewhat indignantly that the definition of “employee” did not make any “hint of any 
reference to the well understood legal relationship of master and servant, nor to the similarly 
familiar distinction between a contract of service and a contract of services”.220 By the end of the 
1970s, the courts were relatively clear that the ESA would not apply to independent contractors, 
but only to those who fell within a jurisprudential definition of “employee”.  
Under all of these statutory regimes, each designed for a different purpose, administrative decision-
makers and reviewing courts in the 1960s and 1970s chose to draw from what was described as a 
traditional or familiar common law approach to analyzing legal concepts of employment and 
employee, in contrast to that of an independent contractor. But this “familiar approach” was forged 
in the interpretation of statutes, and common law doctrines, unrelated to employment, and thus 
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did not emerge from the common law of employment contracts. Indeed, the wrongful dismissal 
claim was not open solely to “employees”, as defined through the control or fourfold test. As 
previously detailed, commissioning and sales agents had brought wrongful dismissal in the first 
decades of the 20th century without controversy over their employment status. In fact, the Court of 
Appeal expressly declined to adopt the control test to determine access to wrongful dismissal 
claims in the 1930s case of Carter v. Bell.221 The Court explained that vicarious liability and its 
“control test” were designed to identify situations where employers were responsible for the 
workers’ acts, but that the question of entitlement to reasonable notice was based on the existence 
of an implied contractual term. The Court held that an intermediate class of workers might be 
entitled to reasonable notice of dismissal –  a class that looked much like the ‘dependent 
contractors’ initially excluded from the coverage of the Labour Relations Act – workers in long term 
relationships and economically dependent on a single contract or buyer.222 But starting in the 1960s 
the courts began to suggest that the control test might also be the appropriate for determining 
eligibility to bring a wrongful dismissal claim223, although the intermediary class of workers, in long-
term relationships with a single firm, continued to be entitled to reasonable notice.224 Thus by the 
1970s the common law entitlement to reasonable notice and the coverage of labour rights statutes 
were brought more closely into line – both excluding independent contractors but providing rights 
for dependent contractors. A more restrictive definition continued to apply under employment 
standards legislation, however, such that those non-unionized workers excluded from statutory 
coverage, by statutory exclusion or judicial interpretation, were left only with the common law and 
civil courts for the enforcement of their work-related rights, if they could afford it. 
 
In addition to considering the scope of statutory coverage, the courts in the 1960s and 1970s 
engaged with the relationship between the substantive terms of work-related statutes and the 
common law of employment contracts, and the question of which legal forum had the authority to 
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adjudicate and enforce different legal regimes. Together with the decisions determining the scope 
of statutory application, this line of cases served to entrench general legal categories of workers, 
and to assign them access to different types of rights regimes.  
Just as the scope of coverage of the Labour Relations Act was contested through the 1940s and 
1950s, the legal status of collective bargaining agreements and their relationship to the common 
law employment contract was also a matter of dispute. By the 1960s and 1970s the courts finally 
concluded that a collective bargaining agreement exclusively determined the employment 
conditions of unionized workers, rather than acting as an “appendage” of the individual 
employment relationship.225 By the mid-1970s, it was also clear that labour arbitrators had the 
power to enforce the provisions of employment-related statutes in unionized workplaces, although 
there continued to be some scope for claims before the common law courts until the 1980s.226 The 
effect of these decisions was to clarify that labour rights were available to “employees” under the 
supervision and control of their employers, and by statutory amendment in some jurisdictions, to 
dependent contractors. For such workers, once employed in a unionized workplace the collective 
bargaining agreement and statutory rights were the sole source of their employment terms, to be 
interpreted and enforced at labour arbitration. Unionized workers were now removed from direct 
regulation by the common law of employment contracts and the common law courts.   
Judicial decisions concerning the ESA went in the other direction however. A question arose as to 
whether rights created by the Hours of Work and Wages Act of 1944, the precursor to the ESA, 
could be enforced before the common law courts, rather than through its administrative 
enforcement mechanism. In the 1968 case of Stewart v. Park Manor Motors the employer argued 
that the statute created rights and remedies not recognized at common law, as well a process for 
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their enforcement, and therefore that that “procedure […] was summary and exclusive and ousted 
the jurisdiction of the established civil Courts”.227 The Court disagreed however, holding that the 
effect of the Act was to introduce additional terms of the employment contract, and those terms 
could be enforced by the civil courts in the same manner as any other term of the employment 
contract. The Court went on to state that its jurisdiction could not be ousted in this context except 
by a statutory specification to that effect.  In the 1970s a similar issue arose in regards to the new 
Employment Standards Act. When the Act was first enacted in 1968 it too did not contain a 
statement of its relationship to common law claims, but a provision specified that “no civil remedy 
of an employee against his employer is suspended or affected by this Act” was introduced in 
1974.228 In Re Downing and Graydon et al a worker had claimed to have been denied a fair hearing 
before an employment standards officer in regards to her equal pay claim. In finding that a full 
evidentiary hearing was not required before the administrative decision-maker, the court noted 
that if displeased with the results of the officer’s investigation, the worker retained the ability to 
seek recourse from the civil courts. The court quoted from Stewart, and cited provision of the ESA 
which specified that no civil remedy was suspended by the Act. The court left for another day the 
question of whether a decision to proceed in one forum could estop proceeding in another.  On 
review the Court of Appeal appeared to agree that an alternate civil remedy remained available to 
the employee, but disposed of the case on other grounds.229  
In Re Telegram Publishing, discussed above, the referee considered the opposite claim.230 The 
employer argued that the because the workers requested an amount in wages owing beyond the 
statutory maximum of $2000 that could be awarded in the employment standards forum, they 
should only be allowed to proceed if they gave up the right to pursue an alternative claim before 
the civil courts.  The referee concluded instead that the workers were free to pursue their claim in 
either forum, and that he had no jurisdiction under the Act to preclude access to the courts. 
Moreover, the mere fact that a decision-maker under the ESA could not award them the full 
amount of their claim was no impediment to hearing the case. Thus unlike the labour relations 
statute, the ESA was held not to create a separate holistic regime for regulating work, but rather to 
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act as a series of minimum standards, qualifying the common law of employment contracts, and 
interpretable by both administrative decision-makers and common law courts. 
Together these types of decisions and legislative choices set in place the tripartite structure that 
holds today for regulating the employment in Ontario. By the end of the 1970s the employment law 
of unionized workers was that negotiated through collective bargaining - contract type 1 - 
interpreted and enforced by labour boards and labour arbitrators. The law of employment for non-
unionized workers, however, was bifurcated between contracts type 2 and 3. Workers who met the 
definition of ‘employee’ under the ESA and other work-related statutes, and who were not explicitly 
excluded, theoretically had access to both the rights and obligations of minimum employment 
standards legislation and the common law of employment contracts under contract type 3. 
Everyone else - statutorily excluded domestic worker, intermediate agents or professional and 
managerial employees - all were regulated under contract type 2 and the common law of 
employment contracts.231 The common law of employment contracts continued to be only legal 
regime available to all non-unionized workers, the civil courts the forum in which to litigate all their 
claims, and the normative and conceptual content of the common law the main source for 
interpreting other statutory regimes.  
 
Thus over the 1960s and 1970s, by active legislative and judicial decision-making, unionized workers 
were removed from the direct purview of the common law of employment contracts, while the 
common law was further entrenched as the residual law regulating the work of non-unionized 
workers. This was not simply a ‘natural’ evolutionary process, or a gradual move from a unified 
common law of employment to a fracturing of regulation through the enactment of statutory 
regimes. Rather, a disparate set of statutory and common law regimes were unified through the 
creation of general categories of employment and standardizing the “types” of workers associated 
with different rights regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It is through this process, and at this time that 
contracts type 1, 2 and 3 were set in place in law in Ontario.  
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(7) Conclusion: The Hidden Choices of the 1960s and 1970s in the Shaping the Modern 
Common Law of Employment Contracts 
The 1960s and 1970s are the period in which the current law of employment contracts was born in 
Ontario. Over these decades the courts chose to entrench and flesh out a structure set in place in 
the early 20th century to regulate a wholly different labour market and economic context. They did 
so on their own, no longer relying on English jurisprudence, particularly as the United Kingdom 
moved towards statutory adjudication of unjust dismissal claims. As issues relating to the transience 
of service-sector employment and the long term duration of the SER were tested before the courts, 
the judiciary implemented a commercial contractual analysis to regulate the employment contract 
at common law. As in the early 20th century, workers and employers both sought to enlarge the 
bases of their property entitlements in employment over these decades. In property-related claims 
questions regarding the commodification of knowledge and service-sector work were debated, 
which served to grant employers proprietary rights over an increasing zone of workers’ intellectual 
and social knowledge. In wrongful dismissal claims the courts deployed a contractual analysis to 
depict changing terms of work in long-term relationships, while simultaneously narrowing the 
conceptual basis of the claim to focus solely on the wrongfulness/damages complex. In this way the 
courts not only rejected workers’ arguments for recognition of an expanded sphere of loss from 
dismissal, they also narrowed the legal analysis of the loss even beyond its early form. The result 
was an analytical structure which was entirely divorced from the realities of the exchanges and 
investments made by the parties to an employment relationship in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, 
despite the proliferation of employment-related statutes over these decades, the common law of 
employment contracts was further entrenched as the residual framework for the legal regulation of 
non-unionized work in Ontario, a structure substantively oriented to higher status workers, to be 
interpreted in the most inaccessible of all legal venues. As Ontario entered the 1980s, the number 
of common law claims would explode, making employment one of the most litigated areas of civil 
law. 232 At the end of the 1970s, as this story closes and as the SER began to lose centrality and 
decades of austerity began, the common law of employment contracts became the focus of 
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arguments over the relationship of law to labour market policy, a battle ground for notions of 
fairness versus efficiency, fought within an increasingly shrinking jurisprudential frame. 
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The story I have told over these pages concerns the evolution of the common law regulation of work 
amidst the emergence and entrenchment of white collar work in Ontario, changing forms of business 
organization, economic growth and periods of recession, the changing role of waged work in the 
structure of the province’s economy, its labour market and the lives of its citizens. It is the story of an 
area of law which, in Ontario, has been the dominated by male higher status workers – managers, 
executives, professionals and skilled workers. Finally, the last chapters have recounted a doctrinal story 
about the relationship between notions of property, contract, and time in employment relationships, 
and the ways in which the Ontario judiciary has given form to the legal regulation of work at common 
law in different eras of the 20th century. 
The traditional narrative in the field which presents the contractual regulation of work as a product of 
the 19th century provides too thin a description. Framing the common law of employment contracts as a 
19th century phenomenon is fundamentally a politicized claim, a way to highlight the continuities in its 
subordinating features with the law of master and servant, its relationship to classical contract, or 
simply its degree of rootedness in the legal order. But despite the courts’ insistence that the common 
law of employment contracts is of ancient origin, and that its doctrines are unchanging, this is an area of 
law that has shifted in significant ways over the 19th and 20th centuries. 1  As this study demonstrates, 
while many common law doctrines for regulating work emerged in the 19th century, they had 
fundamentally different premises which have shifted over time and in relationship with one another. 
The period between the 1890s and the end of the 1970s saw the emergence and consolidation of two 
different conceptual paradigms for regulating work at common law, and the current frame was 
assembled only as of the 1960s and 1970s. 
(1) A Synthesis 
As argued in Chapter 1, before the 1890s the courts in England and Ontario approached the common 
law interpretation of employment contracts in a manner closely tied to master and servant doctrines. 
Master and servant concepts were presented not as a particular body of judicially-constructed doctrine, 
but rather as the ‘natural’ description of the relationship between employers and workers. As with the 
‘status’ system of master and servant law, this meant that the terms of employment relationships were 
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primarily determined at common law by legal presumption, rather than agreement by the parties. The 
move from status to contract was based neither on the venue in which workers’ claims were litigated, 
nor in the source of law used to decide their claims, but rather in a slow process of revamping certain 
features of the employment relationship towards a loose notion of exchange, a process that had only 
just begun at common law by the turn of the 20th century.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Ontario bar and judiciary understood the common law of England to be 
the law of Ontario, such that the 19th century analysis of the contract of employment forged at common 
law in England was theoretically available in Ontario. The courts of Ontario courts drew solely from 
English precedents to determine the cases before them even after Confederation in 1867, with very 
little mention of decisions from the other Dominion provinces. Unlike their American counterparts, in 
the second half of the 19th century the local judiciary did not explicitly adapt English law regarding work 
to the needs of a colonial economy. Rather, the nature of the local economy was visible through the 
types of cases that were brought before the courts. 
 
As proposed in Chapter 2, a contractual approach to work regulation was constructed at common law in 
Ontario over the turn of the 20th century. This occurred as the province experienced its second industrial 
revolution, and at the very same time as the federal and provincials governments began to legislate in 
the area of labour rights and minimum labour standards. Contemporaneously, business growth, the 
separation of ownership and control of enterprises, and the professionalization of business 
management led to an increase in male white collar work, and it was this class of workers that brought 
claims regarding their employment contracts before the courts over the turn of the 20th century. As they 
did so the conceptual framework for regulating the contract of employment at common law underwent 
a fundamental reorganization.   
 
 At a doctrinal level the changes in the common law regulation of work at the turn of the 20th century 
were provoked by the abandonment of the presumption of annual hire in the 1890s, which coincided 
with changing legal understandings of property, time and the tools of managerial control in 
employment. The result of these changes was the first contractual paradigm for regulating work at 
common law in Ontario. Starting in the late 1890s the courts moved from assuming that employers held 
a broad property right of control over workers’ labour for the duration of the contract, to examining 
what types of labour service workers intended to sell for wages.  In this way the courts began to 
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deconstruct employers’ property rights over labour service into a series of discrete interests specifically 
exchanged through contract.  Over the same decades enterprises grew in size and scope, such that their 
management and administration were less often in the hands of business owners and partners, and 
were now undertaken by a growing class of male waged white collar employees. As the nature of waged 
work shifted to encompass a class of workers whose tasks were premised on the exercise of knowledge 
and discretion, duties that were previously limited to employers’ “agents” were now framed as general 
obligations of waged work. Rather than emanations of master and servant law, the duties of fidelity, 
loyalty, confidentiality and good faith thus became explicit features of the contract of employment in 
the early 20th century at common law. These new employment duties emerged to bolster the narrower 
contours of the duty of obedience which followed from the limitations imposed on employers’ property 
rights over labour service. Just as notions of property were in the process of change and the tools of 
managerial control were expanding, notions of time in employment were also reformulated. The demise 
of the annual hire rule in the 1890s ended the conceptual understanding of work as a time-bound 
relationship in law. This was of conceptual significance because employers could now dismiss workers at 
any time, so long as they provided sufficient notice. In practice however, indefinite duration 
employment did not immediately emerge as a legal presumption, but rather slowly began to take on 
conceptual prominence by the 1920s.  
 
By the end of the 1920s, therefore, the courts of Ontario had moved from a property-based 
understanding of employers’ rights of control and ownership over workers’ labour for the duration of 
the employment contract, to an approach based on the presumed terms of the exchange, in a 
relationship that was slowly recast as of indefinite duration, defeasible by reasonable notice. The basic 
framework for the employment relationship that was cemented over the turn of the 20th century 
continued to rely on a series of terms implied by law, but many of those implied terms were new to this 
period, and notions of contractualism arose to determine their limits.  
As explained in Chapter 3, by the 1930s the common law development of the contract of employment 
stalled over the mid-century decades. The number of reported wrongful dismissal claims was very low 
between the 1930s until the end of the 1950s, as the high unemployment rate of the Great Depression 
was followed the very low unemployment period of the Second World War and its aftermath. But while 
the common law of employment contracts was in stasis, by the 1940s the economy itself was once again 
in the midst of transformation.  Ontario’s labour market was now characterized by growing unionization 
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rates, federal and provincial interventions into the labour market and in social welfare programming, 
the lengthening of employment tenure, the standardization of workplace policies, and the emergence of 
internal labour markets within single enterprises. All of these changes occurred mainly outside of the 
common law of employment contracts, which was almost entirely unaffected over the mid-century by 
the reorganization of the labour market around the Standard Employment Relationship (SER). There 
were indications in the few cases litigated over this period of the changes underway in the nature of 
employment, and some suggestion of the legal issues the SER would raise, but the full character of the 
alterations to the nature of work would only come before the common law courts in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
The SER can be thought of as a sort of social contract.2 As discussed in Chapter 3, employers were given 
a free hand in organizing their operations, while workers in SERs were assured of long-term stable 
employment. For those in SERs, employment was an exchange of subordination for stability.3 
Employment security in SERs was made possible by the increased length of  job tenure, but also by the 
existence of a more precarious non-SER workforce, upon which enterprises drew to deal with short term 
fluctuations in their production needs. The relationship between employers, and workers in both SERs 
and non-SERs shaped the nature of the state’s responsibilities for the economic protection of its citizens. 
Employment would provide the means of long-term economic family support and permit the expansion 
of worker consumption and business profitability. Theoretically, the state would then assume some 
measure of support for those who fell outside of the protections of the SER. But when the foundations 
of this system began to fall apart, slowly in the 1960s, and with increasing impact in the 1970s, those 
employees in SERs who could afford to began to litigate their employment claims before the courts. The 
nature of the Standard Employment Relationship presented the courts with a fundamentally different 
type of arrangement than the shorter-term relationships of the early 20th century. Although the judiciary 
had long assumed that employers had the right to direct the workforce, they had never given that right 
much jurisprudential definition. But in vertically integrated enterprises operating with internal labour 
markets, employers’ were now moving workers amongst job tasks, across job units, and amongst 
employment locations. In this context the boundaries of the managerial prerogative were increasingly 
perceived to conflict with contractual principles regarding the alteration of contract terms.  
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 Alain Supiot et al., Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at p. 1.  
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As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the second paradigm for work regulation was thus established in the 
1960s and 1970s, which Freedland refers to as the “wrongfulness/damages complex”.4  More workers 
and employers brought claims to the common law courts through these decades, at higher levels than 
previously witnessed in Ontario. Employers were manifestly more successful in this effort, managing to 
entrench a broad zone of unilateral decision-making in the form of the managerial prerogative. 
However, the courts did not pronounce on the general scope of that prerogative. Rather, in practice 
employers made changes to their workforce and operations as they saw fit, which were only challenged 
where employees occasionally sued for constructive dismissal. The courts purported to utilize a 
contractual analysis to determine the line between the managerial prerogative and unilateral changes to 
fundamental terms of the contract, but articulated no over-arching legal basis for the existence of the 
prerogative.  
 
By contrast, workers were less successful in enforcing their part of the SER bargain. Through legal 
arguments and the personal stories they told, workers asked the courts for greater recognition in law of 
the social, economic and psychological investments they made in their employment relationships. They 
asked the courts to recognize that they had submitted to the managerial prerogative with the 
expectation of job security, that they put their time and effort into developing their employers’ 
businesses, and that dismissal consequently represented a loss of investment, identity, and of a valuable 
interest in job security. The courts responded, however, by narrowing workers’ entitlements upon 
dismissal. They did so by reframing the analysis of wrongful dismissal to focus solely on the entitlement 
to “reasonable notice”,  which became not only the time at which the relation to bout be terminated, 
but also the breach in dismissal, and the measure of damages. Thus, at the very moment when long-
term stable employment had become central to the employment bargain, the courts of Ontario 
abandoned the idea that employers make an implicit promise to retain employees in employment, and 
that dismissal represents a breach of that promise. The courts also refused to countenance the idea that 
psychological distress might arise from dismissal, and that it could have a serious impact on employees’ 
ability to find new employment. The wrongfulness/damages complex forged over this era resulted in an 
analysis in which workers were presented as contracting only for wages for services rendered, and for 
the promise of notice of impending dismissal. There was no longer any legal wrong in the loss of the job 
itself, and no compensation for the socioeconomic costs of termination.  At the same time, through a 
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series of jurisprudential and legislative decisions of the era, despite the growing number of work-related 
statutory regimes, the common law paradigm was further entrenched as the residual framework for 
regulating work for non-unionized workers in Ontario. Thus by the end of the 1970s a 
wrongfulness/damages complex was constructed in which employers held a free hand in managing their 
workplaces, and workers’ entitlements were conceptualized within a shrinking jurisprudential frame. 
Questions relating to property in employment declined in importance after the 1930s. The question of 
what employers bought through wages had seemingly been resolved by the emergence of long-term 
white collar employment within corporate firms. As discussed in chapter 3, the concerns voiced by 
employers in the early 20th century about the protection of firm-specific knowledge from disclosure 
were seemingly alleviated by the expansion of long-term employment starting in the 1940s. The nature 
of white collar work suggested that employers purchased workers’ time during a regular work week, and 
the product of their skill and knowledge over the work day. The issue was not so clear for work outside 
of SERs however. The confusion was particularly visible in restrictive covenant cases as of the 1950s, 
which often arose from service sector work. Service sector work complicated the analysis of the type of 
labour sold in employment, because it did not necessarily depend on producing tangible goods, nor did 
it always depend on knowledge, which the courts had increasingly commodified as of the 1950s.  In 
service sector employment workers were hired to develop relationships on behalf of their employers 
and to build client loyalty. By the 1970s the suggestion was that client relationships were akin to the 
physical or intellectual output of labour, the thing that workers were hired to produce, such that any 
worker action that could harm that product could be restrained by contract.  
The jurisprudential tale told above is one that has primarily concerned the work of male high status 
white collar employees. Over the course of the period of time under study, there were almost no claims 
by women or against female workers.5 Male managerial employees were the largest group to bring 
claims at common law over the course of the 20th century. Sales agents also often litigated their 
employment claims before the common law courts, as well as a variety of different professionals and 
skilled workers, such as physicians, machinists, and engineers. Managerial employees ranged from 
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 The following claims concerned female workers: Wall v. McNab & Co. (1903), 2 OWR 1128 [Wall]; Rutherford v. 
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senior executives of large companies, to managers of smaller enterprises, such as bar managers and 
store managers. The only place where lower status workers appeared with consistency was in restrictive 
covenant cases.  
 
Over the course of the period under study, therefore, the courts developed two separate paradigms for 
understanding employment at common law, both crafted specifically in regards to white collar work. 
The first paradigm was premised on loose notions of employment as exchange, a paradigm assembled 
as the courts shed some of the property-based features of master and servant law that provided 
employers with their broad right of control in the 19th century. The second – the wrongfulness/damages 
nexus - was constructed in the 1960s and 1970s, and was less concerned with the terms of the parties’ 
exchange, and more on evading the implicit bargain of job security that anchored the SER in practice.  
The second paradigm, reinforced by a series of judicial and legislative choices, constitutes the residual 
framework for assessing employment rights in Ontario today, even as the SER continues to erode in 
terms of its practical significance.  
 
(2) Two Methods of Claiming: Property and Contract In Employment 
The doctrinal theme that most clearly emerges from the historical trajectory of the common law of 
employment is the changing relationship between notions of property and notions of contract in the 
regulation of work. Employment was framed and reframed through the shifting boundaries of what was 
sold, exchanged, and created by contract regarding workers’ labour. To say that the common law 
regulation of work is premised on a changing relationship between property and contract is to point 
towards modes of argumentation, methods of claiming different types of entitlement which shift over 
time. Since the 19th century era of classical contract, a claim to contract was intended to signify two 
things: a claim to formal equality between the parties, and an assertion that any entitlements between 
them arise from agreement between them. The claim to a property right represents a deeper claim to 
an entitlement, usually based on a series of rights of ownership and control that exist prior to contract, 
and that can be displaced only by the express agreement of the ‘owner’.  In the context of employment, 
the entitlements associated with each rhetorical mode have shifted over time and in relationship to one 
another.  
244 
 
The critiques of regulating employment through contract discussed in Chapter 1 are formulated in a way 
that places more emphasis on issues of contract than property, but a closer look reveals that questions 
of contract and property are intertwined.6 The first critique rests on the idea that contract masks the 
economic inequality between workers and employers by presenting them as equals in law, as two equal 
sellers of commodities.7 The second critique is that the regulation of employment was, from its 
inception, never fully contractualized because of the baseline assumption that employers had an 
indefeasible right of control over the workforce.8 The existence of a managerial prerogative means the 
parties to an employment contract have never been equals in law, let alone equals in fact. Although not 
expressly articulated, property is essential to both of these critiques. The idea that workers and 
employers could be equals in law presupposes a legal recognition that workers hold a property interest 
in their labour power. The law must transform people’s physical and intellectual capacities into legally 
recognized commodities so that they may exchange them for wages.  Property rules define the 
boundaries of the labour power workers can sell, while contract determines the terms of the sale. Part 
of the story told here is about the process by which non-manual labour power was transformed into a 
property interest at common law. How have the courts conceived of workers as separate from their 
labour, and how did they define the types of labour that could be sold beyond physical work? How did 
contract facilitate and/or limit that exchange, and what rights did it create for the parties when the 
relationship broke down? Likewise, whether or not the parties are equal in law depends on whether the 
managerial prerogative is presented as a right of property or a right of contract. The courts’ have 
extended employers’ property interest in their enterprises to provide them with a managerial right of 
control over the labour they purchase through contract, which in turn has endowed them with the 
ability to make some unilateral changes to the employment bargain over its duration. But where the 
managerial prerogative is placed on a contractual footing, existing as an implicit part of the bargain 
between the parties, it is possible to present the relationship as one of formal equality. The two 
critiques of the contractual regulation of work are therefore inter-related. Constructing workers and 
employers as equals in law not only eliminates from view the vast power differential between them, but 
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also naturalizes the existence of the managerial prerogative, thereby hiding the constant but shifting 
tension between the property rights of employers and workers and the limits to their exchange.   
Focusing on the inter-relationship of property and contract in the regulation of work at common law is 
also fundamental to understanding why ‘contractualism’ has not always favoured employers over 
workers. Workers have asserted contractual arguments when seeking formal equality in law, usually as 
against employers’ property entitlements. But where workers sought recognition of the power 
asymmetry between parties, contract acted as a limiting device.  This can be seen through most of the 
debates and doctrinal changes charted over the previous chapters. The adoption of an intent-based 
approach to determining the property exchange in labour power in the early 20th century served to 
expand workers’ rights, by limiting employers’ existing property-based entitlements over workers’ 
labour. Similarly, in the 1960s and 1970s workers argued for the application of contractual principles 
regarding alterations of contract terms to limit the scope of the managerial prerogative. In both these 
instances workers sought to create equality in law by using contractual doctrines to limit employers’ 
rights of control. Employers have also deployed contractual arguments to insist on the formal equality of 
the parties, but this has usually been done to eliminate concern for the power asymmetry between 
them, and to ignore the ways in which that asymmetry affects the content of the terms of the 
employment contract.  
In a similar fashion, property-based arguments have shifted over time. In the early 20th century 
employers claimed rights over the totality of workers’ labour service, while workers claimed the right to 
sell different features of their labour power in exchange for wages. In restrictive covenant cases, 
moreover, the courts, held that certain aspects of workers’ person and capacities, such as skill and 
knowledge, could only be leased for wages, rather than permanently sold through employment. By 
contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s the courts sought to protect employers’ property in service sector 
employment by characterizing the development of client relationships as employer property, and as the 
very service which workers were hired to provide. In venues other than the common law courts workers 
in the 1950s and 1960s argued that they held a proprietary interest in their jobs, and/or in job-related 
benefits that accrued over the life of their employment.9  This analysis suggest that the 20th century 
history of the common law of employment contracts can best be traced by examining the shifting 
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boundaries and conceptual tensions between employers’ and workers’ property and contractual 
entitlements in the context of the work relationship.   
 
(3) Questions that Remain and Directions for Future Research 
 The research presented here opens up a number of lines for future inquiry. Some of them arise from 
historical questions that were beyond the scope of this project, while others can build upon its results. 
In the first category are questions about the 19th and early 20th century common law regulation of work, 
in England and in the Canadian colonies. Because the focus of this project was on the period between 
the 1890s and the end of the 1970s, I have relied on existing research on the 19th century English 
regulation of work at common law, and on secondary sources from the era, to draw together a coherent 
background to my analysis. To my knowledge there is no general study of the common law regulation of 
work in 19th century England. Rather, most studies focus on the historical trajectory of specific 
doctrines10, move interchangeably between master and servant and common law cases11, or, as I do, 
rely on 19th century treatises to determine the case law of that time. A more general study that 
examines what issues, and which workers were before the common law courts would help to advance 
our understanding of the different forms of work regulation in the 19th century.  
There is also a particularly intriguing question about the category of “agents”, which has potential 
implications for our understanding of the history of the binary divide between “employees” and 
“independent contractors”. Studies of the binary divide tend to focus on the ways in which the concept 
of “employee” was defined under different bodies of law, such as negligence and tax law, as well as 
different statutory employment regimes.  One result of the research presented here is to reveal that the 
courts have not policed the boundaries of the common law of employment contracts in the same 
manner as other areas of law, and the question of who is an employee has only arisen as significant 
since the 1980s in wrongful dismissal cases. The operative distinction in employment contract cases in 
the 19th and early 20th century, where it arose, was between “agents” and “servants”.  There is more 
research to be done on the evolution of these concepts, however, particularly in the 19th century, 
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because the distinction between them does not appear to neatly map onto distinctions between 
contracts of service and contracts for services, or employees and independent contractors.12 
This study has focused on the common law evolution of the contract of employment solely in Ontario. 
Another area of potential research is to examine the comparative trajectories of other Canadian 
provinces over the 20th century. Were there more or less reported cases in other provinces, did they 
come from the same class of workers, or was there regional variation in claim levels and the type of 
workers litigating their employment relationships at common law? Did other provinces also rely 
primarily on English case law until the 1960s, did they rely on precedents from other provinces, and/or 
did they innovate earlier in response to their own socioeconomic development? Are there differences in 
the substantive content of the common law of employment contracts in different eras in the other 
provinces? Answering these questions would provide a fuller understanding of the development of the 
overall shape of the common law of employment contracts in Canada over the 20th century. 
Finally, one of the most noticeable, if entirely unsurprising, aspects of the history of the employment 
contract at common law is the near total absence of claims by or about female workers.13 Over the 90 
year span examined here there were only eight cases at common law concerning female workers.14 
Instead where one did encounter women’s work was in quantum meruit claims for services rendered, 
which were beyond the scope of this study. These claims were brought by women for work within 
families, sometimes from long-term housekeeping and/or nursing or care relationships. While there is a 
significant body of research on the law relating women’s work and property in the 19th century, and 
after the Second World War, studying quantum meruit and wage claims over the first half of the 20th 
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century may add some insights to the history of the legal regulation of women’s work, both within and 
outside the family, in the early 20th century. 
There are other holes in our knowledge of the legal regulation of work in the early 20th century which 
may be more easily undertaken with this study now available. One such project would be to investigate 
how workers used the law prior to the mid-20th century.  What were the main legal claims workers made 
over these decades? Workers clearly did not use the common law of employment contracts with a great 
degree of frequency, but did they make quantum meruit claims, make claims before small courts, or use 
statutory wage recovery mechanisms, such as that under the Master and Servant Act? Did they instead 
primarily seek recovery for workplace accidents? Studying the court records of one geographic location 
might lead to some insights as to what areas of law were most relevant to workers in the early 20th 
century. 
 A second line of investigation concerns how and whether formal law affected workplace organization 
over the first half of the 20th century. Catherine Fisk has studied the effects on employers’ decision-
making of common law rules regarding workplace information by studying the human resource 
documents of certain high technology workplaces in the 19th and early 20th centuries.15 A similar 
methodology might reveal whether employers were at all concerned with employment rights and 
obligations at common law in the way they structured their workplace relationships. Similarly, what did 
workers understand as their workplace rights and obligations over the first half of the 20th century, and 
to what extent did that understanding affect their interactions in the workplace and their relationship to 
trade unionism? Was there a general perception of lawlessness, or that employment was at-will for 
lower status workers? Is this perhaps why statutory notice requirements were included in the 
Employment Standards Act in the 1960s? This seems likely, given the persistent discussions of the 
‘realities’ of at-will employment in social histories of trade unionism and in different labour-related 
decisions in the 1960s.16  
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This study also intersects with current attempts to map out the law of the labour market in the 20th 
century. As suggested in the introduction, I approach the common law of employment contracts as one 
regime among many that regulate the terms work. This is a descriptive, rather than a normative claim. A 
descriptive frame which broadens the lens of study to the multiple legal regimes that affect the 
employment relationship allows us to examine how the work relationship was imbricated in systems of 
social wage protection, and how individual employment contracts of type 2 and 3, human rights law and 
labour law, interacted with one another.17 A descriptive frame which includes all work-related legal 
regimes would enable us to contextualize their operation and inter-relationship over the 20th century, to 
identify points of conceptual overlap, tension, and/or isolation from one another, and to pinpoint how 
and where the overall system is breaking down.  The study presented here contributes to this project by 
adding historical knowledge regarding one important body of law that regulated the labour market over 
the 20th century.  
(4) Postscript: A Return to Contract, Or A Turn to the Common Law? 
Finally, the decline in unionization levels since the 1980s, the increasing centrality of non-standard work 
relationships and the dismantling of the welfare state have led to suggestions that we are in the midst of 
a return to contract in the regulation of work.18 As fewer and fewer people are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, and the nature of non-standard work has rendered access to minimum 
employment standards more difficult, the common law of employment contracts appears to be an 
increasingly central vehicle for adjudicating workplace rights in Canada.19 But if the common law is of 
increasing prominence, its centrality in no way represents a ‘return’ to contract. As this and other 
studies suggest, there was never a moment of pervasive contractual regulation of work in the 19th or 
20th centuries. The common law of employment was first given contractual shape in the early 20th 
century, at the same time as the federal and provincial governments began to actively regulate labour 
and employment rights in Ontario.  Moreover the current common law frame was constructed only in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, just before political and economic forces emerged in the 1970s and 1980s to 
ravage the regulatory power of labour law and the welfare state. Furthermore the current ‘turn’ to the 
common law is in no way ‘contractual’. Rather, the frame developed in the 1960s and 1970s appears 
designed to cabin workers’ entitlements within the conceptual boundaries of reasonable notice, so as to 
deny that employment security was ever part of the SER bargain.  
The judicial desire to preclude entitlements that founded the implicit SER bargain is visible in 
jurisprudential developments since the 1980s.Through the 1980s and 1990s the effect of corporate 
restructuring on employment relationships was increasingly before the courts. There was no direct 
challenge to employers’ right to restructure their enterprises; the issue rather arose through decisions 
concerning constructive dismissal.  By the 1990s the courts moved to present the managerial 
prerogative not as a loose property interest, but rather as a matter of contractual terms bargained 
between the parties. According the Supreme Court in Farber v. Royal Trust, the managerial prerogative 
was actually an express or implied contractual term, such that determining its scope simply required 
contractual interpretation. 20 By presenting the managerial prerogative as a matter of contract, the 
courts both eliminated from the view the underlying property control given to employers by law, and 
suggested that workers acquiesced in employers’ ability to make unilateral changes to the employment 
relationship. The courts did so, however, without acknowledging what workers might bargain for in 
exchange for that subordination.  
Instead the courts developed an increasingly narrow and conceptually tortured analysis of workers’ 
entitlement upon dismissal. In the 1980s and 1990s, in the midst of two significant recessions, some 
courts began to discuss the purpose of reasonable notice in policy-based terms, attempting to 
determine what the Bardal factors were intended to measure.  Were they designed to provide workers 
with a reasonable amount of time in which to find new employment?21 And if so, should employers have 
to assume the financial responsibility for the difficulty of finding new employment in the context of a 
recessionary labour market?22 Determining the purpose of reasonable notice seemed essential because 
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it otherwise held no objective meaning and related to no external phenomena. 23 At the same time, 
there appeared to be an emerging recognition in the early 1980s that some workers did actually bargain 
for long-term security in employment, such that dismissal would foreseeably cause mental distress.24 
But the Supreme Court pushed back both the attempt to conceptually define reasonable notice and 
recognition of mental distress damages in Wallace v. United Grain Growers. 25   
 
In Wallace a senior worker who was induced to leave stable employment on the promise of ongoing job 
security was summarily dismissed after nine years of employment. He argued for recognition of an 
implied contractual obligation of good faith in dismissal, reasonable notice, and for damages for mental 
distress.  The majority of the Court considered the issue of mental distress on the basis of aggravated 
damages, as required by their decision in Vorvis.26 There the majority of the Court had held that 
aggravated damages for mental distress would arise only when the aggravating conduct amounted to an 
independently actionable wrong. The majority of the Court in Wallace upheld the decision in Vorvis, 
because, they stated, “an employment contract is not one in which peace of mind is the very matter 
contracted for”, without which the question of foreseeability of mental distress was not relevant.27  
With this statement the majority explicitly eliminated the idea that workers contracted exactly for the 
peace of mind provided by long-term employment.28  
The plaintiff in Wallace also argued that the Court should recognize an implied obligation of good faith 
which would limit employers to termination for cause or for legitimate business reasons.29 The 
obligation could be framed as an implied contractual obligation or as a tort. The majority of the Court 
recognized this as an attempt to limit the managerial prerogative, and so refused the argument. They 
held that an implied contractual duty of good faith would interfere too greatly with existing principles 
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that permitted either party to terminate the relationship with sufficient notice, and would “deprive 
employers of the ability to determine the composition of their workforce”. 30 Moreover, such an 
obligation was unnecessary. Although aggravated damages would only be available where the impugned 
conduct constituted an independent actionable wrong, the reasonable notice period could be 
lengthened to compensate workers where the employer acted in bad faith in the manner of dismissal. 
This would permit for compensation for both tangible and intangible injuries that flowed from abusive 
conduct in the course of termination. This approach, the majority held, would respect the rule in Addis, 
because it would provide compensation not for the fact of dismissal, but for bad faith conduct by the 
employer in the manner of dismissal.31 The Court suggested that the Bardal factors were not exhaustive, 
and that others factors should be taken into account in assessing the length of reasonable notice, such 
as whether the worker had been induced to leave a secure position, and whether the employer engaged 
in bad faith conduct in the manner of dismissal.  
An alternative approach was presented by Justice McLachlin’s dissenting decision.32 She would have 
explicitly declared that reasonable notice was designed to help workers find replacement employment, 
because this rationale united the Bardal factors. Explaining reasonable notice as the time needed to find 
new employment meant that damages for wrongful dismissal would be correlated to the breach; it was 
the way to put workers in the position they would have been in if the contract had been performed. For 
this reason the manner of dismissal should only be considered where it affected re-employability.  “To 
include other factors is to consider matters unrelated to the breach of contract for which damages are 
ostensibly being awarded.”33 Secondly, according to Justice McLachlin, there were other ways to 
compensate for mental distress. Defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress claims were 
available in tort; negligent misrepresentation would be available where a worker was induced to leave 
secure employment. Moreover, it was time to recognize an implied contractual term of good faith in 
dismissal. This duty would not be as broad as argued by the plaintiff, and so would not impede 
employers’ ability to dismiss with the provision of reasonable notice. Rather, it would simply recognize 
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that the duty of good faith and fair dealing articulated by the majority amounted to an implied 
contractual duty, the breach of which was independently actionable and could ground mental distress 
damages.  
The majority decision in Wallace resulted in an approach to wrongful dismissal that denied workers any 
contractual entitlement to employment security or to a contractual analysis of damages for dismissal. By 
shifting the issue of mental distress damages into the reasonable notice analysis, the majority restated 
the issue from one of contract - from whether workers bargained for peace of mind and employment 
stability - into a question of abusive treatment and the feelings it provoked. The majority explained that 
the employment contract had unique features which distinguished it from other types of contracts; 
most important amongst them was the inequality of bargaining power between the parties.  This 
inequality rendered workers vulnerable, particularly at the time of dismissal. While the loss of 
employment was always traumatic, it was especially devastating when accompanied by an employer’s 
bad faith conduct.  By framing workers’ vulnerability as relating solely to the manner of dismissal and 
the feelings it engendered, vulnerability was transformed from a structural issue of wage dependence to 
an issue of employers’ conduct in the manner of dismissal. An obligation of good faith and fair dealing 
would be imposed to ensure that employers were truthful and sincere, “the breach of which will be 
compensated for by adding to the length of the notice period”.34 At the same time, moving mental 
distress into the reasonable notice analysis diluted the idea that reasonable notice was designed to 
provide workers with reasonable time to find new employment.  Reasonable notice now included 
compensation for breach of workers’ reliance interests, and for the mental distress caused by poor 
employer treatment.  As Lee Stuesser has argued, adopting this approach meant that the damages for 
wrongful dismissal were no longer aligned with the legal wrong.35 The wrong was failure to provide 
reasonable notice, but the damages now included compensation for losses not caused by the breach. 
The majority provided no general statement on the purpose of reasonable notice.  
The majority decision in Wallace has provided the basis for determining wrongful dismissal damages 
since the late 1990s. Although it seemed like a victory for workers at the time, it served to eliminate 
central features of the workplace bargain constructed in the SER era, and to narrow the conceptual 
playing field in which the rights and obligations of the parties could be contested. This narrowed playing 
field was, moreover, further reinforced as the residual site of workplace regulation in the 1990s. In 
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Machtinger v. HOJ the Supreme Court explored the relationship between the minimum notice periods 
required for dismissal under the provincial Employment Standards Act and the reasonable notice 
entitlement at common law.36 The Supreme Court held that where the parties did not contract for 
notice, or did so in a manner that contravened the ESA, the worker would be entitled to common law 
reasonable notice of dismissal rather than the statutory notice period. The reason to do this, according 
to the Court, was to incentivize employers to follow the law.37 But the decision also served to frame 
common law reasonable notice as workers’ default entitlement, the standing method of determining 
loss from wrongful dismissal. The result is that in the absence of a contractual term regarding notice of 
dismissal, workers under contract type 3 appear to be entitled to two minimum notice periods - one 
defined by statute and one at common law - but the difficulties such workers face in enforcing their 
common law entitlements renders the additional protection largely illusory.38 
The courts’ repeated refusal  over the 1980s and 1990s to render enforceable the promise of long-term 
employment was sufficiently successful that by the time the Supreme Court was willing to apply general 
contractual principles to the analysis of mental distress arising from dismissal in Honda v. Keays, it could 
in good conscience hold that the employment contract could not be one where the parties 
contemplated job security because dismissal “is a clear legal possibility”, given that an employment 
contract is “by its very terms, subject to cancellation or subject to damages in lieu of notice”.39 The 
implication was that an employment contract is definitionally ephemeral, and it is thus obvious that 
parties would not contract with anything else in mind. For this reason the “normal distress and hurt 
feelings resulting from dismissal are not compensable”.40   The structural limitations of the wrongful 
dismissal analysis was confirmed in Keays, the only entitlement is for an expectation of good faith 
treatment in dismissal, the breach of which will foreseeably cause distress and is therefore compensable 
where the worker can prove actual loss.41   
Given the courts’ refusal to enforce key features of the SER through a contractual analysis, since the 
1980s workers and scholars have also deployed property-related arguments to anchor claims for 
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employment security, often outside the boundaries of the common law. Some have argued that 
severance is a property interest that vests with workers on the basis of length of service, independent of 
contractual terms. In the United Kingdom, for example, unfair dismissal legislation was initially 
suggested to create a property interest in one’s job. 42  Property was also used as a rhetorical device to 
argue that wrongful dismissal could amount to an improper taking that should be remedied by 
reinstatement. 43 None of these arguments fared well before the courts, however, nor did they gather 
much academic or political steam. More recently the question of property in employment has re-
emerged in the 2000s in the context of corporate restructuring, vertical disintegration and capital flight.  
As noted in Chapter 1, over the last decade some scholars have sought to cast workers not as a fixed 
factor of production, but rather as long-term investors akin to corporate shareholders. This argument 
rests on labour market analyses, described in chapter 4, that suggest that workers invest in developing 
firm-specific knowledge for which they will not gain compensation on the labour market, and agree to a 
lower than opportunity wage at early stages of their careers on the promise of wage stability in their 
later working years.44 The argument is that workers’ investments render them akin to other residual 
corporate owners, and that their interests in the firm are on par with those of corporate shareholders.45 
This analysis is used to suggest that corporate directors’ fiduciary duties should be exercised for the 
benefit of workers as much as for shareholders, or that workers are stakeholders in the corporation, 
entitled to be consulted on large scale decision-making.46 The idea that workers are investors or 
stakeholders has largely been deployed within corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
conversations. This approach is not designed to alter individual relationships between workers and their 
employers, but rather to think about corporations’ general social and economic role, and to provide 
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conceptual and legal space to move corporate governance away from it perceived pathology since the 
1980s. One effect of this approach, however, is to erase from view the structural tension between the 
relative property interests of the parties in employment, by framing them as co-owners of the 
corporation. To the extent that employment is increasingly short term, it is less clear how much workers 
are investing in developing firm-specific knowledge or making other wage-based investments which will 
only vest in later working years. 
Thus to the extent that the SER is being displaced as the central paradigm for the organization of work, it 
appears that the implicit terms of employment bargains are also changing in many industries. Most 
workers no longer assume that they will have long-term jobs, or remain in the same line of work for 
their careers. Instead, the common wisdom is that workers have shorter employment contracts which 
permit them to develop skills, knowledge, and professional connections. Katherine Stone refers to this 
as the boundaryless career.  
A boundaryless career is a career that does not depend upon the traditional notions of 
advancement within a single hierarchical organization. It includes an employee who moves 
frequently across the borders of different employers, […]  or one whose career draws its 
validation and marketability from sources outside the present employer, such as professional 
and extraorganizational networks. It also refers to changes within organizations, in which 
individuals are expected to move laterally, without constraint from traditional hierarchical 
career lattices.47  
The key to this kind of movement, workers are told, is skills development and skills portability. The legal 
question is how and whether the courts are giving effect to this new bargain. At a narrow level, changes 
to the implicit employment bargain provoke questions about the analysis of post-employment 
restrictive covenants. To the extent that workers move in and out of jobs with a greater degree of 
frequency, and that professional connections and networking are central to workers’ career trajectories, 
it may be more difficult to determine what is employers’ property and what workers are entitled to use 
post-employment. More broadly it raises questions about how the courts understand the services that 
are contracted for, what is the product of labour power, and how property interests should be divided 
upon termination of employment. 
If the bases on which workers contract for employment are changing, there are also important questions 
about the types of labour service workers are selling. The centrality of service-sector work to the 
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Canadian labour market, the advent of communications technology, and resulting changes to the labour 
process since the 1970s raise increasingly significant questions about labour time, as the physical and 
psychological separation between work and personal life becomes increasingly ephemeral. Work often 
now takes place outside of traditional office settings and outside of fixed hours of work; many workers 
are now available to employers, co-workers and clients on an almost 24 hour basis through mobile 
internet technologies. This not only wrecks havoc with the traditional distinction between contracts of 
service and contracts for service in terms of managerial control, but it also muddies the analysis of what 
employers purchase through the payment of wages. For workers who must be available at all hours of 
the day and night, wages no longer seem like a purchase of time.  And if it is not a purchase of time, 
then how to determine what workers may do on their account? The prevalence of social media and 
internet technologies also confuses the boundaries between work and private life, because activities 
outside of work are now more easily visible to an employer. Employers are able to access information 
about what their workers do on and outside of work. Moreover, workers’ activities outside of work are 
now perceived to have a greater impact on employers’ reputation. A worker’s online opinions, even if 
entirely unrelated to the workplace, may be considered negative publicity for the employer, such as to 
either constitute cause for summary dismissal, or to provoke dismissal with notice.  
In this context, there remain fundamental questions about property in employment. The question is not 
only whether workers have “property” rights to their job, but of the nature of the labour power they 
sell, given the changing bases of value in late modern capitalism. Writers such as Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt, as well as Mauricio Lazzarato and Nick Dyer-Witherford have undertaken structural 
analyses of the phenomenon of “immaterial labour” amidst changes to the labour process since the late 
1970s.48 This work dovetails with feminist studies of emotive or affective labour, premised on care and 
relationship development.49 In the legal field the question of immaterial labour has arisen primarily 
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amongst intellectual property scholars in regards to the commodification of ideas and knowledge.50 A 
broader engagement with the law’s role in commodifying immaterial labour is necessary however to 
grapple with its relationship to the current operation of capitalist production, and to understand how 
the law separates workers from their labour power in non-manual work.  
To conclude, therefore, the current turn to the common law represents neither a move to ‘contract’ nor 
a ‘return’.  Rather, the common law of employment contracts continues to be developed just as the 
nature of work changes around it. The fact that its content is in the midst of change is of significance 
because the common law of employment is an area of increasing regulatory impact.  A narrative of 
“return” hides the fact that judicial choices are actively being made as to what the common law will 
provide in the context of work regulation. Such judicial choices are, moreover, of increasing importance, 
given that falling trade union density means fewer people are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, and the growing prevalence of non-standard work renders more difficult access to 
minimum employment standards. In this context the common law of employment is not only the 
residual category for regulating work, it is increasingly the main body of law that governs employment 
relations. For these reasons the development of the common law of employment needs to be subject to 
greater academic scrutiny.  But it is not only the common law’s expanded importance as a regime of 
work regulation that renders it important. Rather, because  the common law of employment contracts is 
primarily used by higher status workers with the most bargaining power vis-à-vis their employers, 
analyzing its structure is profoundly revealing of the ways the law constructs the employment 
relationship in Canada. By tracing the historical evolution of the contract of employment at common law 
we can see the political choices made in the boundaries built around the regulation of waged work, how 
and where judges sought to rhetorically align the employment relationship with commercial 
transactions, where property interests have been erased from view, and how the common law  was 
fashioned as both the naturalized framework for understanding the employment relationship in law, 
and as the residual legal category for assessing workers’ entitlements for dismissal. Observing the power 
disjuncture between higher status workers and their employers renders spectacularly visible the way 
that waged work has been constructed over the 20th century, and continues to be developed, on terms 
of structural inequality in law. 
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